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The Critical Ally: Coercion and Defiance in Counterinsurgency
Partnership
Abstract
In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under what conditions do in-
country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening forces and under what conditions do allies
dismiss foreign demands? By examining thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign
interventions in Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both
qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies to their in-country
counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-country allied compliance with (or defiance
of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of "power" in international relations and moving beyond
underspecified explanations of alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this
type of counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the study
argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign allied demands,
including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to implement the requested policy; 2) the
alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the capacity of the host government; 4) wartime
complications; and 5) the presence of an acute enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to
produce a complex set of incentives for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that
whether or not allied interests converge or diverge over a proposed policy interacts with the unilateral ability
of intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and the foreign ally
can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free-ride and is unlikely to comply.
Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the in-
country regime has an incentive to participate in order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting
unilaterally. Overall, the study found remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/
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THE CRITICAL ALLY:  
COERCION AND DEFIANCE IN COUNTERINSURGENCY PARTNERSHIPS 
Barbara Elias 
 Avery Goldstein 
In counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military interventions, under 
what conditions do in-country allies comply with the demands of foreign intervening 
forces and under what conditions do allies dismiss foreign demands? By examining 
thousands of primary source documents drawn from foreign interventions Vietnam, 
Afghanistan (U.S.S.R.), Sri Lanka, Afghanistan (U.S.), and Iraq, the study uses both 
qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze 460 specific requests from foreign allies 
to their in-country counterinsurgency partners, measuring conditions affecting in-
country allied compliance with (or defiance of) foreign requests. Revisiting definitions of 
“power” in international relations and moving beyond underspecified explanations of 
alliance politics, this study theorizes that certain structures inherent in this type of 
counterinsurgency partnership influence the behavior of in-country allies. Specifically, the 
study argues that five factors influence the likelihood of in-country compliance with foreign 
allied demands, including: 1) the potential unilateral ability of intervening forces to 
implement the requested policy; 2) the alignment of allied preferences over the policy; 3) the 
capacity of the host government; 4) wartime complications; and 5) the presence of an acute 
enemy threat. These variables interact with each other to produce a complex set of incentives 
for allied cooperation or defiance. In particular, the study argues that whether or not allied 




intervening forces to implement the policy. For example, if allied preferences converge and 
the foreign ally can implement the request unilaterally, the host ally has an incentive to free-
ride and is unlikely to comply. Conversely, if allied interests diverge and the foreign ally can 
implement the request unilaterally, the in-country regime has an incentive to participate in 
order to avoid being undermined by its ally acting unilaterally. Overall, the study found 
remarkable consistency across this subset of wars, with approximately 1/3 of foreign requests 
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 For domestic actors, losing a counterinsurgency war can mean losing power, 
livelihood, and possibly life altogether. Upon arriving in Kabul in 1996 the Taliban killed 
former pro-Soviet President Najibullah, while in 1975 the North Vietnamese put 
thousands from Saigon into notorious “reeducation camps.” These types of actions are 
not unusual in these wars. Insurgencies are often waged for control of the state, territory, 
and identity of the nation.  If victorious, insurgents rarely treat former officials with 
kindness.  
 In light of the ominous consequences of defeat, it is puzzling why at times we 
observe domestic regimes knowingly behaving in ways that are likely to undermine the 
counterinsurgency war effort. In Vietnam, for example, Saigon limited the strength of its 
army by resisting efforts to lower the national draft age from 20 to 18.1 Similarly, the 
Karzai Administration has refused to investigate brazen banking thefts in Kabul that 
have undermined national economic stability. And Baghdad resisted increasing funding 
to rebuild the city of Fallujah, a hotbed of insurgent activity that Americans feared would 
continue to destabilize Iraq without extensive development. What are the primary 
motivations for these decisions? Considering the potential costs of defeat and the 
pressure to perform on counterinsurgency tasks being exerted by allies, why not 
prioritize efforts to contain the insurgency above other interests? 
 Disregarding the policy goals of the ally can undermine the war effort, the 
strategic alliance intended to win the war, and efforts to ensure the preservation of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 After years of resistance, the Government of South Vietnam eventually lowered the draft age. Following the 
Tet Offensive (1968) Saigon decided it should fill in Army ranks by dropping the age of draftees. Meanwhile 




domestic regime. So why do it?  This dissertation gains leverage on this puzzle by 
answering the critical question: in counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign 
military interventions,2 under what conditions does the domestic host regime comply 
with the policy demands of their foreign ally and under what conditions do they dismiss 
such demands?  
 Building on work in international relations on alliance politics and coercion, I 
revisit debates in political science regarding definitions of “power,” and sort through 
thousands of primary source diplomatic documents from these wars in order to isolate 
demands from foreign allies and trace their outcomes and influences. Policymakers, 
historians, military strategists, and scholars frequently mention the political component 
of counterinsurgency warfare in passing, but it is rarely thoughtfully examined.  This 
study aims to flesh out one critical political element of these highly political wars: the 
alliance between intervening states and their host allies.  
This approach requires moving beyond the standard frame in the military 
literature of treating counterinsurgency (COIN) as a two-player contest focused on 
insurgent and counterinsurgent.  Existing models either fail to differentiate between 
counterinsurgencies with foreign intervention and those without, or acknowledge that 
there are different types of counterinsurgency wars, but largely assume the foreign state 
and the domestic regime cooperate seamlessly.  
 
 
     War 
Figure 1. Traditional Counterinsurgency Models—Two Players at War 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Large-scale foreign military counterinsurgency intervention is defined as a counterinsurgency with more 
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Figure 2. Revised Counterinsurgency Model—For Counterinsurgency Wars with Foreign 
Military Intervention, 3+ Players 
 
This project examines the darkened arrow on the left, the alliance between 
foreign and domestic counterinsurgents. A systematic study of this relationship is 
curiously absent from the prevalent counterinsurgency literature. This deficiency is 
surprising considering the extraordinary costs of these wars and of the importance of 
this alliance to counterinsurgency war fighting and outcome. High-profile 
counterinsurgency conflicts involving foreign military interventions, including Vietnam 
and Afghanistan (both the Soviet and the American experience), have been deeply 
frustrating for intervening forces. Superpowers have retreated from these wars and 
millions lost their lives in the fighting. Historical accounts of these conflicts are littered 
with anecdotes describing conflict between allies and the resulting potential impact on 













examined. As Robert J. McMahon wrote about Vietnam, “Although the nature of the 
South Vietnamese regime inspired a flood of polemical tracts in the United States during 
the 1960s and early 1970s, relatively few scholars have probed deeply into the underlying 
structure(s).”3  
Foreign militaries routinely criticize the shortcomings of their domestic allies. 
The Pentagon Papers documenting American involvement in Vietnam, for example, is 
full of details of South Vietnamese failures. “[U.S.] Colonel Sam Wilson was able to say 
plainly that the [South Vietnamese 46th Regiment] was poor and that its commander 
was ineffective and, without a doubt, corrupt. [South Vietnamese Major General] Ky 
explained that the commander in question was a close friend of the division commander 
who was a close friend of the corps commander who was a close friend of Ky. That 
seemed to explain the matter.”4 The commander was not removed. U.S. officials were 
frustrated.  
As this example illustrates, there are tensions in these alliances that can 
potentially influence counterinsurgency performance and war outcome. Ineffective 
commanders left in change due to domestic political connections could detract from 
effective force employment on the battlefield. Over time and across political and military 
institutions, these dynamics could influence who wins and who loses these conflicts.   
The Central Argument 
 Military analysts, policy makers and historians tend to attribute the wartime 
failures of allied counterinsurgency partners to the foibles of particular governments or 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Robert J. McMahon, Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays, 2nd ed. 
(D.C. Heath, 1995), 389. 




personalities. From the corruption of the Diem Regime, to incompetence in the 
Najibullah Government, and present frustrations with Hamid Karzai, commentators 
repeatedly bemoaned the presence of the “wrong” people in charge. These comments 
imply different individuals would have done better.  
This study takes a different approach. I argue dynamics in the alliance and war 
produce incentives or disincentives to cooperate with allies. The decisions of host 
regimes to behave in particular ways are, at least in part, rational responses to the 
presence of an intervening military. Specific policymakers are essential figures in the 
wars examined, but these individuals are making decisions within a specific 
counterinsurgency environment. The context of the military alliance and conditions of 
the war affect the decision making process, making certain decisions by in-country 
political actors more or less likely. This project identifies important elements of the given 
counterinsurgency environment and the influence they have on the behavior of in-
country regimes. Additionally, due to the importance of structural elements of the 
alliance and the war influencing behavior, I argue that similar patterns in compliance 
outcomes will emerge across this subset of wars regardless of regime type, military 
strategy, leadership personalities, financial investment, or the length of the intervention.  
Detailed explanations of the important structural aspects of counterinsurgency 
wartime alliances, that I argue influence the behavior of allies, are provided in Chapter 2. 
Briefly, however, I will summarize that this study holds that host allied regimes tend to 
either comply with, or defy, the demands of their foreign allies based on multiple factors 
including: 1) their short-term benefit from seeing the request fulfilled, 2) the potential 
capability of the foreign ally to implement the request independently, 3) the capacity of 




operating in a war zone, and 5) a substantial, acute enemy offensive that may restructure 
host regime interests, at least temporarily. In total, these five variables interact to create 
incentives for compliance or non-compliance with the requests of an intervening force. 
Keep in mind that counterinsurgency wars are notoriously complex.5 The 
importance of, and connections between political and military actors, variables, 
conditions and mechanism can be overwhelming. A 2009 PowerPoint slide was created 
as an attempt to illustrate the connections between dozens of the most important 
elements of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, including, for example, terrain, government 
corruption, tribal belief systems, tax revenues, Afghan popular sympathies, the 
experience level of U.S. soldiers, insurgent casualties, U.S. domestic opinion and 
perceptions of security. The resulting graphic was so convoluted The New York Times 
reported that although it intended to “portray the complexity of American military 
strategy,” it “looked more like a bowl of spaghetti.”6 This project examines one strand of 
counterinsurgency spaghetti, the relationship between foreign and domestic political 
allies and the tools available to each ally to coerce one another.  
Limiting this investigation to a small piece of the counterinsurgency puzzle does 
not mean the inter-alliance relations in question are simple. In fact, based on the 
evidence, I argue that variables do not always have a straightforward affect on the 
behavior of allies; they also interact with one another. In particular, I argue there is an 
interaction effect between allied interests and dependency on the in-country regime to 
implement the policy. Whether allies agree over the action requested, and the potential 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual. (University of Chicago Press, 2007), 26–
29; David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (Oxford University Press, USA, 2010), 3. 
6 Elisabeth Bumiller, “We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint,” The New York Times, April 26, 2010, 




unilateral ability of the intervening force to implement the request, if necessary, create 
specific incentives for in-country compliance with, or defiance of, foreign demands.  
Specifically I argue that when allied preferences diverge and the external ally 
cannot implement the request unilaterally, the local government is unlikely to comply 
with the demands of its foreign ally. Under these circumstances, foreign forces cannot 
undertake the action independently, and the ally it is depending on is not interested in 
seeing the request fulfilled. Unless other factors intercede, the request will likely never be 
implemented. On the other hand, if allied interests had converged over this request, 
compliance would be likely since the participation of the local regime is required to 
implement the policy and the regime would prefer to see the request realized.  
Conversely, when allied preferences align and, if necessary, the intervening force 
is able to undertake the requested policy unilaterally (without local help), the local ally 
has an incentive not to participate, despite its clear benefit from the policy, because it 
can wait out the foreign ally and free-ride off efforts of intervening forces. Lastly, 
divergent interests between allies combined with an independent capacity of the 
intervening force to implement the request, if necessary, actually promotes compliance 
from the local ally, because the regime has an incentive to participate in order to avoid 
being left behind, isolated, or undermined by its ally acting independently and 
implementing a policy it doesn’t care for. Even though the local partner is opposed to the 
request, it is likely to participate to exercise some control over implementation.  
Examples of the mechanisms and variables described are provided in every chapter and 
further specified in Chapter 2.  
It should be noted that because this study gets into the nooks and crannies of 




systematic analysis of materials detailing inter-alliance relations. To test the hypotheses 
proposed (also detailed in Chapter 2), I analyzed nine wars and gathered thousands of 
primary source documents to detail specific policy requests made from intervening allies, 
as well as the outcome of those requests. Due to the amount of information being 
processed, in addition to qualitative analysis of each high-level request made in this 
wartime environment between political allies, I also constructed a database of requests 
and outcomes to quantitatively test the theories proposed. This process is detailed in 
Chapter 3. The findings of this study are constructed around the 460 requests identified 
by intervening counterinsurgency forces on their domestic allies and the outcomes of 
each of those policy requests.  
Why Examine These Alliances?  
This study enables a more sophisticated understanding of a complex form of war 
that has real-world interest and application. Because I analyze the conditions necessary 
for a foreign ally to translate material wealth into coercive influence, the study is also an 
opportunity to reexamine concepts of “power” in international relations.  It contributes 
to greater understandings of alliance politics in international relations by specifying 
mechanisms that can cause alliance entrapment, and forces better specificity of variables 
frequently discussed in the alliance literature, such as “dependency” and “interests.”  
If the interaction effect I specify between interests and dependency-creating 
incentives or disincentives to cooperate is accurate, future scholars studying alliance 
politics will have better tools for analyzing inter-alliance coercion because they will be 
better able to specify when and why one partner (or the other) is likely to be influential in 
bargaining encounters. Currently the study of these issues relies on nebulous terms, such 




sometimes this matters and sometimes it doesn’t. The specification of the interaction 
effect offered in this study, on the other hand, better contextualizes the likely effect of 
“greater interest” on policy outcomes and explaining when “greater interest” is likely to 
be important and when it is unlikely to have effect at all on which partner prevails in 
inter-alliance bargaining encounters.  
The study is also compelling by specifically targeting dynamics in 
counterinsurgency conflicts. Despite the inclination of great power militaries towards 
conventional war, irregular warfare has become increasingly prevalent. In the Correlates 
of War database, Dr. David Kilcullen found that 385 of 464 (83%) of armed conflicts 
were considered civil wars or insurgencies, while 79 (17%) were coded as conventional 
interstate wars. “Indeed, though military establishments persist in regarding it as 
‘irregular’ or ‘unconventional,’ guerilla war has been the commonest of conflicts 
throughout history.”7  
And in these increasingly common wars aiming to contain insurgent movements, 
foreign forces have run into serious trouble.  By definition, as foreigners, intervening 
parties have difficulty establishing domestic legitimacy justifying their use of force. 
Before the Taliban killed him, mujahedeen commander Abdul Haq warned American 
forces this would be the definitive political dynamic for the U.S. in Afghanistan. Afghans 
“will fight. Despite everything the Taliban has done to destroy human rights, to destroy 
people’s health, education, their livelihoods, they will fight. Afghans will always unite in 
the face of what they see as a foreign enemy and this will help strengthen the Taliban.”8  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, ix–x. 
8 Keith Dovkants, “Rebel Chief Begs: Don’t Bomb Now; Taliban Will Be Gone in a Month,” Evening 
Standard (London, October 5, 2001), cited in Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic 




In other words, the very concept of a foreign military intervention provides a 
strategic advantage for local enemies of the intervention. In order to counteract this 
dynamic, intervening forces typically turn to domestic allies to help fulfill their policy 
agendas and legitimize their presence. But as documented in this study, this is also 
problematic. Foreign intervening forces do not always have the ability to compel local 
allies to follow instructions—yet a failing performance by this local regime can contribute 
to defeat. For this reason, examining the particular dynamics of counterinsurgency 
alliances is important. It will better explain important aspects of regime behavior and 
counterinsurgency war outcomes.  
This project is divided into nine chapters. As explained in the previous pages, this 
chapter (Chapter 1) explores the general context of the research question and the 
framing of the relevant issues at hand. Chapter 2 details the primary arguments offered 
and provides a brief literature review situating this study in the context of existing 
scholarship. Subsequent chapters test my theory while addressing alliance dynamics 
across specific counterinsurgency wars. Chapter 3 addresses case selection and 
methodology.  Foundations of the study are detailed including definition and data 
collection. Each chapter on a particular counterinsurgency war also has its own 
methodology section to discuss issues and sources of data specific to that conflict.  
In Chapter 4, I examine the U.S. war in Vietnam. Having identified 105 U.S. 
demands on Saigon, I find the proposed interaction effect between interests and 
potential unilateral ability of the intervening ally. In Vietnam, the Tet Offensive also 
provides a valuable test case for the fifth variable proposed in the study: the influence of 
an acute enemy offensive. I find the shock of the Tet Offensive provided powerful 




offensive not only refocused President Thieu on specific counterinsurgency tasks, but 
also momentarily shifted the behavior of South Vietnamese government (GVN) 
bureaucracies. Provoked by the fear of impending defeat, GVN employees accomplished 
multiple tasks that had previously languished for years.   
In Chapter 5, I study the U.S. in Iraq, identifying 106 U.S. demands.  The 
theorized interaction effect is again significant in Iraq. Additionally, there was an 
interesting dynamic in Baghdad’s response to American economic demands. Iraq’s 
historically statist economy conflicted with American demands for free-market solutions 
to development problems. This created a unique tension based on conflicting economic 
philosophies. Furthermore, Iraq was directly governed by the Americans under the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (March 2003 – June 2004). This period provides an 
excellent comparison to the Soviet takeover of the Afghan Government from 1980-89.  
 Chapter 6 explores the U.S. war in Afghanistan by examining 148 American 
demands posed to the Afghans. The hypothesized interaction effect between interests 
and American unilateral ability was again statistically significant, with an Afghan twist. 
Surprisingly, I find the Karzai Regime less likely to free-ride off American efforts when 
compared to other allies. The Afghans had a tendency to comply, at least in part, with 
U.S. projects that Americans could implement independently because Afghan officials 
saw these demands as opportunities to make money. In situations where other allies 
would have be inclined not to participate, instead opting to benefit indirectly from the 
unilateral actions of their foreign allies against their collective enemies, Kabul 
participated so it could tap into project revenues and better dictate which specific Afghan 




Chapter 7 addresses the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, exploring the 
dynamics of Moscow’s takeover of the Afghan state. Only 22 demands were identified, all 
made within the first 13 months of the nine-year Soviet intervention, as thereafter the 
U.S.S.R. simply assumed direct control over Afghan policy. According to the available 
documents, the Afghans agreed to all Soviet demands.  But despite this perfect record of 
verbal compliance, there was no increase in rate of substantive compliance when 
compared to other conflicts examined in this study. The Afghans appeared to always 
agree with the Soviets, without necessarily being able to fulfill their promises. This 
chapter also briefly discusses several other interventions instigated by authoritarian 
regimes, including Egypt’s involvement in Yemen, Vietnam in Cambodia, Cuba in Angola 
and Syria in Lebanon.  
Chapter 8 discusses the relatively short Indian intervention in Sri Lanka. In less 
than three years, over 1,150 Indian troops were killed attempting to implement an 
Indian-brokered solution to Sri Lanka’s “Tamil problem.” Again, the interaction effect 
proposed in this study was found significant in a statistical analysis of 79 demands from 
New Delhi to Colombo. This is a fascinating intervention due to India’s shifting alliances 
between the insurgents and government counterinsurgents. From 1983-1990, New 
Delhi’s allegiances alternated between belligerents in the Sri Lankan conflict, switching 
from arming, funding, and training Tamil independence groups to sending troops to Sri 
Lanka to suppress those same Tamil separatists. Indian soldiers were killed by militants 
Indian intelligence agents had trained and armed just years before. New Delhi sought to 
coerce the Sri Lankan Government into compromising with Tamil leaders by funding the 
Tamil Tiger insurgents (LTTE), while also attempting to coerce the LTTE by sending 




This overestimation of its coercive influence over all parties in Sri Lanka came at a high 
cost for India. The Indian mission did not succeed.   
Chapter 9 provides a concluding summary and thoughts on the potential impact 





THEORY, ARGUMENT, AND LITERATURE 
“The present GVN [Government of South Vietnam] continued, as they 
had so often before, to agree readily in conversations with us to the 
principle of national reconciliation; yet any concrete implementation 
remained elusive even through another top level meeting with the 
President.” 
 – The Pentagon Papers9   
 
 This study analyzes the decision of host regime allies in counterinsurgency wars 
to either comply with or defy the demands of their foreign allies. I argue that five 
variables explain variation in host regime compliance: 1) The short-term interest of the 
host regime in seeing the request fulfilled, 2) the potential capability of the foreign ally to 
implement the request unilaterally, 3) the capacity of the domestic regime to undertake 
the activity demanded, 4) complications from operating in a war zone, and 5) 
substantial, acute enemy offensives that may restructure host regime interests, at least 
temporarily. In this chapter, I define each of these variables and offer hypotheses about 
the influence each variable has in determining whether or not the host regime is likely to 
cooperate.  
The political dynamic of these alliances is complex. I argue that the variables 
identified in this study do not always have a direct impact on compliance outcomes. 
Instead, certain variables, like interest and dependency, promote or discourage 
cooperation when combined. This indirect pathway is logical, but not initially obvious. It 
has gone undetected by busy policymakers coping with these difficult partnerships and 
by academics who have acknowledged the importance of each variable, but have been 
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unable to specify how they interact. The chart on the following page explains how 
interests and dependency combine to affect the likelihood of domestic regime 
compliance with foreign allied demands.  
Table 1. Proposed Hypotheses on Interaction Effect between Dependency on the Host 
Regime and Allied Interests 
 
 Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power 
 
















   
   























I reason that if the interests of allies diverge over a given policy proposal, and the 
intervening state is not able to undertake the action unilaterally, compliance is unlikely 
(bottom, right box). Under these circumstances, there is nothing to motivate the partner 
to participate in a request from its ally that it would rather not see implemented. If, on 
the other hand, allied interests converge, and the host ally must participate in order for 
the request to be fulfilled, compliance is likely (top, right box). 
A reverse relationship is hypothesized when the participation of the domestic ally 
is not required for the request.  If allied interests diverge, host allies are likely (perhaps 
surprisingly) to participate, even though they disagree with the request (bottom, left 
box). These actors would rather contribute and gain a say in the implementation of the 




by their ally. Lastly, if the intervening force can implement the policy on its own and 
allied interests converge, the domestic ally is unlikely to comply (top, left box). It can 
instead free ride off the efforts of its partner, benefiting from the activity without paying 
the costs.  
Table 2 summarizes the primary arguments of the study based on these two 
variables (dependency and interest) as well as the remaining three variables (capacity, 
the wartime environment and a substantial enemy threat).  
Table 2. Summary of Arguments 
  
Conditions making 
compliance more likely  
 
 
















Divergent interests between 
allies and the demand does 
not require the participation 
of the domestic regime 
 
 
Divergent interests between 
allies and the demand requires 
the participation of the 
domestic regime 
 
Convergent interests between 
allies and the demand 
requires the participation of 
the domestic regime 
 
 
Convergent interests between 
allies and the demand does not 







No impact from war fighting 
on conditions related to the 
demand 
 
War fighting impacting 








Substantial, acute enemy 
threat 
 






This chapter details each of these hypotheses, situates my arguments in existing 
scholarship, and offers examples to clarify the arguments made. 
 Literature Review 
This project is grounded in previous work in international relations, military 
analyses, and comparative politics. Relevant works can be organized into two categories. 
The first are military studies on insurgency and counterinsurgency warfare. The second 
are materials from political science that deal with political, military, and social patterns 
in alliances, wars, security, and state interests. This dissertation draws from both 
categories, using insights from each to better construct an understanding of this type of 
counterinsurgency war and interstate alliance.  
Military Studies—Counterinsurgency Warfare 
The first category of relevant work derives from studies of counterinsurgency 
(COIN) warfare. Relatively little from international relations directly analyzes COIN war 
or COIN alliances. The strongest effort to analyze this specific type of war has come from 
the military and policy communities. That said, these groups tend to be compelled by the 
issue if actively involved in fighting a COIN war, but soon lose interest when the conflict 
ends. This is unfortunate, as counterinsurgency remains a dense, complex problem that 
merits careful examination. It is, as one U.S. Special Forces officer in Iraq noted, “Not 
just thinking man’s warfare—it is the graduate level of war.”10 
COIN conflicts have been called small wars, guerilla wars, revolutionary (and 
counter-revolutionary) wars, or what Robert Taber famously called “the war of the 
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flea.”11 From 1940-1970, as colonial powers battled emerging leftist and/or nationalist 
revolutionary movements, several foundational studies of insurgencies were produced by 
American, French, British, and Australian military scholars.12 These large militaries 
tended to dislike counterinsurgency projects. In this type of conflict, technologically 
advanced national armies were unable to decisively apply their overwhelming 
conventional military advantage, and furthermore were typically not organizationally 
prepared for fighting insurgencies. According to Andrew Krepinevich, COIN was 
detested by the U.S. Army because it contradicted the American “army concept,” “the 
Army’s perception of how wars ought to be waged.” These are the foundational ideas that 
guide how the Army “organizes and trains its troops for battle.”13 Notable failures in 
counterinsurgency wars (involving both Cold War superpowers in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan) caused great power militaries to focus their studies almost entirely on 
explaining war outcome—neglecting the study of other, more specific or relational 
aspects of counterinsurgency wars, such as the alliances examined in this dissertation 
(despite the importance of difficult alliances for the troubles superpowers faced). These 
outcome-oriented studies do not make generalizable or testable claims about alliances in 
counterinsurgencies, or even the impact of these alliances on outcome. Nevertheless, a 
number of them relate directly to the wars studied in this dissertation and therefore are 
used throughout the study as sources of important information dissecting and analyzing 
the dynamics at work in specific counterinsurgency conflicts.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Potomac Books Inc., 2002). 
12 U. S. Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Pavilion Press, 2004); David Galula, Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Theory and Practice (Praeger, 2006); Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist 
Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (F. A. Praeger, 1966). 





The study follows a long tradition in international relations of explaining how 
states behave by examining the structural forces motivating certain behaviors. The 
project is an analysis of state responses to pressures exerted by a certain type of 
interstate alliance, aiming to explain when and why allies make particular decisions. 
Even though counterinsurgency alliances are a very particular category of interstate 
relationship, this research question is an important one, as COIN alliances are habitually 
misunderstood (and frequently frustratingly complex) partnerships that are critical to 
fighting and winning a certain kind of war.  
This study builds upon aspects of studies in international relations on coercion, 
intervention, foreign assistance, and alliances, but re-examines established variables in 
the literature to offer new insights on alliance politics. According to Glenn Snyder, 
despite their importance, alliances remain “one of the most underdeveloped areas in the 
theory of international relations.”14 Much of the existing work on alliances relates to 
balance of power, polarity, alliance formation, and alliance termination—none of which 
are particularly useful to the question of this study.15 Warring Friends, Jeremy 
Pressman’s 2008 book on alliance restraint, argues that the ability of one ally to 
influence another is contingent on the “willingness of the most powerful ally to mobilize 
its power resources,” the quality of information, a unified leadership, and the importance 
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of the issue to national security.16  These observations are interesting, but also not 
helpful for this study. In the large-scale counterinsurgency interventions examined in 
this project, the “powerful ally” has mobilized its resources and has very good 
information since it is occupying the warzone. Furthermore, as detailed in the 
methodology section, in this study, I control for domestic disunity for both allies and 
account for allied interests, breaking away from traditional models that discuss which 
ally has more or less motivation to “win” the negotiation. Instead, I argue that whether 
allied interests converge or diverge over a given issue being debated better explains 
bargaining outcomes in the context of COIN alliances. 
Unfortunately, no scholar in international relations has asked the question 
addressed in this project. Aspects of alliance theory developed by political science 
scholars help provide insight and structure of this COIN alliance question, including the 
work on alliance management, intra-alliance bargaining, asymmetric alliances, and 
burden sharing. This project, however, is the first systematic examination of alliance 
politics in the counterinsurgency context in international relations.  
Economic Theories of Alliances  
 In their 1966 economic theory of alliances, Mancur Olson and Richard 
Zeckhauser developed a model based on the logic of collective action to explain why 
there is unequal burden sharing in security alliances such as NATO.17 Inequality in 
defense burdens, they claimed, was a logical outcome of allies simultaneously pursuing 
their independent national interests, while also striving to provide a public good to be 
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shared between allies.18 According to Olson and Zeckhauser, strong allies (also 
occasionally referred to in the literature as “large states”) will carry the burdens of 
weaker (“small”) states because smaller alliance members “find they have little or no 
incentive to provide additional amounts of the collective good once the larger members 
have provided the amounts they want for themselves.”19 Due to their size and security 
requirements, contributions from the larger state to the alliance are usually greater than 
the amount the smaller state would have chosen in order to secure itself.  
Todd Sandler and Keith Hartley further develop this economic theory, illustrating 
incentives for “free riding” in an alliance, a behavior frequently observed in COIN 
alliances. According to their model, the weaker state can take advantage of its deficient 
resources or an enhanced threat to convince stronger states to 
shoulder more, if not all, of the burden of defense. If for example, the 
large ally spends $250 billion on defense and a small ally only desires to 
spend $50 billion ….when equating its marginal willingness to pay 
marginal costs, then the small ally is unlikely to spend very much.20 
They admit that this argument falsely assumes that defense is perfectly substitutable 
between allies, but their work nevertheless provides an initial framework for explaining 
free riding by weaker alliance members.  In this study I take an important step forward 
by explaining specific elements of COIN alliances that foster free riding, namely a 
particular combination of the unilateral ability of the intervening force to implement the 
requested policy and the match-up of allied interests in the outcome of the request.  
Although still useful (as will be discussed below), these economic models are an 
imperfect fit for the asymmetric alliance question at hand in this study. First, they focus 
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on alliances such as NATO’s during the Cold War, which relied on deterrence rather than 
defense for security. This makes a difference in conceptualizing these issues as it has 
been reasonably argued that deterrence remains “a relatively pure or inclusive public 
good,” whereas in active physical defense “allies are partially rival,” as they may compete 
for the material use of collective forces.21 In addition to being partially rival, collective 
benefits from alliances are arguably also excludable, as allies can be abandoned. As 
Avery Goldstein argued, 
States can act to reduce, but cannot eliminate, the grave uncertainties of 
life in an anarchic realm where the fear of abandonment reflects the fact 
that alliance security is a benefit that actually fails the key public goods 
test of non-excludability. Although the probability of abandonment might 
be small, the consequences, especially in the nuclear age, could be 
disastrous.22 
It is important to only cautiously draw from deterrence-based alliance models, or 
large-N alliance studies that group all types of interstate partnerships together, when 
considering military alliances engaged in applying (not just threatening) force, such as 
those found in counterinsurgency wars.23 Even categorizing counterinsurgency wars as 
offensive or defensive—a standard distinction in international alliances—is surprisingly 
problematic as “a state may have to undertake a tactical offensive in order to defend 
itself, its ally, or its interests effectively.”24 This observation may be particularly 
applicable in modern COIN war, as David Kilcullen explains in Counterinsurgency 
Redux: 
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Classical counterinsurgency theory posits an insurgent challenge to a 
functioning (though often fragile) state. The insurgent challenges the 
status quo; the counterinsurgent seeks to reinforce the state and so defeat 
the internal challenge. This applies to some modern insurgencies—
Thailand, Sri Lanka and Colombia are examples. But in other cases, 
insurgency today follows state failure, and is not directed at taking over a 
functioning body politic, but at dismembering or scavenging its carcass, 
or contesting an “ungoverned space”. Chechnya, Somalia and East Timor 
are examples of this. In other cases (like Afghanistan) the insurgent 
movement pre-dates the government.25  
 With these caveats in mind, economic models of alliances remain interesting 
because they explain how decisions regarding defense levels made by individual states 
will cause alliances to function below Pareto-efficient levels of collective allocation “as 
the marginal benefits that an ally’s defense provision confers on the other allies is 
ignored.”26 States will look to alliances to optimize their own utility, as opposed to 
making efforts to optimize the utility of the alliance itself. This lays the theoretical 
foundation for the question addressed here that an optimal level of efficient 
counterinsurgency war fighting from the alliance may not be aligned because decisions 
regarding the support of the alliance are made by individual regimes. These decisions 
will aim to optimize what each state achieves from the alliance, not necessarily what the 
alliance achieves in the war. 
Power Asymmetry  
There are powerful domestic political forces at work influencing the dynamics of 
international alliances, including the counterinsurgency interventions examined in this 
study. Work in the field of comparative politics on state building, predatory states, neo-
patrimonialism, corruption, and institutional development are helpful in setting 
parameters for complex ideas and terms used in this study, such as “state capacity.” The 
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idea of accounting for important domestic political forces in studies of inter-state politics 
is of course not new. Studies by Putnam (1988), Schultz (1988) and Merom (2003) have 
each flagged the role of domestic politics in international bargaining processes. 
Furthermore, insights from work in international relations on asymmetry in war 
also relate to the alliance dynamic being examined in this study. This includes Jeffery 
Record (2007), Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2006), T. V. Paul (1994) as well as Andrew Mack’s 
influential 1975 article, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict,” and British imperialist strategist C.E. Callwell’s 1896 book, “Small Wars,” 
which notes that guerilla warfare is a “petty annoyance rather than operations of a 
dramatic kind.”27 Work on power asymmetry provides a critical context for various 
underlying political dynamics permeating the partnerships examined in this study. 
Nevertheless, part of the contribution of this project is to better specify the mechanisms 
for influence in an alliance, instead of relying on assumptions that one state or another 
ought to have more or less influence over another. By examining hundreds of specific 
bargaining encounters between asymmetric actors across multiple wars, this project 
provides new insights into the influence of the “weak,” and the motivations and 
capabilities of smaller states to resist the designs of their larger allies.  
Bargaining Theory 
Given the political tension in alliances between promoting the agenda of the 
partnership and a state’s foremost desire to further its own national interests, 
international relations scholars frequently turn to bargaining models to explain inter-
alliance dynamics. In between the two extremes of dissolving an alliance and sacrificing 
state autonomy to save it, allies have a strong interest in negotiating with partners to 
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ensure they get favorable terms out of alliance policies. Allies are dedicated to supporting 
the alliance in order to resist the enemy, but partners will inevitably disagree when it 
comes to determining how to shoulder the responsibility of this resistance. 
 In their work on alliances, Glenn Snyder and Stephan Walt identify three primary 
elements in a partnership that explain an ally’s bargaining power: interest, dependence, 
and commitment.28 Asymmetries in each of these areas impact a state’s relative 
advantage or disadvantage within inter-alliance negotiations. According to Walt, 
when the recipient cares more about a particular issue, the supplier’s 
ability to influence the recipient is reduced… even powerful patrons are 
unlikely to exert perfect control over their clients. Because recipients are 
usually weaker than suppliers, they have more at stake. They are thus 
likely to bargain harder to ensure that their interests are protected. In 
general, therefore, the asymmetry of motivation will favor recipients.29 
Snyder neatly summarizes the variables by arguing that the party with the most interest 
in the issue being discussed will have a bargaining advantage, the party that is the least 
dependent on the alliance will have a bargaining advantage, and the party that is the 
least committed to the alliance will have an advantage. The interaction of these variables 
determines which policy terms are adopted by the alliance. 
The next section of this chapter takes these general ideas from the literature on 
alliance politics and embeds them in a counterinsurgency context. This detailed re-
specification of each of these variables will make them more useful in this study, as well 
as in more general discussions of alliance in international affairs.  
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Re-conceptualizing Ideas in International Relations on Allied Commitment, 
Dependency, and Interest 
Following Snyder, Walt and others, this study first begins the analysis of 
bargaining and compliance in counterinsurgency alliances by examining interests, 
dependence, and commitment between allies. However it is important to note that 
despite the excellent insights of works by these scholars, there is a tendency in the 
literature to conflate or ignore the difference between analysis of these variables in terms 
of the specific issue being negotiated and analysis in terms of the alliance as an 
institution. In Afghanistan, for example, Washington may depend on Kabul to pass 
legislation ratifying a new constitution, but the U.S. is not dependent on its alliance with 
Afghanistan for American survival. These issues should not be conflated. This study 
makes a point to better specify these variables in order to identify how they uniquely 
affect inter-alliance relations.  
 The following section isolates each of these elements (commitment, dependence, 
and interest) in order to discuss traditional understandings of each variable in the field 
of international relations, the approach adopted in this study on counterinsurgency 
interventions, and the contribution of my framework for each variable to understanding 
of inter-alliance coercion in international relations.  
Commitment  
! In this study, a partner’s commitment to the alliance is considered both 
substantial and constant. By nature of these interventions, the security interests of the 
foreign ally are intimately tied to the survival of the host ally. When South Vietnam fell to 
communist forces, for example, American Cold War interests in Southeast Asia 




critical vessels for protecting the geopolitical interests of the intervening power. 
Additionally, the willingness of the foreign intervening ally to accept a large number of 
casualties is a strong signal of dedication to the survival of the host ally. Since the cases 
examined in this study are limited to interventions with over 1,000 foreign military 
deaths, very high commitment to the local ally is built into the analysis, as well as very 
high commitment from the local ally, which has a lot at stake in the outcome of the 
insurgency. That said, since commitment is essentially constant across wars and 
demands, commitment to an alliance is not a particularly helpful variable explaining 
variation in compliance outcomes across demands.  
! This is not to argue that commitment is unimportant in the inter-alliance 
dynamics examined in this project. On the contrary, a primary motivation for isolating 
these counterinsurgency interventions from other wars, alliances, and inter-state 
partnerships is to create an opportunity to look across this type of conflict with high 
alliance commitment. Following the logic of Glenn Snyder, “the more firmly a state is 
committed to defend its ally, the less influence it will have in intra-alliance bargaining.”30 
This dynamic is evident across the wars examined in this study. In Vietnam, for example, 
Washington’s belief that the war was preventing communist revolutions across Asia 
caused the U.S. to become deeply committed to Saigon’s survival. It was a costly 
reputational commitment, which meant that any American threat to break the 
commitment or to adopt positions that might harm their South Vietnamese partners 
were not necessarily credible. 
Since the United States now correctly saw that its entire mission was 
contingent on the RVN’s stability, which only [Prime Minister] Thieu was 
able to provide, it in turn was wholly dependent on Thieu remaining in 
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power, a fact he perceived and exploited ruthlessly. Ironically who was 
master and who was puppet was increasingly blurred with time.31 
 
Accepting this context of diminished influence due to strong commitment to an ally as a 
given, this study then examines the tools at the disposal of the intervening force to 
compel its allies, considering the constraints high commitment can place on the foreign 
force.  
! In addition to providing an opportunity to examine how high commitment to an 
ally weakens leverage, this study also illuminates conditions that enable the foreign 
intervening force to coerce its host ally, even within the context of high commitment. 
Scholars of alliance politics frequently discuss the tension between the fear of 
abandonment and the fear of entrapment.32 Too little commitment to an alliance and 
states dependent on their allies for security will fear abandonment. Under this condition, 
dependent actors will focus on their own interests instead on the greater goals of the 
alliance, even if doing so is detrimental to their security. Too much commitment and 
states are left supporting their allies even if they disagree with their actions. These are 
interesting dynamics in counterinsurgency interventions. For example, entrapment as a 
consequence of high alliance commitment is evident in the prevalence of free riding by 
the host ally. As hypothesized in this study, if allied interests converge and the 
intervening force has the unilateral ability to implement the policy, non-compliance is 
likely due to incentives to free ride. The intervening ally is trapped by its commitment to 
strengthen the domestic ally. For the most part, intervening states will gain more by 
undertaking the action unilaterally (which tolerates free riding) when contrasted with 
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the alternative of potentially weakening its partner by not working towards joint 
counterinsurgency goals.  
! This study also shows that high commitment to an ally does not entirely eliminate 
coercive leverage. I argue, for example, that the intervening force’s unilateral ability to 
implement a policy can provide leverage over an ally if interests between allies diverge. 
Despite its high commitment, an intervening ally can compel its partner to participate in 
actions it initially opposes if that partner believes the intervening force will otherwise 
implement the policy unilaterally. In other words, high commitment does not eliminate 
all opportunities for influence over an ally, but it does make it more difficult.  
Alliance Commitment and Foreign Allied Withdrawal?  
In this universe of counterinsurgency wars, some form of abandonment is in fact 
guaranteed, as the foreign ally is not interested in fighting indefinitely. Indeed, the 
purpose of these interventions is usually to aid the domestic ally just enough to get them 
fighting the war independently. Beyond that point, the foreign power would prefer to 
depart.   
A logical question regarding the consistency of commitment considered in this 
study arises from the withdrawal of foreign allied forces. Do rates of compliance change 
once the foreign ally declares it is withdrawing from the conflict? According to prevailing 
theories, a decrease in commitment signaled by a withdrawal announcement should lead 
to increased levels of compliance from the ally left behind.  However, there are multiple 
reasons why I do not believe this to be the case and why an increase in compliance is not 
expected in response to withdrawal. The simplest demands are likely to be fulfilled 
earlier in the war, spiking compliance rates early in the conflict. This leaves more 




end of the war will tend to be more difficult to complete. At this stage, host allies acting 
under the fear of abandonment will focus on securing the survival of their regimes, 
potentially at the cost of ignoring an ally on its way out. Furthermore, even though the 
foreign ally is withdrawing, it is still very interested in the success of the host ally. 
Therefore, despite lessening its involvement in the war, the foreign ally is largely unable 
to credibly issue threats for allied non-compliance because fulfilling threats would 
conflict with its strong interest in the survival of the allied regime.  As a result, any 
leverage that supposedly results from a lesser commitment is largely lost in the type of 
alliances examined in this study. In order to study these dynamics, rates of compliance-
over-time through every stage of intervention are tracked in the study. 
! In summary, as described by international relations scholars like Glenn Snyder, 
commitment as a variable explaining inter-state alliance dynamics lies at the general 
level of the partnership. It can only be conceptualized as commitment to the alliance, not 
commitment to the issue being bargained.  Issue commitment is essentially relative 
interest, which is accounted for by the interest variable introduced later in this chapter. 
Due to the nature of this variable, in this study, I set aside commitment from the 
dependency and interest variables drawn from existing work on alliance politics. In 
contrast to commitment, interests and dependency can be specified to the individual 
demand or policy being debated. As discussed in the upcoming sections, this dynamic 
makes these two variables applicable to my study investigating hundred of policy 
demands between counterinsurgency allies.  
Dependency 
For Snyder, “dependence refers only to the degree of harm the partners could inflict on 




adversaries could inflict in war.”33 This perspective is not terribly helpful for this project 
because dependency on a specific alliance in this universe of cases is largely fixed. To 
varying degrees, in these conflicts the domestic regime is more reliant on the foreign 
power for its national security than can be said of the reverse relationship. By virtue of its 
position and the type of threat the enemy insurgent poses to each ally, the foreign state is 
less dependent on the domestic for its national survival.  
I argue that an issue-specific conceptualization of dependency regarding the 
requirement of host regime participation in implementing the particular issue being 
negotiated affects compliance outcomes. This concept of dependency acknowledges that 
allied duties and functions are not perfectly substitutable. Sometimes only one partner 
can fulfill a particular role or undertake a particular action, and this can affect bargaining 
and compliance outcomes.  
As an example, during the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. sought local supply routes. It 
was dependent on Turkey because there were no other viable alternatives. Taken in total, 
throughout its modern history, Turkey has been more dependent on the U.S. than in 
reverse, but during this particular alliance negotiation, Turkey has the relative 
bargaining advantage, as the U.S. had no alternatives and an acute security need.  
If it were simply an issue of greater dependency on the alliance in general, we 
might expect resource-rich countries to prevail in the majority of bargaining encounters. 
Both Snyder and Walt note of course that this is not the case and that in order to be 
useful, theories on alliances need to acknowledge that “the relative influence of allies 
turns not simply on their relative military strength and potential, as is often assumed, 
but on their comparative dependence on, or need for, each other’s aid, which is a more 
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complex notion.”34 This study tests and further refines the theories outlined by Walt and 
Snyder in specifying these complex notions of alliance dependency.   
The fact that resources do not always translate into influence has been the focus 
of several other works in international relations on power asymmetry. Robert Keohane 
(1971) notes how “alliances have in curious ways increased the leverage of the little [less 
powerful state] in their dealings with the big [more powerful state].”35 Weakness, 
according to Keohane, “does not entail only liabilities; for the small power, it also creates 
certain bargaining assets.” The worse shape the regime is in, the more assistance it can 
squeeze out of donors.  
! Working from these observations that resources should not be conflated with 
influence, this study contextualizes dependency within the context of the specific policy 
issue being bargained. Which state is more dependent than the other for the 
implementation of the particular issue being negotiated? Can the foreign ally implement 
the policy without the domestic regime? Can it enlist other domestic political factions to 
undertake the policy?  
! ! The impact of this issue-specific concept of dependence is not as 
straightforward as prevailing theories might imply. According to the dominant thinking 
on alliance management, it would be logical to assume that if the foreign ally is 
dependent on the domestic regime for implementing a policy, it should lose leverage in 
bargaining encounters and experience increased rates of non-compliance with its 
demands. I argue, however, that based on the evidence, the effect of dependence can only 
be observed in combination with allied interests. More simplistic models that ignore the 
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interactions between these variables fail to accurately describe the behaviors observed in 
these wars.  
Interest 
 Existing works on inter-alliance bargaining assume that the state with the most 
interest in the issue being negotiated will have an advantage over its partner. “Ceteris 
paribus, allies with the most interest at stake in bargaining encounters will have the most 
influence in such encounters.”36 This theory rests on the assumption that the ally with 
the most at stake regarding the issue being negotiated will push harder in the bargaining 
process and will have an advantage as a result of this effort. The theoretical framing of 
interest as a variable in these works focuses on which ally has more or less interest 
relative to the other.  
 Based on these studies, it would seem reasonable to assume something similar 
for this project: the partner with the strongest interest in the issues addressed in the 
demand might have an advantage in bargaining encounters. Because the domestic 
partner is often in a battle for its survival, it would be expected to have greater interest in 
the issue being negotiated more often than not. The foreign ally does not usually have as 
much at risk in the war, despite substantial investments and reputational interests.  
Breaking away from the prevailing theoretical frame of “more” or “less” interest 
as an explanatory variable determining the outcome of bargaining encounters, I argue 
that greater interest in the issue being negotiated is not always an asset for an ally. 
Instead, I suggest that the most critical aspect of interests that influence bargaining 
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outcomes in the wars examined in this study is whether or not the interests of allies 
converge or diverge over a given policy.  
For example, in negotiations to end the U.S. war in Vietnam, Saigon was more 
interested in specific concessions made to Hanoi than was Washington. South Vietnam 
had a lot to lose from allowances that would advantage the North in its push towards 
reunification. Nevertheless, the U.S. was able to coerce the South Vietnamese into an 
uncomfortable agreement during the Paris Peace Accords because it could sign a treaty 
with the North ending U.S. involvement with or without South Vietnamese participation. 
According to historian Larry Berman, there was a “pattern of exclusion for the next four 
years—Kissinger negotiating an American troop disengagement with the North 
Vietnamese while informing [South Vietnamese President] Thieu only after the fact.”37 
Eventually Thieu signed on to the negotiation process in order to save face and protect 
his interests as well as possible under the circumstances.  
The fact that South Vietnamese interest did not “win” this negotiation process 
with the U.S. does not refute Snyder or others’ argument that ceteris paribus, allies with 
greater interest will have the most influence bargaining, because Snyder would likely 
note that circumstances of dependency and a weakening commitment outweighed the 
greater South Vietnamese interests in this particular example. But this conclusion is 
unsatisfying. It fails to specify when interests might be important or discuss the 
mechanisms causing interests, dependency, and commitment to interact to produce 
certain outcomes.  My theory, on the other hand, is able to better predict American 
success in this negotiation with its ally. Allied interests over the concessions diverged, 
but the U.S. could act unilaterally to sign the agreement with the North. I argue Saigon 
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would likely comply because it has more to gain from participating in the process as 
opposed to leaving it up to the Americans.  
 This study provides a better specification of interest as a variable in alliance 
relations by arguing that the asymmetry in motivation driving allies to negotiate hard or 
compromise relatively quickly largely assumes allies want different things. But what 
happens if allies agree? There is likely still a negotiation over the terms of implementing 
the policy. Is greater interest in the issue still an asset? This study argues that whether or 
not the interests of allies converge or diverge is critical to understanding the influence 
one ally may have over another, not just which ally is more or less interested.  
 From the demands identified in this study, allied interests usually diverge over 
issues such as how to pay for programs, election reforms that empower political 
opposition groups, cracking down on corruption networks that profit the domestic 
regime, or, from the example given previously on Vietnam, providing concessions to 
enemy forces. Interests tend to converge over development programs and economic 
restructuring programs.38  
Variables and Hypotheses 
 In order to measure complex variables such as “interest,” I make several 
assumptions about the actors involved. First, I assume that the host regime wants to stay 
in power. Second, I assume that both parties to the alliance would generally prefer to 
have their ally do as much work as possible on behalf of their collective interests. Third, I 
assume that the host regime has domestic political interests to consider in addition to 
the examined pressures from international allies. Fourth, I assume that the intervening 
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Dependent Variable – Domestic regime compliance with the counterinsurgency policies 
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 I argue that some of the proposed variables (capacity, interests, dependency, 
complications from the war, and external threats) have a direct effect on compliance 
outcomes. Variable 1 (capacity) is one example. If the domestic regime does not have 
sufficient capacity to fulfill a request from its ally, compliance is less likely. Other 
variables, including 2 (interest) and 3 (dependence), have an indirect effect on 
compliance outcomes. Figure 3 illustrates the proposed relationship between capacity, 
interest and dependency to clarify the arguments offered. A substantive discussion of 
each variable is provided in the upcoming pages.  
Independent Variables – What Determines Compliance? 
Domestic State Capacity 
Mapping the conditions for domestic state compliance with the policy demands 
of its foreign ally first requires determining whether or not the domestic partner has the 
capacity to execute the policy. Capacity is a threshold issue for compliance. If the state 
lacks the ability to implement the policy, then non-compliance is inevitable.   
Domestic regimes allied with foreign powers in a counterinsurgency inevitably 
have limited capacity. If they were more institutionally sound, these regimes would not 
be fighting an insurgency, or, at a minimum, they would be able to fight the insurgency 
on their own without a large-scale foreign military intervention. Nevertheless, the 
domestic regime’s governance capacity has an impact on the regime’s ability to 
implement requested policies. This does not mean, however that the ability to implement 
Hypothesis 1 – Domestic regimes with insufficient resources, capabilities or 





a request is always correlated with compliance. The upcoming variables discuss how 
compliance is determined by other factors in addition to capacity. 
Interests and Dependence 
! I hypothesize that there is an interaction effect between allied interests and issue 
dependencies influencing compliance outcomes. If the foreign ally is not dependent on 
its domestic partner to implement the demand, and allies have a shared interest in the 
likely outcome of the policy, the domestic regime is likely to not comply because there is 
an incentive to free ride. For example, in Afghanistan in April 2009, the U.S. requested 
that Kabul create “longer and better coordinated opening hours at Af-Pak border 
crossing points.”39 The government of Afghanistan had a lot to gain in customs revenue 
from the increased cross-border traffic that would likely result from longer hours at 
crossing points. But the U.S. also would benefit from increased efficiency at the border. 
NATO troops in land-locked Afghanistan rely on resupply routes either through Pakistan 
or the Northern Distribution Network, a series of circuitous routes that run through a 
combination of Central Asian states including Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, 
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Hypothesis 3A – If allied interests converge over a given policy proposal, the 
domestic regime is more likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation.  
Hypothesis 3B – If allied interests converge over a given policy proposal, the 





Hypothesis 2A – If allied interests diverge over a given policy proposal, the domestic 
regime is less likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation.  
Hypothesis 2B – If allied interests diverge over a given policy proposal, the domestic 




Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. 40 Frustrated with border inefficiencies and the 
lack of Afghan initiative, in late 2009 the U.S. opened two Border Coordination Centers 
(BCCs). In principle, these centers were a “joint effort,”41 but in practice were “reliant 
upon U.S. sources” which “pre-determines a U.S.-heavy solution, not necessarily the 
ideal for a facility with aspirations to multi-national cooperation.”42 They are 
commanded by a U.S. colonel or lieutenant colonel, while “the Afghan National Army 
has provided representatives more-or-less as a show of goodwill; and the Afghan 
Uniformed Police and Afghan Border Police are represented by officers who essentially 
drop-in as a part of their daily beat in the local neighbourhood.”43 The Afghans benefit, 
but due to the shared allied interest in the request and U.S. ability to implement the 
policy without Afghan participation, Kabul did not have the motivation to comply. They 
were able to free ride off American efforts.  
! If, on the other hand, the foreign ally does not depend on its partner, and allied 
interests diverge, there is a higher probability of compliance. The domestic regime is 
likely to comply in order to protect its interests since action may be undertaken without 
them. Unilateral action by an ally could leave them isolated or undermined. As discussed 
in detail in the chapter on the U.S. war in Iraq, one example is Baghdad’s decision to 
begrudgingly comply with American demands to match funding to the Sons of Iraq (SOI) 
program and incorporate a percentage of SOI members into the government.44 The 
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Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Regime was wary of the American SOI program that had armed 
local Sunnis pledging to resist al-Qaeda. Even though promised SOI salary payments 
from the government were frequently delayed and there were widespread reports that 
Baghdad was discriminating against SOI elements, eventually the Iraqi Government 
largely went along with U.S. demands on SOI in order to take control of the program and 
eliminate it as an independent threat.45  
! Allied interest convergence has a reverse impact on compliance outcomes if 
unilateral action by the foreign intervening force is not possible.  If independent action 
by the foreign ally is not possible and interests converge, there is a higher likelihood of 
compliance because the domestic actor is required to act if it wants to see the policy 
implemented. Take for example the May 1987 Indian request that Sri Lankan forces in 
the northeast retreat and stay in their barracks.46 In order to give Indian forces the 
opportunity to approach the Tamils, New Delhi wanted Sri Lankan forces to withdraw 
peacefully in order to set the stage for Indian-led negotiations. Colombo, of course 
commanded its military. Their organized retreat from entrenched positions in northeast 
Sri Lanka was not something India could ensure without Sri Lankan participation. At 
this point in time, Colombo was hopeful the Indians could broker a solution to the Tamil 
problem, and were willing to let Indian forces take the lead for the moment.47  
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! Lastly, if interests diverge between allies and the foreign partner cannot 
implement the requested policy without the participation of the domestic ally, I argue 
that there is a lower probability of compliance. Because the implementation of the policy 
relies on host regime participation, they can avoid executing the request, effectively 
protecting their short-term interests. Because the foreign ally is dependent on its 
partner, it does not have an alternative route for implementation and will have difficultly 
compelling reform. There are multiple examples of these circumstances in the wars 
examined in this study, including Indian requests that Sri Lanka cut off independent 
negotiations with Tamil militants, or American demands that Iraq renew legislation 
granting legal immunity to foreign contractors.  These requests were not fulfilled.  
The theory postulating this interaction effect between interests and dependency 
is summarized in hypotheses 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B. The influence of having to rely on an 
ally to implement the proposed issue being bargained over has a contrary effect on 
compliance outcomes depending on whether the interests of the allies converge or 
diverge over the issue.  
The Effect of the War 
 
This variable is related to the previous variable on capacity and accounts for 
complications from the war influencing compliance. However, I discuss it separately in 
order to better specify the effect of a specific external environmental factor (the conduct 
of military operations) on compliance outcomes. Complications from military efforts can 
shift what it takes to “comply” with a demand. It can strain the capacity of the host 
Hypothesis 4 – Complications from military activities will make compliance with 




regime to cope with mounting wartime issues, making it increasingly difficult to comply. 
Capacity, as a variable, measures the assets of the host ally, whereas complications from 
war zone considers the difficultly of the environment. Since counterinsurgency wars are 
difficult political problems, these variables are designed as rough estimates of 1) the 
capabilities of the actor faced with that difficult problem, and 2) the impact of that 
difficult environment on that actor.  
It is easy to imagine aspects of a war influencing compliance outcomes. Friction 
and fog are notorious in warfare. Friction, as Clausewitz wrote, 
is the force that makes the apparently easy so difficult…Countless minor 
incidents—the kind you can never really foresee—combine to lower the 
general level of performance, so that one always falls short of the intended 
goal. Iron willpower can overcome this friction; it pulverizes every 
obstacle, but of course it wears down the machine as well.48 
 
Unforeseen complications from combat operations can influence compliance outcomes.  
Initially, this variable may seem constant, as each request in the sample is 
complied with or disregarded within a wartime context. But I argue that even though 
each request is impacted in some capacity by conflict, there are some instances where 
military efforts fundamentally change the compliance environment, making particular 
requests more or less complex while other requests remain relatively unscathed. Despite 
the fact that the war is a constant, complications arising from the war are not. The 
multitude of potential consequences of military operations cannot be predicted and 
certainly will not have a uniform effect on all demands or compliance conditions. This 
variable includes issues such as such as increased demand on government support 
services, migration and refugee concerns, mobility constraints, or civilian casualties. In 
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Afghanistan, for example, the U.S. requested that its Afghan allies expand state judicial 
services into each province in order to counteract Taliban efforts to win popular support 
through the provision of reliable legal processes in rural areas. But deteriorating security 
from the war meant that the government not only had to set up buildings, judges. and 
clerks, but also had to insert police to protect them and set up supply and reinforcement 
protocols. This would likely require costly infrastructure projects such as road 
reconstruction, which also would require security and supplies. These escalating and 
costly requirements strained the frail capacity of Kabul. Without the threat of violence 
from the war itself, complying with the American demand would be much simpler, as it 
might have been limited to training and inserting judicial personnel.  
Some demands made from the foreign ally will be impacted by military action; 
some will not. This study predicts that requests that are affected by military operations of 
the war will tend to have lower rates of compliance because combat is likely to 
complicate the social and political environment, not simplify it.  
An Existential Enemy Threat 
All enemy action threatens the domestic regime. However, I hypothesize that an 
organized, acute enemy offensive, like the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, is likely to increase, 
not decrease, the likelihood of compliance with allied demands. There are several 
reasons for this prediction. First, behaviors such as free riding will seem less attractive to 
domestic allies when faced with a security crisis. A significant threat is likely to draw 
allies together, inspiring the domestic ally to participate in efforts to bolster security, as 
opposed to leaving survival in the hands of its allies. Second, domestic regimes are not 
Hypothesis 5!F A significant, acute enemy offensive will make the domestic 







single, unified, rational actors. Like all political organizations, they have factions, 
infighting, and bureaucratic constraints. A state security crisis can unify domestic 
groups, creating opportunities to fulfill requests put forth by the external ally that might 
otherwise be stalled by internal conflict. In essence, this variable is an external shock 
that reorients the interests of the domestic regime from national interests to allied 
interests in the war effort. It is isolated from the more general variable of interest in 
order to better specify the effect of a specific external shock on compliance outcomes.  
A Summary of the Proposed Hypotheses  
1. Domestic regimes with insufficient resources, capabilities, or institutional 
capacity to fulfill a given request from an ally are less likely to comply with that 
request. 
2A.  If allied interests diverge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is 
less likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation. 
2B.  If allied interests diverge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is 
more likely to comply if the proposal does not require its participation. 
3A.  If allied interests converge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is 
more likely to comply if the proposal requires its participation. 
3B.  If allied interests converge over a given policy proposal, the domestic regime is 
less likely to comply if the proposal does not require its participation. 





5. A shock or sudden increase in enemy activity threatening the domestic 
counterinsurgent ally will make compliance more likely.  
Control Variables—Other Important Factors  
! Several additional variables included in this study are not mentioned in the 
proposed hypotheses above for the sake of simplicity and clarity. However, I will describe 
them briefly in order to provide a better picture of the overall scope of the project. These 
variables are also contextualized in the upcoming chapters on specific conflicts. 
! The substantive subject of a request, for example, is one obvious potential issue 
that could influence compliance outcomes. Not all requests ask for the same thing. 
Whether or not an actor does what it is asked at least in part depends on what is being 
requested. In order to account for this basic dynamic, the study accounts for potential 
short-term costs and benefits as well as the general subject of request, based on six issue 
areas for demands: political reform (governance), military strategy, military reform, 
development, economic reform, and specific counterinsurgency strategy.  
It initially may seem tempting to expect variation in compliance based on subject 
areas. For instance, one could imagine that host regimes might be more likely to comply 
with development projects rather than painful political reforms. However, for multiple 
reasons, I do not expect the general subject of requests to be significant in explaining 
compliance outcomes. First, because policies designed to fulfill a counterinsurgency 
strategy can attempt to address social, cultural, military, economic, and political factors, 
the demands studied in this project frequently apply to multiple subject categories. 




“Counter Narcotics Trust Fund.”49 The request pertains to economic reform (funding 
management procedures), development efforts (alternative livelihood campaigns), and 
specific counterinsurgency protocols focused on counter narcotics. The coding rules for 
organizing data in this project, including issue areas, are specified in the next chapter on 
methodology. However, this overlap illustrates how requests can cross cut numerous 
topics, which makes categories of subjects less helpful explaining variation. 
Secondly, seemingly “easy” requests can quickly become exceedingly difficult. 
The Indian request for copies of Tamil-area electoral rolls from 1982-1986 seemed fairly 
straightforward. The registers were available through the Sri Lankan commissioner of 
elections and open to the public. But the commissioner said the Indian request “defied 
my understanding…there is no apparent valid reason” for providing copies. Officials in 
Colombo were suspicious of Indian motives. Just a few years earlier, New Delhi had been 
the primary sponsor of the Tamil insurgents that wreaked havoc on Sri Lankan security. 
The Sri Lankan commissioner concluded it was not possible to allow Indians 
photocopies of “the old electoral registers. [The Indian High Commissioner] can be 
allowed access to the current registers. If he wishes he can take the photocopies of the 
current registers.”50 The general subject of requests may not be significant in 
determining compliance outcomes because subjects that seem easy or appealing can 
rapidly transform into other subjects and issues that are not initially apparent in the 
general subject of the request.  
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Finally, the hypotheses previously outlined in this chapter predict that domestic 
allied interests are important for determining compliance outcomes, but causality is not 
as straightforward as it might initially seem. The domestic ally does not simply comply 
with the requests it is most interested in and defy requests it is not. As previously 
discussed, under certain circumstances, the ally can fail to comply (free ride) on requests 
it is interested in, and comply (be coerced) on requests it would rather not see 
materialize. In light of these dynamics, I do not expect general topics of requests to be 
significant in explaining compliance outcomes. Despite the likelihood that host regimes 
may tend to oppose recommended political reforms more frequently than development 
projects or proposed military strategy, for example, these general interests are not 
expected to translate into reliable trends in compliance, as other factors such as capacity 
and the interaction between interests and dependency are expected to be more 
significant determining outcomes. Development requests, for example, can be very 
complex and time consuming and can require significant infrastructure. This may make 
compliance difficult despite interest. 
Following the tradition of economic models of alliances, this study also monitors 
whether or not the ability of the intervening force to exclude the domestic ally from 
benefiting from projects has an impact on compliance. However, I do not hypothesize 
that this will affect compliance.  This prediction is in part due to the strong tendency in 
counterinsurgency interventions to bolster, not threaten, the allied government. As 
discussed earlier in terms of commitment in this type of alliance, undertaking actions to 
weaken the partner regime contradicts the national interests of the foreign state and, 
therefore, weakens the credibility of threats to exclude them from benefits. The ability of 




in compelling reform because the intervening state rarely would exclude its ally since its 
mission is usually to strengthen this regime and withdraw.    
A Note on the Interaction Between Variables 
The alliance between the foreign and domestic actors is an evolving and complex 
relationship. It is important to note that the interactive nature of this relationship creates 
variation between the independent variables included in this project. Take the issue of 
corruption, for example. In Vietnam, historical reports claimed that U.S.-backed Prime 
Minister 
Thieu sought to make [the civil service] a reliable instrument of his power. 
Although their nominal salaries were low and kept falling, he allocated to 
them a whole panoply of corrupt practices to deepen his hold on their 
loyalties…corruption suffused and financially lubricated the state 
bureaucracy at all levels.51 
Such corrupt practices may arise in part out of the interests of the regime, as it may use 
corrupt practices to appease opponents, buy loyalty, and create coalitions. However, 
once these practices are in place, the domestic regime may fail to undertake anti-
corruption reform because it lacks both the interest in jeopardizing its control of the 
established organizations and the capacity to reign in corrupt practices. It may not have 
enough institutional support, without these side payments, to implement painful 
reforms. Similarly we can imagine that a regime would turn to these corrupt practices in 
the first place because it lacked capable rational-legal institutions.  
Even though there are circumstances where independent variables interact (as in 
the case of the above examples of corruption networks), they should not be confused as a 
single variable. State capacity (or lack of capacity) may be impacted by a regime’s 
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interest in preserving its control of government, but it is certainly not produced by these 
preservation policies alone. Something as amorphous as “state capacity” is determined 
by a multitude of factors—resources, bureaucratic traditions, and infrastructure, just to 
name a few.  Furthermore, such policies can potentially impact state capacity in a variety 
of ways. It would be erroneous to assume there is only one form or direction of causality 
between these variables, as it is possible that the interest in the issue being negotiated 
could either bolster or hinder state capacity, depending on the given situation.  
The interaction between variables should not be considered a drawback to this 
study. Understanding the different ways these variables interact is part of what makes 
this examination compelling. Systematically studying the impact of each variable on the 
dependent variable as well as documenting the conditions and consequences for the 
variety of ways they interact is a remarkable step forward in our understanding of this 
complex foreign-domestic COIN alliance and its impact on domestic state behavior.  
Studies like this, which specify interaction pathways to predict the behavior of 
allies reacting to a complex set of incentives, advance the study of alliance politics in 
international relations. It is largely accepted that interest, dependency, and commitment 
in alliances impact how much influence one ally has over another. But it is not well 
understood how these factors interact to create the type of alliance dynamics observed in 
the political world. How does an ally’s divergent interest affect cooperation? Under what 
conditions can an intervening force coerce an ally, despite a high level of commitment to 
the alliance? These questions are not answered by previous studies that simply observe 
that interest, dependence, and commitment are (somehow) important in determining 
alliance dynamics. This study, on the other hand, comprehensively addresses a specific 




shows an interaction effect between interests and dependency which enables better 
understandings of how these variables interact in the political world to create outcomes 
to demands from foreign intervening forces on their domestic ally that may initially seem 






In short, this study utilizes over 4,000 government documents to analyze 
coercion between allies in nine counterinsurgency wars. For five wars (U.S-Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Vietnam, India-Sri Lanka, and U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan) sufficient primary source 
documents exist to conduct quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis. For these five 
wars, I was able to identify 460 specific policy demands from the intervening ally to its 
domestic political partners. Using these 460 demands, I built a database to track trends 
in compliance. The variables tracked and the coding rules for producing the variables are 
detailed in this chapter. For the other four wars (Vietnam-Cambodia, Egypt-Yemen, 
Cuba-Angola, and Syria-Lebanon), the lack of documentary evidence released by these 
regimes prevented quantitative analysis and detailed discussion of alliance relations in 
these wars. Reliable evidence on alliance dynamics is unfortunately unavailable. These 
wars are instead discussed qualitatively and are used as comparative examples 
throughout the project.  
This study is built on within-population case studies from post-WWII 
counterinsurgency wars with 1000+ foreign military casualties. These wars were 
identified using the Rand Corporation’s 2008 study on counterinsurgencies, “War by 
Other Means,”52 which updated James Fearon and David Laitin’s 1999 dataset 
“Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.”53 From this data, I found 28, or approximately a 
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third, of post-WWII insurgency wars had some level of foreign troop military 
intervention on the side of the counterinsurgent.54 
This project is limited to investigating large-scale foreign military intervention in 
order to further understanding of counterinsurgency alliances with a high level of 
alliance commitment. Other types of interventions and the commitments these 
operations entail, such as colonial wars or covert interventions, are likely to have their 
own influence on the behavior of allies. I would risk sacrificing the internal validity of 
this study by including such cases, effectively treating dissimilar phenomenon as similar 
events.  
This study does not compare counterinsurgency (COIN) wars with foreign 
intervention to COIN wars without foreign military involvement for several reasons. 
First, the independent variable is not foreign intervention; it is specified aspects of 
foreign intervention in these types of wars, namely the impact of alliance dynamics, such 
as interests and dependencies, on the behavior of the domestic counterinsurgent ally. 
Second, a comparison of wars with and without interventions is unlikely to identify the 
impact of these aspects of the alliance on the domestic regime’s behavior because there 
could be several intervening variables that would likely cloud the actual relationship 
between the incentives produced by the alliance and the behavior of the domestic 
regime. There is a naturally-occurring selection process dividing counterinsurgencies 
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54 Note: Colonial counterinsurgency (COIN) wars such as Algeria (1954-1962) and Mozambique (1962-1974) 
have been coded as wars without foreign COIN military intervention even though we might commonly think 
of them as foreign-involved COIN wars. There is good reason for excluding these wars. Firstly, a colonial 
project is fundamentally different from a foreign policy mission that has an established exit goal – especially 
in terms of the dynamics of the alliance between “foreign” and “domestic” COIN partners. In colonial wars 
“domestic” state institutions are officially part of the foreign state apparatus. Furthermore, by definition in 
colonial wars outside powers are fighting for the inclusion of these contested areas into their “domestic” 
territorial holdings – a dynamic that changes definitions of “domestic” and “foreign.” In colonial wars 
powerful states are not fighting as foreigners, but as landowners. Secondly, this study hopes to say 
something about the future of counterinsurgency warfare, which in this post-colonial age may not be served 




without foreign military interventions and those with, as only domestic 
counterinsurgencies in dire need of assistance welcome foreign military intervention 
The 1,000-military-death threshold is drawn from the Correlates of War dataset 
on civil wars (note that insurgencies are frequently considered a subset of civil wars). As 
stated in the dataset, “In order to be classified as a civil war, the central government 
should be actively involved in military action with effective resistance for both sides, and 
there should be at least 1000 battle related deaths during the civil war.”55 Furthermore, 
the data naturally separates into two categories, with a notable gap between 83 foreign 
military deaths (Somalia) and the next highest, 1150 (Sri Lanka). Taking this 1000+ 
battle-death metric, I find nine conflicts56 of the initial 28 with foreign military 
intervention that are directly relevant to the research question (see Table 3). 
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55www.correlatesofwar.org Note that these are general battlefield deaths, not specified to one side or the 
other. But this study borrows this 1,000+ death threshold as a metric specifically regarding the foreign force.   
56 Note: There are five COIN conflicts with foreign military intervention on behalf of the counterinsurgency 
side where there is insufficient public data available on foreign military deaths. The civil war in Mozambique 
where Zimbabwe was involved for over a decade (1982-1992), Tajikistan (1992 – 1997) fought with the aid of 
Russian and Uzbek troops, Eritrea (1960 – 1993) fought with the aid of Cuban troops, Laos (1960 – 1975) 
fought with the aid of Thai troops, and the Anti-Kabila war in Congo (1998 – 2003) fought with a coalition of 




Table 3. Post WWII Insurgency Wars with 1000+ Foreign Military Casualties: Cases 
Examined in the Study 
Conflict Initial Year Foreign COIN Intervener Outcome 
Yemen 1962 Egypt Mixed 
South Vietnam 1964 U.S. Insurgency Victory 
Angola 1975 Cuba  COIN Victory 
Lebanon 1975 Syria Mixed 
Cambodia 1978 Vietnam Mixed 
Afghanistan 1979 U.S.S.R. Insurgency Victory 
Sri Lanka 1987 India COIN Victory@B 
Afghanistan 2001 U.S. Ongoing 
Iraq 2003 U.S. COIN Victory  
 
For each of these wars, I sought to identify specific demands from foreign allies to 
their host regime partners made during the time of the intervention. For all wars that 
have available source documents (namely Vietnam, both Afghanistan cases, Iraq, and Sri 
Lanka), I systematically analyzed thousands of high-level executive branch materials in 
order to identify requests made to the primary leadership of the domestic regime. For 
wars where there is unfortunately very little evidence on alliance politics (Yemen, 
Angola, Lebanon and Cambodia), even within reliable historical accounts of these 
conflicts, I am limited in the information that can be provided and discussed in this 
project. Discussions of these wars are made periodically throughout the study, in 
particular in Chapter 7 in order to provide contrast with the Soviet war in Afghanistan.  
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It is important to clarify that these demands are the unit of analysis of the study, 
while the wars are the boundaries from which these observations are drawn. To use the 
specific terminology of King, Keohane and Verba for methodologically structuring a 
social scientific study, these specific policies are the unit of analysis, the “individuals, 
institutions, entities, or objects about which data are collected.”58 As King, Keohane and 
Verba articulate, the term “case” in social scientific research can be used in a variety of 
ways and can ultimately be a confusing term. In conventional terms, it might seem that 
the individual wars from which I am drawing policy demands would be cases. However, 
according to King, Keohane and Verba, these wars “merely define the boundaries within 
which a large number of observations are made.”59  
For example, in the U.S. war in Vietnam, the U.S. asked Saigon to “offer of 
amnesty to all Viet Cong adherents who cease fighting.”60 This proposed program of 
amnesty is my unit of analysis, not the war in Vietnam. Did Saigon offer a program of 
amnesty as a result of this request? Why or why not? What motivated the Government of 
Vietnam’s response to the American demand? For wars that do not have open archival 
materials or available documentary evidence (namely Yemen, Cambodia, Lebanon, and 
Angola), I rely on secondary historical accounts or primary source observations from 
outside actors such as U.S. intelligence agencies to identify the dynamics of these 
alliances. Each chapter in the study has a specific methodology section to explain exact 
sources of information and the ways those sources were utilized in the investigation of 
that war.  
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59 Ibid., 117. 
60 “A Plan for Political Resolution in South Vietnam,” Paper Prepared by the Under Secretary of State George 
Ball, U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., May 13, 1965. Foreign Relations of the United States. 
Vietnam 1965. Document 300. Source: Johnson Presidential Library, National Security File, Country File, 




One recurrent issue came up when identifying demands. I found it was important 
to differentiate between general desired results and specific policy requests. A statement of 
desired outcome is not specific enough for an ally to implement. Take, for example, the 
Soviet statement to Afghan President Karmal that he is to “do everything to revive and 
develop the national economy, to raise the standard of living of the population and, first of 
all, of all workers and peasants.”61 What is “everything?” How exactly is President Karmal 
to “develop” the national economy and raise the standard of living for workers? A higher 
living standard and economic expansion are potential consequences of policies but are not 
policies themselves to be complied with or denied. Furthermore, such categories of issues 
are so broad they are difficult to analyze and code as meaningful data. It is more 
methodologically sound to limit “demands” to specific policy recommendations that can be 
carefully followed and coded.62 For example, in a different meeting, the Soviets were more 
specific with their Afghan partners, proposing they adopt new policies emphasizing foreign 
trade that were designed to expand the Afghan economy.63 Determining whether or not the 
Afghans implemented these new foreign trade policies provides more reliable data about 
compliance with Soviet demands than general trends in economic growth that may not 
indicate much about the alliance or Afghan compliance.  
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61 “Soviet briefing on the talks between Brezhnyev and B. Karmal in Moscow,” October 29, 1980, Top Secret, 
Central Committee Foreign Department Bulletin, Budapest, Hungary. Cold War International History 
Project, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Collection old War in the Middle East, 
Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, Identifier: 5034D60B-96B6-175C-951772DCA62270BA.  
62 Certain policy requests have multiple components. Consider, for example, U.S. requests that Kabul fund 
and expand the Community Defense Initiative (CDI). Since the diplomatic correspondence treats these two 
actions (funding and expanding the CDI) as a unified CDI-related issue, it was coded as a single request. 
Kabul funding, but not expanding, or expanding, but not funding the CDI would have been coded as partial 
compliance with a single request. If the intervening force considers the proposed program as a cohesive unit 
in terms of creating a budget and allocating personnel, it is coded as a single request.   
63 “CPSU CC Politburo Decision,” 28 January 1980, with Report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-
Ponomarev, 27 January 1980, Top Secret, No.P181/34, To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, 
Suslov,Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov.CPSU Politburo session of 28 January 1980. Cold War International 
History Project, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “documents on the Soviet Invasion 





Additionally, it is important to carefully differentiate specific policy requests 
(means) from policy goals (ends) because there is no guarantee that the requested policies 
of the foreign ally will accomplish what they intended. Whether the Afghans are able to 
expand the economy is a different issue from whether Soviet policies designed to expand 
the Afghan economy were effective. This, in turn, is a separate issue from whether the 
Afghans complied with Soviet demands for economic reform.  This study must measure 
compliance, not strategic effectiveness, making the differentiation between “requests” and 
“goals" vitally important. For example, a domestic ally can do exactly as requested, yet still 
fail to achieve the expected outcome. This is an example of compliance, even though the 
result was not what was hoped for. Ultimately, the failure of expected outcome is a 
problem with strategy, and many scholars grapple with measuring the effectiveness of 
various counterinsurgency approaches. But that is not the question of this study and not 
what it intends to measure.  
Once specific demands have been identified from the available evidence, I then 
analyzed compliance outcomes. This information was gathered again through primary 
source materials (where available) as well as media reports, research publications, and 
historical analyses. Sometimes the outcome of the demand was readily self-evident. For 
example, if the U.S. asked its Iraqi partners to construct a school, the existence of that 
school on a map with photographs and media announcements would provide tangible 
evidence. A file for each request was created detailing relevant developments and sources 
of information. The demand was then coded into an original database that tracked 
relevant conditions of the request (such as allied interests) as well as compliance 
outcome. Quantitative statistical analysis enabled me to investigate patterns across 










my hypotheses and create new opportunities for understanding aspects of a complex 
political relationship across wars without losing the complex context of inter-alliance 












































 Gathering requests and measuring their outcome was conducted in a systematic 
and careful process. The project gathered and analyzed as much information as possible. 
Thousands of documents were evaluated, and hundreds of books and media reports were 
used to bring together both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the essential 
questions of this study. Nevertheless, because primary source national security documents 
are not usually meant for public consumption or for use as quantitative data points, the 
evidence in the project can be uneven across requests and the processes of alliance politics 
are unavoidably messy and difficult at times to fully appreciate. But political processes that 
are difficult to measure are no less important to analyze than those that are prone to 
number crunching or readily made data for comparison. This study is intended to provide 
a general map explaining how allies relate under a given set of pressures in 
counterinsurgency war. By nature of the complex issues investigated, as well as the 
unevenness of available data, this study undoubtedly contains flaws, but nevertheless 
provides thorough information and new insights about an important political relationship 
that has been woefully ignored in international relations.  
The Reliability of U.S. Department of State Cables from Wikileaks  
Due to current classification barriers, most of the data for the chapters on the 
U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan relies on the U.S. Department of State cable database 
released by Wikileaks.com. Because this source of information was vital for identifying 
U.S. demands and compliance outcomes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the substance of the 
material in Wikileaks merits examination in order to be sure the information used to 




Only a portion of U.S. Department of State cable traffic produced from 2002-
2010 are contained in the Wikileaks cable database. Specifically, only documents tagged 
for the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET, SIPDIS) were included. The 
SIPRNET databank was established in the 1990s to facilitate interagency file sharing, 
and was later expanded after September 11, 2001.64 The internal U.S. State Department 
cable guide advises staff to tag cables for inclusion in SIPDIS only for “reporting and 
other informational messages deemed appropriate for release to the U.S. government 
agency community.”65 According to the U.S. Department of Defense, “(SIPRNET) is the 
Department of Defense's largest network for the exchange of classified information and 
messages at the SECRET level.”66  
The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan required substantial interagency 
coordination and therefore a significant portion of cable traffic from the U.S. embassies 
in Baghdad and Kabul were routed through SIPRNET. Interestingly, the U.S. Embassy in 
Baghdad, which only opened in June 2004, originated the third most cables in the leaked 
version of SIPRNET (6,677 messages). This is second only to Department of State 
Headquarters (8,017), which sends messages across the world, and the U.S. Embassy in 
Ankara (7,918), which sent 1,850 messages through SIPRNET before the U.S. diplomatic 
post in Baghdad was established in June 28, 2004.67 This means from the time the U.S. 
Embassy in Baghdad was functioning in 2004, it sent the most messages in SIPRNET of 
any American embassy.  
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There were 2,961 documents released by Wikileaks that originated from the U.S. 
Embassy in Kabul, which is less than half of the 6,677 messages from the Embassy in 
Baghdad. This is likely because Kabul was only a fraction of the size of the U.S. mission 
in Iraq during the time the documents in the Wikileaks database were produced. Sitting 
on 104 acres, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq, a.k.a. “Emerald City” was “physically larger than 
the Vatican,” while housing between 5,000 and 16,000 employees during the war.68  
According to the U.S. Department of State Office of Inspector General, the U.S. Embassy 
in Kabul, on the other hand, had only 179 federally employed staff members in 2005, 
320 in early 2010, and 1,572 by the end of 2010.69  
Comparing the characteristics of the documents released by Wikileaks against 
requests identified in this study may provide some insight regarding potential bias in the 
findings of the chapter. For example, does the number of U.S. requests identified simply 
follow the trajectory of what is available in Wikileaks? This might indicate that findings 
about the number of requests per year were perhaps a product of what was in SIPRNET 
instead of a reliable indicator of trends in demands and inter-alliance relations. Although 
some similarities can be expected since an increase in activity at the Embassy would 
likely result in an increase in demands to allies as well as cable traffic.  
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Graphing the trend in the number of documents available from the U.S. Embassy 
in Kabul in Wikileaks against the number of requests from the U.S. to Kabul identified in 
this study reveals the following:70 
 
Figure 5. Number of Documents in Wikileaks from the U.S. Embassy Kabul and Number 
of U.S. Requests 
Illustrated by Figure 5, there are similarities in the trends over time between the 
number of documents included in the Wikileaks database from the U.S. Embassy in 
Kabul and the number of U.S. requests identified, in particular in the period between 
2004 and 2009. The number of documents contained in the Wikileaks database and the 
size of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan both expand after 2005, reflecting an increase in 
U.S. diplomatic correspondence produced regarding Afghanistan. However, this does not 
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70 The graph ends in 2009 because the Wikileaks database ends February 28, 2010, providing barely two 
months of data for 2010. Providing two months of figures for the year 2010 could provide a false impression 
of a decrease in requests, which may or may not be the case depending on what transpired in 2010. It is hard 
to say at this point in time since 10 months of 2010 are missing from Wikileaks and these materials have yet 




mean characteristics of the Wikileaks data are determining the observed patterns in 
requests made in this study. As violence in Afghanistan begins to rise in Afghanistan 
after 2006, increasing attention is paid to the U.S. mission, including a rise in the 
number or requests to Afghan allies.    
Graphing the trend in the number of documents available from the U.S. Embassy 
in Baghdad in Wikileaks against the number of requests from the U.S. to Baghdad 
identified in this study reveals the following: 
 
Figure 6. Number of Documents in Wikileaks from the U.S. Embassy Baghdad and 
Number of U.S. Requests 
According to Figure 6, documents from Wikileaks are increasingly available from 
2004-2008. Yet the number of unique requests from the U.S. to Baghdad identified in 
those documents peaks in 2007. This indicates that the number of requests identified is 
not necessarily due to the number of materials in the database. Note also that 2009 has 
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strong correlation between the number of documents in Wikileaks and the number of 
demands identified in the study.71  
Interestingly, trends in the number of requests made per year in Iraq and 
Afghanistan may correlate with the level of violence in these wars. Consider Figure 7 
estimating violence by IED incidents.  
 
Figure 7. Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks in Iraq & Afghanistan72 
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Comparing Figures 5, 6, and 7, it appears that increases and decreases in 
American demands roughly correspond with levels of violence, in particular in Iraq.73 As 
attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq increased in 2007, so did American pressure on its 
Iraqi allies to reform. Note, however, that there isn’t a corresponding spike in Iraqi 
compliance in this same period (See Chapter 5). There are several reasons why this may 
be the case. As discussed in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, violence in Iraq and Afghanistan 
created complications that made compliance with demands increasingly difficult.  
As a precaution against bias, most requests identified in this study through 
Department of State documents in Wikileaks were correlated with declassified 
documents and public statements. In Iraq for example, in May 2007 President Bush 
publicly laid out 18 “benchmarks” for the GOI to achieve as a precondition for additional 
funding. These demands included policies to disarm militias, establish minority rights, 
hold provincial elections, perform a constitutional review, implement hydrocarbon 
legislation and support the Baghdad Security Plan.74 Each benchmark was the subject of 
debate in the cable traffic in the Wikileaks database and was also captured as 18 unique 
demands in data analysis. In Afghanistan, the 2006 “The Afghanistan Compact” (also 
called “The London Compact”) was similar. Benchmarks from the compact included 
policies to promote the employment of youth and demobilized soldiers, implementation 
of public administrative reform, increased judicial personnel in the provinces, providing 
assistance to refugees and the disabled, and programs to re-structure state owned 
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banks.75 Many benchmarks identified in the compact were discussed in Wikileaks 
documents. 
The Foreign Intervening Force—Selecting Requests to Allies 
 Throughout the wars examined, to a certain extent intervening forces chose 
requests with some consideration for the capacity limitations of the domestic regime. In 
Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq Washington regularly tailored its requests to actions it 
felt were in the grasp of their in-country allies. This tendency influenced the population 
of requests analyzed in this study, since there is a self-selection against requests with 
overwhelming capacity obstacles. However, there are a couple of reasons why this is not 
problematic to the findings of this study. First, intervening states frequently have no 
choice but to ask for difficult reforms if those actions were critical for the war effort or if 
the intervening ally is dependent on the domestic regime to adopt the given policy. 
Second, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Americans in Vietnam were somewhat naïve 
early on in their interventions, underestimating the difficulty of certain tasks and 
overestimating the ally’s ability to reform. Third, a bias in the sample towards requests 
the foreign power felt the domestic ally had the capability to adopt would not be unique 
to any particular war. I would expect such a phenomenon to exist across the population 
of counterinsurgency wars and to exist in similar future alliances. Finally, such a bias 
does not adversely impact the finding that lacking capacity tends to lead towards non-







The Dependent Variable—Compliance  
Compliance is defined as the act or process of conforming, submitting, or 
adapting to a desire, demand, proposal, regimen, or to coercion. Specific policy demands 
from the intervening state to the domestic ally are the units of analysis for the study. 
Consider, for example, New Delhi’s 1987 request that Colombo “hold elections to [the] 
provincial council of northern and eastern [province] before 31.12.87.” The dependent 
variable being measured is Colombo’s compliance with the demand. The full spectrum of 
potential compliance outcomes is accounted for in substantive chapters of each war, and 
qualitative analysis of individual demands. On the other hand, in the quantitative 
analysis, for the sake of simplicity, compliance is divided into two categories, verbal 
compliance and substantive, material compliance. Within each of these categories, the 
data it is coded on a continuous scale: 0 = non-compliance, 1 = partial compliance, 2 = 
full compliance.  
The following guidelines were used for coding the general outcome of each of the 
460 policy requests identified: “full compliance” was assigned to a request when the 
domestic ally successfully fulfilled all major components of the request that were specified 
by the foreign ally. Minor aspects of the request may have gone uncompleted or been 
altered by the domestic ally, but because all major aspects have been fulfilled, the foreign 
ally is satisfied with the actions of its partner regarding the given request. “Partial 
compliance” was assigned when the domestic ally fulfilled some of the major components 
of the request, while leaving others unfulfilled. The foreign ally is satisfied with aspects of 
the response of its ally, while unsatisfied about others. Lastly, “non-compliance” was 




request. Minor aspects may be satisfied, but the primary components of the request have 
gone unfulfilled and the foreign ally is unsatisfied with the actions of the domestic ally.  
Of course these are unsophisticated categories covering a broad range of 
outcomes. “Partial compliance,” after all, could mean a small or significant amount of 
compliance, lying somewhere in between non-compliance and fulfillment. Nevertheless, 
relying on these simple, rudimentary categories is the best way to ensure the validity of 
the data. The subjects measured (compliance, interests, dependencies, etc.) are not 
naturally prone to quantification. There is no physical or standardized unit to measure. 
As one team of scholars observed, “There is no one objective standpoint from which 
social scientists can study a social phenomenon like compliance.”76 The categories 
assigned in this study are perhaps best conceptualized as “most,” “some,” and “less” 
compliance. For the sake of simplicity, however, these categories are referred to as “full,” 
“partial,” or “non” compliance throughout the study, since in discussions it is confusing 
to refer to an ally providing “most compliance.” It begs the question, the most what, 
exactly? It is clearer to say “full compliance” to indicate a high degree of cooperation, 
despite the fact that there is no objective marker for what constitutes “full,” “partial,” or 
“non” compliance. Such an “objective” standard does not exist. These categories are 
relational.  
Statistical tools can be instrumental in a study such as this, as long as categories 
assigned to the social phenomenon observed are conceptualized in relation to one another 
instead of in absolute terms. Individuals may disagree, for example, about whether a given 
outcome should be considered “full” or “partial” compliance, but such debates ultimately 
have little bearing on the data or the claims made in this project. Even though individuals 
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may have different definitions for what could be considered “full,” “partial,” or “non” 
compliance, individuals would be expected to nevertheless agree on what outcomes 
contain more or less compliance, and that assignment of “more” or “less” for any given 
outcome will correspond with the general scale given for “full,” “partial” or “non” 
compliance in this study. The findings of this study are not based on what is partial 
compliance, but on what conditions make compliance more or less likely.  
Therefore, given the nature of this information, instead of attempting to assign a 
large variety of quantitative values to the spectrum of complex compliance outcomes, it is 
more appropriate to use broad categories and to investigate the phenomena and categories 
in question in terms of their relation to one another instead of their unqualified value. 
Reliability and validity in measurement come from analyzing the ways the general 
categories relate to one another varying circumstances, not in the assignment of any 
specific title. Thomas Thayer discussed a similar issue regarding the appropriate and 
inappropriate use of quantitative analysis of data in the Vietnam War:  
Sir Josiah Stamp (1880-1941) had a few pertinent words on the subject: 
“The government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, 
raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful 
diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes 
in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what 
he damn pleases.” Perhaps. But the village watchman often pleases to tell 
the truth, and in any case he probably reports about the same way most of 
the time. So one must learn to look for a constant bias in reporting, The 
individual numbers may not be completely accurate, but the trends and 
changes in relationships among them may reveal quite a bit about what is 
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Therefore after a substantive analysis using qualitative methods, in this study, the 
dependent variable (compliance by the domestic ally with a demand made by a foreign 
intervening ally) is coded quantitatively as full (more) compliance, partial (less) 
compliance, or non-compliance based on the available evidence. Consider the following 
three examples pulled from early in the U.S. war in Afghanistan. In January 2002, the 
U.S. asked its partners in Kabul to make sure the selection committee for the Loya Jirga 
conference tasked with writing constitutional protocol include minorities and women in 
order to better protect their interests in the future post-Taliban Afghan state.78 Karzai 
followed through with this request and three women and multiple ethnic factions were 
represented, which was not difficult considering the Northern Alliance which dominated 
post-Taliban political life was itself dominated by ethnic minorities.79 This request was 
coded as “full compliance.”  
Contrast the previous example with the outcome of a request from the Americans 
just a few days earlier that current military factions and weapons come under the control 
of the Interim Administration in Kabul.80 Efforts were made by the GIRoA to incorporate 
military factions into the Ministry of Defense and programs such as Disbandment of 
Illegal Armed Groups (DAIG) were established to complement U.S. and U.N.-run 
programs on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). Nevertheless 
localized armed groups remained exceedingly powerful in Afghanistan, and various 
regional groups remained obstinate in their control of territory, creating difficulty for 
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Kabul in implementing disarmament and reintegration.81 This request was coded as 
“partial compliance.” 
Lastly, consider the November 2002 request that all police trainees be required 
to complete an anti-narcotics self-certification. The Government of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
conducted drug testing and recruits were vetted through the Afghan Criminal 
Investigation Department at the Ministry of Interior, but a self-certification was not 
required, as it was for individuals hired to work for USAID. The utility of the 
certifications would be questionable anyway with over 70 percent of recruits illiterate 
and oversight of the training programs transferred to the U.S. military in 2005.82 This 
request was not fulfilled by the Afghans and therefore coded as “non-compliance.”!
In addition to substantive compliance, the database also notes verbal compliance, 
whether or not official representatives from the domestic regime indicated they intended 
to comply with the demand in question. Ideally this information is found in primary source 
documents recalling discussions between officials or public statements made by the 
domestic regime. It was coded according to the same general categories as substantive 
compliance: 0 = non-compliance, 1 = partial verbal compliance, 2 = full verbal compliance. 
Again, these are not exact categories, but are considered in relation to one another, as 
verbal agreement for the most part, some part, or no part.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (I.B.Tauris, 2005), 272; Kenneth Katzman, 
“Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” UNT Digital Library (January 20, 2012): 
37, http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc87376/. 
82 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Letter of Agreement on Police and Justice Projects,” 
November 29, 2002; Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan, “Afghan National Police (ANP) 
Vetting and Recruiting Presentation,” 2005, 
http://edocs.nps.edu/AR/topic/misc/09Dec_Haskell_appendix_II.pdf; Inspectors General, U.S. 
Department of State, Department of Defense, “Interagency Assessment of Afghan Police Training and 
Readiness, Department of State Report No. ISP-IQO-07-07, Department of Defense Report No. IE-2007-




Consider, for example, the Soviet request that the Taraki regime in Afghanistan 
unite Afghan communist political factions, asking Kabul to create “a single national front 
under the aegis of the People’s democratic party of Afghanistan as the recognized leader 
of the people.”83 A subsequent politburo document noted the following: 
In connection with the latest events, a few days ago we urgently appealed 
to Taraki and Amin, in the name of the CC CPSU Politburo and L.I. 
Brezhnev personally, with an urgent call to unite and in the name of 
saving the revolution act in concord and with unity. We warned them 
directly that a split in the leadership would be disastrous and that it would 
be immediately taken advantage of by internal counter-revolution and 
foreign enemies of Afghanistan. We called on the leaders of Afghanistan 
to demonstrate a high degree of responsibility to the revolution. Both 
Taraki and Amin at the time welcomed positively our appeal. However, in 
actuality, judging by incoming intelligence, Amin continued his activities 
to realize his plans, while Taraki demonstrated a high degree of 
indecisiveness in suppressing these activities.84 
The document indicates verbal compliance, as the divided communist parties welcome 
the demand, but perhaps not substantive compliance.  
Inter-alliance bargaining over a demand proposed by an intervening ally can lead 
to partial verbal compliance where some, but not all, aspects of the request are agreed to. 
For example, consider the demand from the Government of India to the Sri Lankans that 
representatives from the Election Commission of India and the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF) inspect the 1988 voters list.85 The Sri Lankans responded to the request by 
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noting that this request was “Approved. Except TULF who may apply like any other 
registered Political Party.” Part of the request would be complied with; part of it would 
be rejected. Officials from the Indian Election Commission were allowed access to the 
voters list, but not members of the TULF. This was coded as partial verbal compliance.  
Lastly, requests can be refused by domestic regimes in negotiations. Consider the 
2007 request from Washington that Baghdad continue providing legal immunity to 
foreign contractors operating in Iraq.86 In response to increasing American pressure on 
the issue, Iraqi officially publicly refused to extend the conditions of immunity.87 This 
was coded as verbal non-compliance.  
With verbal compliance, there was a notable percentage of data missing, up to 
33% in the U.S. war in Afghanistan for example. There are two primary reasons for this 
lack of data. First, in recent wars such as Afghanistan, detailed diplomatic 
correspondence may remain classified and therefore not available for analysis. Second, 
even in older conflicts, because the information sought regarding verbal compliance can 
be somewhat obscure, it is not always preserved in archived documents. Because 
determinations regarding substantive compliance usually leave a trail of budgets, 
material, new organizations, buildings, media reports, or personnel employed, there is 
considerably more evidence available to piece together actual implementation of the 
request in question. But understanding whether or not there was verbal agreement 
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usually depends on the release of diplomatic correspondence, which can frequently be 
classified or destroyed if it is not considered relevant to critical components of the 
history of the event.   
Independent Variables 
In order to monitor factors potentially influencing the probability of compliance, 
the database also tracks multiple independent variables. The first variable is unilateral 
ability, measuring whether or not the fulfillment of the request requires the participation 
of the domestic ally, or if the intervening force (who is making the request) can, if it so 
chooses, fulfill the request independently. In counterinsurgency wars, the intervening ally 
frequently makes requests that its forces can implement independently because there is an 
imperative to (1) provide legitimacy for the action, and therefore work through domestic 
actors, or (2) insist on the participation of the domestic regime in order to promote 
independent action by that regime and facilitate the withdrawal of foreign aid. The variable 
tracking unilateral ability is important because it measures dependencies within the 
alliance. As discussed in Chapter 2, dependency has long been observed as an important 
factor explaining leverage in alliances. In order to simplify the variable in this study, 
unilateral ability was coded as either unilateral ability = 1, indicating that the foreign force 
has unilateral ability to complete the task at hand in the request and therefore is not 
dependent on its ally regarding this particular issues, or unilateral ability = 0, indicating 
the foreign force is indeed dependent on its ally for the actualization of the goal of the 
request.  
Examples may be useful for explaining the dynamics of this variable and how it 
was coded in the study. Take the September 1968 U.S. request that Saigon begin to pay 




groups in Vietnam.88 Since the U.S. had been funding the program and had the financial 
capacity to continue to do so, it could implement the policy (funding the program) 
without the participation of the Saigon government. The CIA was seeking to get the 
Vietnamese to take over funding because “without a direct GVN input (and, hence, 
vested interest) there will always be the risk of the program's being considered, even in 
Thieu's eyes, an American scheme the Vietnamese are indulging.”89 This request was 
coded as unilateral ability = 1 (yes) because the Americans had the ability to implement 
their request for program funding without the participation of Saigon. It was a request 
made out of preference for Vietnamese participation, not out of necessity for their action. 
This is in contrast to Washington’s 2007 request to Baghdad that the regime 
“cease sectarian appointments and politically motivated prosecutions,”90 or the 2003 
request that Kabul pass anti-money-laundering legislation.91 By the nature of these 
requests, the participation of the allied regimes in Baghdad and Kabul are required for 
their fulfillment. Washington is dependent on Baghdad to participate in stopping 
sectarian appointments and on Kabul for passing legislation. These requests were 
therefore coded as unilateral ability = 0 (no).  
However, coding whether the foreign force has unilateral ability to implement a 
request was not always immediately straightforward. Consider a more difficult case. 
While the U.S. was asking the Government of Iraqi (GOI) to cease “sectarian 
appointments and politically motivated prosecutions,” (the example provided above), it 
was also asking Baghdad to seek the “vigorous prosecution of government and security 
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officials who break the law.”92 For the request that Baghdad cease sectarian 
appointments, the U.S. was dependent on Baghdad, because it cannot change personnel 
decisions made by Iraqi policymakers without their participation unless it was prepared 
to take over the Iraqi state, which in 2007 was not something Washington was 
contemplating as it was desperately seeking to transfer responsibility and withdraw. The 
Americans in Baghdad could provide incentives with the hopes of encouraging less 
sectarian decisions but they were nevertheless dependent on some action by the Iraqis to 
mitigate sectarian appointments in the Government of Iraq.  
The request regarding prosecuting security officials that break the law is a more 
complex question regarding U.S. unilateral ability. At the time of the request, the U.S. 
was operating independent law enforcement agencies in Iraq. Americans were routinely 
detaining and prosecuting Iraqi nationals suspected of terrorist acts against the GOI or 
U.S. forces. Although the U.S. was unable to prosecute Iraqi government and security 
officials who violated Iraqi law, the institutions were in place in 2007 to detain Iraqi 
government officials suspected of certain crimes against U.S. interests. In theory, 
therefore, the institutions were in place for the U.S., if so motivated, to take over 
responsibility and prosecute “government and security officials who break the law.”  This 
request was therefore coded as unilateral ability = 1 (yes). If the request had specified 
prosecution under Iraqi law, the U.S. would not have the ability to do so without Iraqi 
participation, and the request would have been coded, unilateral ability = 0 (no). 
Therefore, two primary factors need to be considered when coding unilateral 
ability. First, does the foreign ally have the relevant resources, personnel, means, or 
institutions in place that can take over the roles being requested in the demand? If the 
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foreign power has independent institutions required to fulfill the demand, it is likely to 
be less dependent on the domestic ally. For example, in 2007, even though the U.S. could 
theoretically prosecute Iraqi government officials, it could not pass Iraqi law or make 
Iraqi political decisions about sectarian appointments.  
Second, as with concepts of deterrence and compellence in international 
relations, the status quo is a critical component to coding potential unilateral ability. 
What is the situation at the given moment the demand is made that may impact whether 
or not the foreign state can fulfill the request without the participation of the domestic 
regime? There are times when the foreign power may be running relevant domestic 
affairs for its ally and may have unilateral ability to implement a request, whereas under 
other circumstances the domestic regime is more independent and not readily controlled 
by foreign institutions. Which ally is in control of the organizations involved and how 
does that effect which actors can have direct influence over the state of affairs? In 2004, 
under the Coalition Provisional Authority, the U.S. did have control over Iraqi personnel 
decisions. However, by 2007, it had lost that ability and therefore was beholden to Iraqi 
sectarian decisions.  
Noting whether the intervening force has the unilateral ability to implement a 
request provides one indication of the dependency of the intervening force on its 
domestic ally regarding a particular policy. If an ally does not have unilateral ability, it is 
more dependent on its partner to undertake the action, since it has no independent 
capacity to circumvent that partner.  A related issue to this dependency was also tracked 
in the database. Coded as excludability, when the intervening force had unilateral ability 
to implement a request independently (unilateral ability = yes (1)), the request was then 
also coded according to whether or not the domestic ally could be excluded from 




Inspired by the literature on alliance burden sharing and the issue of private vs. public 
goods, this variable attempted to isolate situations in which domestic allies might be 
prone to free-ride. If, for example, the foreign ally can implement a policy without the 
participation of its domestic allies, and the domestic allies cannot be excluded from 
benefiting from its efforts, domestic regimes might be more prone to free-riding since 
they cannot be excluded from the public good. Military activity against the enemy is a 
general example. If the foreign force requests assistance from its domestic ally yet the 
foreign force has an independent capacity to conduct military operations against enemy 
forces, the foreign force cannot exclude the domestic ally from benefitting from their 
military operations that weaken their collective enemy. In this case the variable would be 
coded as excludability = no (0).  
An example of a request where excludability is possible (excludability = yes (1)) 
can be observed in the 2003 U.S. request to its Afghan partners that Kabul establish anti-
corruption narcotics-related programs across the government that would work to 
inculcate a more cohesive anti-corruption culture across all levels of government. 
Although it couldn’t set Afghan government policy or set rules for Afghan institutions, in 
2003, the U.S. had the unilateral ability to fund and run a separate anti-corruption 
training program that could aim at Afghan government employees. American (not 
Afghan) decision makers therefore determined the anti-corruption curriculum, which 
could, if the U.S. so chose, exclude the regime in Kabul. Instead of benefiting the critical 
decision makers in the Afghan regime, such anti-corruption programs could potentially 
target Afghan elites. It depends on who sets the agenda, but exclusion was possible and 
therefore was coded as such in the database.  
In addition to unilateral ability, interests were also accounted for as an 




with the demands of a foreign intervening force.  Each demand was coded for whether it 
could potentially create short-term political and/or economic benefits for the domestic 
regime For example, in 2008, the U.S. requested that Kabul pursue aggressive policies to 
register hawalas, the informal bankers that conduct the majority of financial 
transactions in Afghanistan and other parts of Asia and the Middle East. Kabul could 
potentially gain a short-term benefit from complying with this request because requiring 
hawalas to be licensed opens up new sources of revenue for the government, increased 
information, and even generated new opportunities to ask for kick-backs. Requests that 
have such potential short-term benefits were coded as short-term benefits = 1 (yes).  
For other requests there was no potential short-term benefit. Consider U.S. 
demands for increased reporting on human rights abuses in Afghanistan. Human rights 
reporting might provide long-term positive consequences for Kabul, but under the given 
conditions of instability, the request offered few short-run benefits. Even reports of 
human rights abuses perpetuated by enemy forces highlight the lack of governance in 
Afghanistan, which reflects poorly on the regime in Kabul. Questions of longer-term 
benefits were excluded because almost all requests have the goal of long-term benefits 
for the domestic regime. These policies, after all, are designed to strengthen the regime 
so that it can secure its position and defeat the insurgency. Questions of potential long-
term benefits therefore are not terribly helpful in explaining variation in outcome; 
almost all requests have some potential long-term benefit, but may or may not impose 
different costs in the short run.  
In addition to potential short-term benefits, potential short-term political or 
economic costs were also coded to track their potential influence on compliance outcomes. 
Requests that have such potential short-term costs were coded as short-term costs = 1 




observed in the November 2002 request from Washington that Kabul internally budget 
adequate funding for the ministries of Justice and Interior instead of relying on 
supplementary funding.93 Although these costs were negligible in the long term, this 
request posed high short-term financial costs as monies had to be budgeted, which would 
sacrifice other projects currently receiving government funds.  
Requests can, of course, provide both costs and benefits, including for example the 
2006 U.S. request that the Afghans ratify the U.N. Convention Against Corruption. Kabul 
could have potentially benefited politically in the short-term by taking such a step against 
the unpopular endemic corruption plaguing Afghanistan, but would also endure short-
term costs from anti-corruption measures that would hold policymakers accountable for 
less-reputable practices.  
 The potential short-term costs and benefits of a request were coded in simple 
terms as yes (1) or no (0) despite the fact that not all costs and benefits are equal. Some 
requests may pose very high costs or very low benefits. But quantifying varying levels of 
benefits would be exceedingly difficult and likely unreliable for several reasons. First, 
although economic costs can be quantified in terms of money, they are not easily 
measured in this case because these are potential costs (or benefits). How much they 
actually may potentially cost or profit the domestic ally is at best a rough estimate and 
may never be stated in terms of an actual figure in the documentary evidence. Second, 
political costs or benefits are not easily quantified. Third, costs and benefits are dynamic. 
They shift based on changes in circumstances, which is a characteristic that is 
exacerbated in this study by existing in a complex war-time environment that shifts 
political and economics environments.  
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 Nevertheless, in order to gather more information about potential costs and 
benefits of requests and to analyze if these potential affects have an influence on the 
likelihood of compliance, a composite variable was created that takes both potential 
short-term costs and short-term benefits into consideration. Both costs and benefits 
after all are balanced in the decision-making process of policymakers, and therefore 
should also be considered in balance with one another in estimating interests. This 
composite potential costs and benefits variable was termed “allied interest 
convergence/divergence” because it approximates whether allied interests match or 
deviate over a given request. The variable assumes the foreign ally has an interest in the 
request in question since this ally is the actor making the request. The interests of the 
domestic ally are then estimated by considering what the evidence indicates about costs 
and benefits. If the record indicates that, for the most part, the domestic regime felt 
short-term benefits outweigh costs, the variable was coded as allied interests = converge 
(1). If the evidence regarding the request indicated domestic policymakers felt that 
potential costs outweighed benefits, the request was coded as allied interests = diverge 
(0). This is a highly useful variable because it estimates how costs and benefits were both 
considered by the domestic ally. Of course many calculations of costs and benefits are 
done outside the official record and are difficult to fully document. Additionally political 
calculations can be very complex and can shift depending on changes in circumstances. 
However, this variable relies on the existing evidence, including media reports, public 
statements by domestic actors, and political analysis of the intervening force. It focuses 
on the critical domestic policymaker in question in the decision-making process. The 
variable is a general estimate of interests. It is designed to paint a broad picture through 




political interests in a complex wartime environment, which would not be a task 
appropriate for statistical analysis.   
 An example of coding may help describe both the purpose and limits of the 
variable measuring allied interests convergence/divergence. In 2009, the U.S. asked 
Kabul to work on establishing longer and better-coordinated hours at certain critical 
Afghan-Pakistan border crossings to facilitate trade and ease the burden of transporting 
goods into Afghanistan.94 This request posed both potential costs and benefits to the 
regime in Kabul. On the one hand, extended hours would strain current bureaucratic 
practices as well as potentially disrupt profitable black-market practices by individuals 
connected to Afghan officials that take advantage of closed border crossings in order to 
smuggle goods. However, extended hours at border checkpoints would also create 
opportunities for increased import taxes and trade and transport volume.95 Weighing the 
potential short-term costs and benefits to powerbrokers in Kabul, the request was coded 
as allied interests converging because longer hours at official border crossings would 
immediately increase import tax revenue without necessarily creating obstacles that 
black markets could not easily shift to accommodate. This was observed at the Torkham 
Gate border crossing between Kabul and Peshawar for example, where province 
Governor Gul Agha Sherazi was accused of levying a second, unofficial tax at the official 
border crossing that profited the governor and his network.96 Taken in total, the regime 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Economic Agenda Items for Af-Pak Trilateral 
Commission, 09KABUL943.” 
95 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Powerbroker and Governance Issues in Spin Boldak, 
10KABUL467,” February 7, 2010; U.S. Department of State, U.S. Embassy Kabul, “EXBS Afghanistan 
Advisor Monthly Border Management Initiative Reporting Cable - April 2007, 07KABUL1731,” May 24, 
2007; Amie Ferris-Rotman, “NATO Races to Secure Violent, Porous Afghanistan-Pakistan Border,” Reuters, 
September 2, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/02/us-afghanistan-pakistan-border-
idUSTRE7814QY20110902; Nathan Hodge, “Afghans Probe Corruption at Borders,” Wall Street Journal, 
December 10, 2012, sec. World News, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324024004578171410335390372.html. 
96 Hodge, “Afghans Probe Corruption at Borders”; Justin Mankin, “Rotten to the Core,” Foreign Policy, May 




in Kabul had more to gain than to lose in the short term by longer and better-
coordinated hours at the Pakistani border.  
 In addition, the data is coded according to the general issue areas addressed in 
each request. This variable monitors if the domestic regime had distinctive interest in 
different kinds of requests or if certain topics were prone to compliance or non-
compliance. There were six categories: 
1. Political Reform, defined as actions intended to change government policies and 
institutions. These requests could include electoral issues, law enforcement, 
governance, protections for minorities, bureaucratic protocols, constitutional 
reforms, and reconciliation programs. 
2. Economic Reform, defined as actions intended to change economic policies. 
These requests include changes to exchange rates, currency manipulation, 
banking sector reforms, and tax policy. 
3. Development, defined as projects or activities intended to support economic 
growth and provide social services, including land reform, school construction, 
reconstruction of damaged urban areas, microfinance strategies, and assistance 
to refugees and veterans. 
4. Military Strategy, defined as actions intended to guide military forces in the 
execution of the war effort, including policies regarding the distribution and 
buying back of weapons and strategic decisions about troop placements. 
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5. Military Reform, defined as actions intended to change military policies and 
institutions, including expanding/shrinking security forces, increasing authority 
for military commanders, and reforming command and control protocols.  
6. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy, defined as actions intended to 
implement counterinsurgency strategy. These include COIN projects, negotiated 
ceasefire agreements, and pacification activities.  
 As important as interests may be in influencing compliance outcomes, however, 
first it must be determined if the domestic ally even has the ability to comply with a given 
demand. By definition, states that have partnered with foreign militaries to control their 
own territories are lacking governance capabilities. If they were more capable, they 
would likely avoid large-scale foreign military interventions to secure their regimes. 
Therefore capacity to implement a given request is a critical variable in determining 
compliance outcomes. 
 This control variable, capacity, accounts for whether the compliance process has 
been affected by missing capabilities in the domestic regime. If there is a clear indication 
from the documentary evidence or reliable historical accounts that compliance with a 
request has been affected by a lack of resource (usually political, economic or 
bureaucratic) within the domestic ally, the capacity variable for that request was coded 
as capacity limitations = yes (1). If there was no indication or discussion of a lack of 
capabilities effecting compliance processes, the variable was coded as capacity 
limitations = no (0).  Consider, for example, the March 1979 Soviet request to the Kabul 
that Afghanistan seal its border with Pakistan.97 Once the Soviets took over military 
activity in Afghanistan, they realized the impossibility of this task due to terrain and 
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cross-border Pashtun traditions. 50,000 Soviet soldiers assigned to the task could not 
prevent arms and militants from infiltrating into Afghanistan.98 It was a task far beyond 
the reach of Afghan communist forces in 1979.99  
However, a discussion of potential capacity limitations regarding a request does 
not automatically indicate that the request will go unfulfilled by the domestic ally. 
Requests with capacity concerns can be fulfilled, in full or in part, even if there is a signal 
that the compliance process may be affected by capacity limitations. Consider for 
example, the U.S. request to Kabul that poppy elimination programs focus on Helmand 
province.100 As the request was made, violence in Helmand was on the rise, as well as 
popular protests against counter-narcotics programs. Helmand was titled “the most 
difficult province for ISAF,” and U.S. policymakers noted the situation was straining the 
capacity of poppy elimination teams.101 Nevertheless, the Afghan government pushed 
forward and enforced some eradication programs focusing on Helmand including pre-
planting outreach programs, leading to partial compliance with the request.102  
 A second control variable, domestic internal politics, accounts for internal 
political conflict in domestic regimes. The domestic ally is not a unitary actor. As with 
any political organization, internal disputes can affect policy outcomes. This dynamic 
was coded separately from capacity because it addresses a different issue. In such cases, 
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the necessary infrastructure may be in place to execute the action requested, but the 
collective political will is absent. When there was evidence of a specific domestic political 
issue influencing the compliance environment, the variable was coded as domestic 
internal politics = yes (1), and when such evidence was not apparent, the request was 
coded as domestic internal politics = no (0).  
Of course internal divisions undoubtedly exist on the side of the intervening ally 
as well. However, because demands from intervening forces are drawn only from very 
high-level decision documents that have been passed along to international allies, the 
internal debate among organizations within the intervening power is largely immaterial. 
For the most part, the final product, the result of those policy debates, is where coding 
for this project begins, which excludes the debate in the organizations of the intervening 
force. If there are exceptions where internal politics in an intervening ally has influenced 
compliance outcomes, those are noted with examples in the substantive chapters on 
specific wars.  
However, internal political turmoil for the domestic regime can be expected to 
influence the process of determining whether or not to comply with a demand from an 
ally. Legislatures can block executive efforts to comply with allied requests, while 
political rivals can employ nationalistic rhetoric to threaten decision makers to refuse a 
request from an ally, and bureaucratic organizations can work at cross-purposes in order 
to diminish the effectiveness of a rival bureaucracy. Consider for example, the request 
discussed in Chapter 8. In 1988, New Delhi demanded that Colombo prevent individuals 
settled in northeast Sri Lanka after 1983 from voting.103 However there was notable 
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Sinhalese pressure within Colombo not to give in to this demand, as not only would it 
work against Sinhalese representation, but would also exclude individuals who had 
turned 18 since 1983, therefore violating longstanding electoral laws.104 Colombo did not 
comply.  
 A third control variable, wartime environment, tracked occasions when 
complications from the war impacted demands and the process of compliance. To put it 
in terms from Clausewitz, this variable is controlling for wartime “friction.” Because 
conflict is so dynamic and unpredictable, things do not go as planned. As Clausewitz 
wrote, “Everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties 
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction…”105 Simple demands can quickly 
become complicated by conditions of the war. This variable controls for these 
complications that may include violence, combat operations, refugee influxes, and 
offenses by the enemy.  
Initially, the issue of a wartime environment may seem constant, as every request 
in the sample is complied with or defied within a wartime context. However, even though 
each request was likely affected in some capacity by the conflict, this variable tracks 
instances where a specific consequence of military efforts fundamentally changed the 
compliance environment. Despite the fact that war is a constant, complications arising 
from war are not uniform. Friction is unpredictable; sometimes it paralyzes 
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organizations, sometimes it leaves operations unscathed. Furthermore, understanding 
how conflict can impact certain requests but not others may help provide insight into 
patterns of compliance.  
An example of the war influencing conditions relating to compliance can be 
observed in a demand previously referenced in this chapter: the 2009 U.S. request that 
Kabul extend service hours at certain important Afghan-Pakistan border crossings to 
facilitate trade and ease the burden of transporting goods into Afghanistan.106 In 
November 2011, U.S. aircraft attacked two Pakistani border posts, killing 24 Pakistani 
soldiers. In response, Pakistan shut down entry points into Afghanistan, including the 
routes specified in the demand to have longer hours, only to reopen them months later in 
July 2012.107 Compliance with the American demand that Kabul work on better-
coordinated schedules with the Pakistanis to facilitate trade was complicated by a U.S. 
military action in a way that could not have been foreseen. The request and indeed the 
whole border was a victim of wartime complications. For this request and ones with 
similar dynamics, this variable was coded as wartime environment (complications) = yes 
(1). For other requests where there was no evidence of a direct impact of military action 
on the compliance environment, the variable was coded as wartime environment 
(complications) = no (0). 
 The variables of domestic internal politics and wartime environment are 
monitoring separate phenomena and were coded as separate issues. However, because 
they can be observed somewhat infrequently when contrasted with other variables, and 
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both variables monitor occasions when outside factors complicate compliance, a 
composite control variable was created to combine them, Conditions of War or Internal 
Politics Impacting Compliance Environment. Various statistical models were employed 
throughout the study occasionally using the composite variable and, at other times, using 
the unique variables on domestic politics and wartime environment. The models always 
specify which data was used and the logic behind its usage.  
 In Chapter 4 there is an interesting corollary to the variable on wartime 
environment. As developed in that chapter, an existential threat to a domestic regime 
caused by conditions of the war is a separate phenomenon from routine friction of 
operating in a warzone as described in the previous variable. Because there is a 
difference between routine operations and emergency conditions, a separate variable 
was created to monitor acute enemy threats (immediate threat = yes (1) or no (0)). The 
Tet Offensive in Vietnam, for example, had a markedly different effect on compliance 
when contrasted with daily operations in a counterinsurgency war. Explanations and 
examples of this variable are provided in detail in Chapter 4 – Vietnam.  
 Lastly, the database gathers basic information to contextualize the dependent and 
independent variables previously described, including coding the year the request was 
made, based on the available evidence. Allies can ask for requests repeatedly if they are 
not complied with in a timely manner and if they are deemed important to the war effort. 
The earliest communication of that request to the domestic ally was coded as the initial 
year of the request. Additionally, the year of compliance was also coded and again was 
recorded as the earliest date based on the available evidence. These years of initial 
request and completion were tracked for both verbal compliance and substantive 




was not evident regarding compliance, a folder for each request was built to collect 
evidence, documents, and to construct a timeline of the history related to compliance.   
For more details and specific discussion of documents and coding rules, please see 
Appendix A, which provides a detailed account of coding by tracing requests from the 
U.S. war in Vietnam. Furthermore each chapter has a unique methodology section to 
discuss particular methodological questions related to information and data sources of 







“The Vietnamese in the street is firmly convinced that the U.S. totally 
dominates the GVN [Government of Vietnam] and dictates exactly what 
course shall be followed. However, the bitter and tragic truth is that the 
U.S. has been kept at such a distance from GVN circles and power that in 
joint councils or plans our views may be heard, some portions of our 
logic may be endorsed but with confrontations or matters that represent 
any truly revolutionary departure from existing GVN practices etc, we 
are light weights and presently do not possess the leverage or power to 
carry the day.”  
- The Pentagon Papers108         
         
 
This study examines counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign military 
interventions, identifying conditions promoting compliance by the domestic regime with 
the demands of their foreign ally and conditions promoting non-compliance. Using 
hundreds of declassified national security documents on U.S.-Vietnamese relations, I 
analyzed 105 U.S. demands, tracking relevant causal variables and compliance outcomes. 
There are two significant findings. First, there is an interaction effect between whether or 
not allied interests converge or diverge over a request, and dependency on the domestic 
regime to implement the request. If the Americans could undertake the requested 
activity unilaterally and Vietnamese and American interests converged, there were 
higher levels of Vietnamese non-compliance due to incentives to free-ride. If on the other 
hand interests diverged and the U.S. could act unilaterally, Washington was able to 
coerce Saigon into complying. Second, the shock of the Tet Offensive led to an increase in 
compliance, suggesting a serious external threat will motivate cooperation. This is in 
contrast to the influence of working under non-emergency wartime conditions, which 
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complicates the environment, makes requests difficult to fulfill and is correlated with 
higher rates of non-compliance.  
This chapter proceeds in several steps. First, using descriptive statistics it 
discusses the characteristics of the data uncovered on compliance in Vietnam. Second, 
four categories of independent variables are detailed and examples of their impact on 
Vietnamese compliance provided. Third, several statistical models are offered in order to 
provide an overview of the independent variables and their significance.  
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Vietnamese Compliance 
Over 2,500 U.S. primary source documents (10,000+ pages) were analyzed to 
identify 105 policy demands from the U.S. government to their Vietnamese allies from 
1964-1973. Each demand was found the primary source documents contained in the 12 
volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) on Vietnam published by 
the U.S. Department of State Office of the Historian.109 The process of identifying the 
outcomes of each of these demands again relied on these FRUS volumes, as well as the 
Pentagon Papers, declassified U.S. documents in the Digital National Security Archive 
(DNSA) and the Declassified Document Reference System (DDRS) as well as online U.S. 
government document repositories including usaid.gov and dtic.gov. A step-by-step 
guide to the methods used to process the data presented in this chapter on the U.S. war 
in Vietnam is offered in Appendix A.  
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Working from the 105 demands from the U.S. to Saigon over the course of the 
war, I found more instances of compliance than non-compliance. (46/105) 43.8% of the 
time the GVN (Government of Vietnam) complied with American demands (25/105) 
23.8% of the time they partially complied and (34/105) 32.4% they failed to adopt the 
policies demanded. Compliance was measured by researching the outcome of the 
demand and determining if there was mostly no implementation (non-compliance), 
some implementation (partial compliance) or mostly implementation (compliance) of 
the request. 110   
Table 4. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War 
 
War 
Rate of Full 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial and 
Full Compliance 
Combined 
Rate of Non 
Compliance  
South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)  
46/105 (43.8%) 25/105 (23.8%) 71/105 (68%) 34/105 (32.4%) 
Afghanistan (Soviet 
Demands)  
11/22 (50%) 3/22 (14%) 14/22 (64%) 8/22 (37%) 
Sri Lanka 
(Indian Demands)  
30/79 (38%) 19/79 (24%) 49/79 (62%) 30/79 (38%) 
Iraq  
(U.S. Demands) 







92/148 (62%) 56/148 (37.8%) 
 
Verbal compliance was also interesting. Like all allies, Saigon made promises. 
Sometimes it kept them; sometimes it didn’t. Vietnamese officials agreed to undertake 
the action being requested 72% of the time (76/105). This means they effectively agreed 
to implement almost ! proposals put forward by the U.S. Of these guarantees, 55% 
(42/76) were ultimately fully completed, 24% (18/76) partially adopted, and 21% (16/76) 
were not undertaken at all. This is interesting because it illustrates how verbal contracts 
are meaningful for the most part, but there is nevertheless a substantial amount of 
agreement without action. 
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Table 5. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War  
 
War 
Rate of Verbal 
Agreement 
Rate of Partial 
Verbal 
Agreement 
Rate of Partial 










South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)   








51/70 (73%) 10/70 (14%) 61/70 (87%) 9/70 (13%) 9/79 (11%) 
Iraq 
(U.S. Demands) 
75/83 (90%) 2/83 (2.4%) 77/83 (93%) 6/83 (7.2%) 23/106 (22%) 
Afghanistan  
(U.S. Demands) 
91/99 (92%) 0/99 (0%) 91/99 (92%) 8/99 (8%) 49/148 (33%) 
Figure 8 illustrates trends in the frequency of U.S. requests alongside rates of GVN 
compliance over the course of the Vietnam War. Explanations for trends in the graph 
based on developments in the war are found below the graph. Note that the number of 
requests complied with in 1968 rises above the number of new requests made by the U.S. 









Patterns in the direction, intersection and slope of the data show five discreet 
sections of the graph, 1964-66, 1967, 1968, 1969-70 and 1971-73. Each is a distinctive 
segment of the war where changing dynamics impacted the number of new U.S. 
demands and GVN rates of compliance. Details regarding these dynamics are provided 
below. Note that two trends are particularly significant. First, the shock of the Tet 
Offensive motivates Saigon to cooperate to an unprecedented level in 1968.  Second, the 
drop off in both requests and compliance after 1969 as the Nixon administration, weary 
of the war, largely gives up on asking the GVN to reform.  
1964-1966 
 At the start of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam there is an upward trend in both 
the number of requests made by the U.S. and requests complied with by the GVN.  
Washington has sharply increased aid to Saigon, and is asking for specific reforms in 
return. This funding combined with the American takeover of military operations frees 
the GVN to comply with relatively simple U.S. demands, including requests that call for a 
larger customs force, higher exchange rates, and the creation of secured stockpiles of 
weapons and rice to insulate Saigon against attack. Throughout this period the GVN is 
initiating more intensive projects that will take time to implement, such as land reform 
policies.  
1967 
 There is a sharp decrease in requests made and an even more dramatic drop in 
compliance. After a few years of U.S. military intervention, the GVN has already 
completed simple reforms requested, as well as made decisions regarding which U.S. 
requests to undertake and which to put off.  Complex projects in progress will take 





 The Tet Offensive of January 1968 is often cited as a turning point in Vietnam, 
and as illustrated by Figure 8 patterns in GVN compliance were also strongly affected by 
Tet. As I discuss later in the chapter, this spike in compliance in 1968 is a response to the 
NLF attacks on Saigon and other GVN urban strongholds, which shocked the GVN into 
recognizing the external threat posed by the enemy to their regime. There are multiple 
examples of this heightened sense of emergency inspiring compliance with U.S. 
demands. From the data in the graph a dramatic shift is evident between 1967 and 1968, 
where post-Tet the GVN is complying with more requests than the U.S. is making as it 
catches up on long-standing demands made between 1964 and 1967 in an effort to 
improve war-fighting capacity and solidify its position against the enemy.  
1969-1970 
Following the Tet Offensive and the initiation of numerous reforms which had 
been stalled prior to 1968, this period contains more requests complied with than new 
requests made by U.S. officials. This level of compliance is in part due to the completion 
of several reforms initiated in earlier years that took time to implement, as well as the 
immediate adoption of multiple new requests made by the U.S. during this period 
including offering concessions to North Vietnam in order to initiate peace negotiations.  
1971-1973  
 A drop off in both the rate of new requests made and the rate of requests 
complied with illustrate the stalemate of the last years of direct American military 
involvement in Vietnam. The vast majority of new demands pertain to compromises 
offered during peace talks. U.S. officials have largely stopped asking for new substantive 
domestic reforms, and old requests, such as specific anti-corruption measures continue 




 The trends observed in Figure 8 also indicate that compliance and the frequency 
of new requests drop off significantly over time in Vietnam. There are several factors 
contributing to this trend. First, easy reforms are adopted early on, causing a spike in 
compliance near the beginning of intervention. Second, Washington makes a large 
number of requests early in the war as expectations for reform are high.  Third, 
institutions, including Saigon’s bureaucratic policies and U.S. expectations for Saigon, 
eventually reach an equilibrium over time as certain reforms are neither enacted, nor 
expected, even if Washington believes reform would help the war effort. As Saigon grew 
increasingly accustomed to U.S. funding, support, and military efforts, it became harder 
for Washington to use those factors to compel change.  
 These observations tap into an extensive literature in comparative politics on 
political change, path dependence and historical institutionalism. Political and social 
institutions are often described as “sticky,” reflecting how laws, policies, procedures, 
offices, and bureaucracies become self-enforcing organizations. They reinforce the status 
quo in order to avoiding investing in new approaches, risking personal costs, and avoid 
uncertainly and change.111 Change can be observed early in the U.S. intervention in 
Vietnam as American funding pays for the creation of new bureaucratic structures, 
followed by a hardening of those organizations and institutional interests that seek to 
avoid change.   
 Table 6 presents the statistical findings using the data from the primary source 
documents. Although any student of the war in Vietnam should be wary of quantitative 
tools for estimating political and social aspects of the war, when used properly these 
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methods still provide great tools for understanding trends in the war. As the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense noted, 
quantitative analysis of the hundreds, even thousands, of “countless” 
events occurring in many parts of Vietnam every day... [was one of the 
only ways for commanders] to understand the war and how it was going… 
Any given action was seldom important by itself, and at first glance no 
patterns were seen.  Analysis however, revealed persistent patterns and 
cycles.112  
 Substantive compliance, the dependent variable, was coded along a continuum as 
non-compliance, partial compliance and compliance. Multiple models were created to 
simulate varying conditions of the war in Vietnam and to test the effect and significance 
of various independent variables on compliance. These variables are grouped into four 
categories: warfare and external threats, state capacity, dependency and interest.  
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Table 6. Compliance & Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Vietnam 
Ordered Probit –Saigon’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 1964 - 1973 
 !
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












GVN Can Be Excluded! 0.519 
 (0.367) 
!  ! ! !
Interaction Term:  
GVN Benefit and U.S. 
Unilateral Action%%1!
 !  -1.024* 
(0.491)!
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Military Strategy  
!    0.489 
(0.673) 
 

















! ! ! ! ! 1.195** 
(0.420)!
N (Observations)! 105! 105! 105! 105! 105! 105!
* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01 
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Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance 
 
Each independent variable was researched and coded in an original database on 
compliance in the Vietnam War. I find they have varying levels of influence on 
compliance and interact in interesting ways to determine what factors were influencing 
Saigon’s behavior.  
Capacity  
Studying compliance first requires accounting for capacity. Capacity is defined as 
the possession of adequate resources and sufficient institutional ability to translate 
resources into action. Note that capacity was measured by triangulating reporting on 
each task by the U.S. Embassy and military mission officials as well as secondary 
historical investigations.115 This is a threshold issue for compliance. A given actor would 
be fundamentally unable to accomplish a demand if they lack the attributes necessary to 
take on the activity in the first place.  
As expected, the data indicates capacity is strongly correlated with non-
compliance. When capacity is lacking, compliance is unlikely. Despite this predictable 
result, the relative low frequency that capacity was cited as an issue determining 
compliance is surprising. Less than 27% percent of all cases indicated South Vietnamese 
state capacity impacted performance. 27% is not necessarily a small figure, but for a 
struggling regime with faltering capabilities, capacity might be expected to play an even 
more prominent role. Yet the data shows that more often than not, capacity was not 
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decisive in South Vietnam’s lack of compliance with American demands.116 As detailed in 
Chapter 3 this may be due in part to U.S. officials recognizing the limits of the 
government in Saigon and tailoring their requests to actions they felt were in the grasp of 
their Vietnamese allies. This tendency influences the population of requests analyzed in 
this study since there is a self-selection against requests with capacity issues. However, 
as detailed in the methods chapter there are a couple of reasons why this is not 
problematic for the findings of this study. First, in Vietnam the U.S. had no choice but to 
ask for difficult reforms if those actions were critical for the war effort or if the U.S. was 
dependent on the GVN to adopt the given policy. Therefore some requests were made 
regardless of likely capacity issues. Second, U.S. policymakers were somewhat naïve in 
the early years of the war, underestimating the difficulty of certain tasks and 
overestimating Saigon’s interest in reform. Third, and most important, the bias in the 
sample towards requests the foreign power feels the domestic ally has the ability to 
implement is not unique to any particular war. In Vietnam and elsewhere it is reasonable 
to expect such a phenomenon across the population of counterinsurgency wars and to 
exist in similar future alliances. Such a bias does not impact the finding that lacking 
capacity tends to lead towards non-compliance.  
 
The most common capacity issue afflicting South Vietnam’s ability to implement 
demands came from deficient GVN bureaucratic institutions. American dollars were 
readily available to invest in reforms, but GVN officials nevertheless still had to cope 
with bureaucratic machinery that was at best underdeveloped and at worst inept. 
According to American documents, GVN administrators ultimately encouraged 
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ineptitude in the bureaucratic state structure by basing promotions on loyalty instead of 
effectiveness.  
There are multiple examples of faltering South Vietnamese state structures 
impacting compliance. In anticipation of greater military efforts and U.S. involvement in 
1964 Washington demanded that the GVN “increase the armed forces [RVNAF] (regular 
plus paramilitary) by at least 50,000 men.”117 The GVN ultimately complied by raising 
force levels, but not until late 1965 when American military forces had already arrived in 
large numbers and could actively participate in reorganization efforts. Until that point 
force numbers were dropping, even as they were supposedly being augmented. Saigon’s 
“failure to provide funds was blamed as a major reason for these military manpower 
deficiencies,”118 despite the fact that, as Secretary of Defense McNamara informed U.S. 
officials, “there is an unlimited appropriation available for the financing of aid to 
Vietnam. Under no circumstances is a lack of money to stand in the way of aid to that 
nation.”119 According to Ambassador Taylor, the problem was U.S. funds for South 
Vietnamese force expansion were not being distributed to local recruiters who could 
enlist troops.  The bureaucratic hold up from transferring funds from Saigon to local 
officials in the provinces was the primary roadblock to force expansion.  
 Washington also felt the general treatment of the ARVN was problematic. By 
1968 the average desertion rate in the ARVN was 17.7 per 1,000 soldiers, one of the 
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highest in modern history.120 But high desertion could not entirely be attributed to low 
morale among troops, as organizational and bureaucratic failures of ARVN 
administration also contributed to the trend.  Inadequate housing and insufficient leave 
allowances motivated desertions while inaccurate reporting that did not account for 
soldiers who left their units to join others closer to home or soldiers that went AWOL, 
but later returned, led to inflated rates. These organizational issues had a serious impact 
on the joint U.S.-GVN war effort.  
Faltering bureaucratic capacity also contributed to the inability of the GVN to 
provide services for its veterans. In November 1967 Saigon announced an “Action 
Program” attempting to address a range of social issues including “improved benefits for 
servicemen, veterans and dependents.”121 However, providing such benefits required 
institutions such as hospitals and vocational training facilities. Even with American 
funding, the development of such complex institutions at best takes years to accomplish.  
In order to improve treatment afforded Saigon’s veterans, President Thieu merged the 
Ministry of Veterans Affairs with the Ministry of Defense in order to transfer 
administrative know-how to the effort. Nevertheless, in the context of an ever-expanding 
war, resources from the Ministry of Defense and War Veterans were funneled towards 
military operations and away from veterans.122 It became common practice for 
Vietnamese commanders to report wounded veterans at home with their families as 
active service members in the field in order to continue to provide them a paycheck. This 
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practice inflated estimates of active ARVN personnel, leading to unrealistic force 
projections and understaffed units.  
Dependency and Unilateral Action  
At times only one ally can fulfill a particular role or undertake a given action. This 
causes the other partner to be “dependent” on its ally for executing the policy on behalf 
of the alliance. Such dynamics were evident in the U.S.-GVN alliance. Sometimes the 
U.S. could act unilaterally and take over tasks if Saigon failed to perform. American 
military planners did so on multiple occasions, including assuming control of efforts to 
expand the Port of Saigon, upgrading coastal transportation systems or funding youth 
programs.  Other times the U.S. could not independently tackle the issue, leaving it 
reliant on Saigon to move forward. To its frustration, Washington found itself entirely 
beholden on the GVN to dismiss inept or corrupt officials, amend the national 
constitution or lower the draft age.  In order to understand whether or not U.S. ability to 
independently undertake the actions requested impacted compliance I coded requests 
according to whether or not the U.S. could potentially adopt the activity on its own, or if 
it would fundamentally require GVN participation.123 Note that this variable tracks the 
ability to take independent action, according to the characteristics of the request, and 
does not monitor whether or not the U.S. actually chose to act on its own. Due to a 
counterinsurgency strategy emphasizing actions to strengthen the GVN, in order to 
prepare them for an U.S. withdrawal, Washington usually tried to work through 
Saigon.124 This was the case even if it meant the given task suffered, because the 
frequently arduous process of working through GVN institutions was expected to expand 
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their independence, capacity and legitimacy. This was usually a higher priority than any 
particular activity requested of the GVN.  
 The statistical model presented in Table 6 indicates that there is no linear 
relationship between American unilateral capability to undertake the task requested of 
Saigon and GVN compliance. On the one hand, under certain circumstances U.S. 
unilateral capability provided incentives working against cooperation, as the GVN could 
wait for the U.S. to undertake the activity, in effect getting the benefit without the cost. 
One example of free riding and non-compliance is a 1966 American request that the GVN 
make an effort to train more health personnel in order to provide better care for soldiers 
and civilians. For reasons of legitimacy, Washington thought it was best if Saigon 
participated as a public demonstration of GVN provision of government goods and 
services. Regardless of this goal, a year later U.S. personnel had taken over the task.125 
Because the U.S. could accomplish the task without their assistance, the GVN could 
choose to opt out and yet still benefit from the service.  
 On the other hand, as the analysis indicates, U.S. capabilities to undertake the 
activity without the GVN did not always inspire free-riding and non-compliance. If the 
U.S. is able to undertake the action independently, there is a motivation for Saigon to 
comply in order to gain favor with the Americans and better protect their interests. If 
Washington is likely to undertake the action regardless of Saigon, under certain 
conditions South Vietnamese leaders seem to have rationalized that they might as well 
take the lead and get what they can out of the policy.  
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“Report for the President,” June 28, 1966. 74 p. Secret, Special Handing Required. Released June 28, 1978. 
Johnson Library, White House Central File, Confidential File, Subject Reports, DOD, June 1966. Available 




This type of behavior is apparent in peace negotiations with North Vietnam. With 
American domestic support for the war plummeting, Washington was under increasing 
pressure to end the war. American officials were pushing the GVN to agree to 
concessions facilitating a negotiated solution. President Thieu was appalled by U.S. 
demands that his government accept the NLF as a political party in peace negotiations. 
His position on the NLF frustrated U.S. policymakers, who did not want their 
Vietnamese ally to stand in the way of a negotiated solution. North Vietnam was insisting 
on “four-party talks,” while the GVN advocated “two sided” negotiations to avoid 
recognizing the NLF. Saigon officials effectively stalled negotiations for two months by 
refusing to sit at a “square” table during negotiations, as the four sides would represent 
four parties. The issue was ultimately solved by all parties agreeing to call negotiations 
whatever they wanted (four-party or two-sided) and by adopting a Soviet-proposed 
compromise which included one large round table and two rectangular ones.126 
Regardless, the GVN reluctantly accepted the NLF as a party in negotiations, and even 
later acquiesced to U.S. demands that it offer to have direct talks with the NLF. 
America’s ability to negotiate with communist forces with or without the GVN and to 
potentially sign an agreement that excluded Saigon convinced GVN officials to acquiesce 
to American demands. Refusing to participate would only cost the regime more.   
Similarly, when the U.S. is unable to implement the requested policy 
independently varying degrees of both compliance and non-compliance are observed. 
This is apparent in the outcome of two tax reforms the U.S. requested in 1968. The first 
was for a substantial increase in GVN consumer taxes on oil and petroleum, designed to 
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increase GVN revenues by 3-4 billion piasters.127 Even though the GVN made a good deal 
of revenue from taxing the extraction and distribution of petroleum128 they nevertheless 
continued to provide tax exemptions for public consumption. As the U.S. Department of 
Defense summarized, “Ostensibly, the GVN has failed to act on raising petroleum taxes 
for the following reasons: Petroleum is thought to be a price leader; thus all prices will be 
raised if the price of petroleum is increased; it would be unpopular with the people; and 
it would be unpopular with the legislature which would have to approve a rise in 
petroleum taxes. In short, it is frequently claimed that in the interest of political stability 
the price of petroleum must not be allowed to rise.”129 Saigon never raised the petroleum 
taxes requested by the U.S.  
On the other hand Saigon complied with U.S. demands to place more taxes on an 
ad valorem basis, in order to allow revenues to “expand automatically with price 
increases.”130 This reform was important since inflation was causing a substantial 
decrease in revenue among taxes collected by a set fee per item. Although reforms were 
slow, the GVN promulgated a series of updated income and excise taxes from 1972-1974, 
“basing most of the new taxes on an ad valorem basis.”131 Note that these laws were 
passed when the U.S. was withdrawing forces and the GVN was faced with 
independence.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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The U.S. could not implement any such reforms unilaterally because only the 
GVN could create and enforce a new tax code for itself. Yet Washington was directly 
impacted by how much revenue the government collected because it not only would have 
to supplement cash shortages, but was acutely interested in fostering a sustainable South 
Vietnamese regime that had independent and renewable sources of income. Despite this 
interest, because the U.S. could not adopt the reforms unilaterally, the GVN could pass 
the tax law it determined would best serve its interests and ignore the other. Ultimately 
U.S. policy makers could do nothing about it.   
These examples illustrate how unilateral ability impacts compliance in varying 
ways, sometimes creating incentives for compliance, sometimes motivating non-
compliance. The statistical model confirms the hypothesis that foreign unilateral ability 
and the interests of the domestic ally interact to affect compliance outcomes.  If the U.S. 
can act unilaterally and GVN-U.S. interests converge, the GVN is more likely to fail to 
comply because there is incentive to free-ride. If the U.S. can act unilaterally and allied 
interests diverge, there is a higher probability of compliance as the GVN will agree in 
order to protect its interests since the action may be implemented without them anyway. 
The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible, as observed in the given tax 
examples above.  If independent action is not possible, and interests converge there is a 
higher likelihood of compliance. If alliance interests diverge and independent action by 
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Table 7. Ordered Probit—Saigon’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 1964 – 1973 


























This finding implies one set of circumstances in which coercion is possible for the 
foreign power.  If interests diverge between allies, but the foreign power has the ability to 
independently implement the requested policy, it can coerce compliance by threatening 
to execute the policy and leave the domestic partner out altogether. Somewhat counter 
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produced by combining two interest variables, “Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private 
Benefits for Domestic Regime.”  The variable was created in order to have a robust measure of Saigon’s 
interests based on costs and benefits, instead of substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while 
excluding the other. Since the foreign power (U.S.) is making the request, I assume they are interested in the 
request. Therefore interest convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic 
regime (Saigon). Interest is determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to 
Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic 
Regime) for the domestic regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary 
evidence. For more on coding see Vietnam Methodology – Appendix A. For more on the interest variables 




intuitively, such coercion is only possible if the domestic regime is opposed to the 
request.  If the regime is interested in the policy, it has little incentive to participate. It 
benefits most by waiting for the foreign power to carry out the policy, effectively free 
riding without paying the costs for implementation.  
This observation also has implications for trends in verbal compliance. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly there are more instances of promises given by Saigon lacking substantive 
follow-through when interests diverge and the U.S. is unable to act independently. In 
such a scenario, verbal compliance is used as a way of biding time and avoiding inter-
alliance conflict, without actually adopting the requested reform. Washington has no 
direct way to coerce compliance, punish the GVN for agreeing to undertake reforms 
without actually doing so, or implementing the policy independently. Under such 



















Figure 10. Rates of Verbal Compliance Without Substantive Compliance 
 
 
 Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power 
 
















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










(4/23) Verbal Compliance 







(1/14) Verbal Compliance and 






(3/16) Verbal Compliance 






(8/23) Verbal Compliance 




An additional variable related to dependency included in the statistical analysis 
(Table 6) was excludability. This measured whether or not the U.S. could exclude Saigon 
from benefiting from a request if they failed to comply.133 To illustrate with examples, the 
U.S. would be unable to exclude Saigon from benefiting from American military 
operations against North Vietnam as combating Saigon’s enemies inevitably helps 
Saigon. However, Washington might be able to exclude the GVN from benefiting from 
American efforts to build an anti-communist labor party. Such an organization could 
create political rivals that would challenge, not bolster, GVN control. However, this 
variable proved to have no notable impact on compliance, in part because the GVN did 
not necessarily believe the U.S. would exclude it from benefits of American efforts. Due 
to Washington’s interests in the survival and success of the GVN, it went against 
American interests to weaken the regime by withholding potential benefits. Actions 
undertaken to weaken the GVN would benefit the enemy more than the Americans. The 
GVN were aware of the dynamics of U.S. interests and did not seem concerned that the 
U.S. would exclude them, even if they had the ability to do so.  
Interests  
Having addressed the impact on compliance of 1) GVN capacity and 2) U.S. ability to 
implement reforms without Saigon, it is now appropriate to account for interests, a 
critical variable determining compliance. Interests are important. Whether or not you do 
what a partner asks largely depends on what they are asking for. How much does it cost? 
How do you benefit? Therefore it is not surprising that whether or not Saigon complied 
with U.S. demands in part hinged on what Washington had in mind.  
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In order to observe trends in compliance correlated with different issues, six categories 
were created to classify requests by their subject.  
1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and 
provide social services. Including land reform, school construction and assistance 
to refugees and veterans. 27/105, 26% of U.S. requests.  
2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including 
raising exchange rates and increased taxes. 12/105, 11% of U.S. requests.  
3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and 
institutions. Including policies towards opposition parties, protocol for 
administering funds, and legal and constitutional issues. 43/105, 41% of U.S. 
requests. 
4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Effort intended to implement U.S. 
counterinsurgency strategy. Including COIN projects (Project Take-Off, 
Operation Hop Tac), public sacrifice campaigns and pacification activities. 9/105, 
9% of U.S. requests. 
5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. 
Including military promotion policies, enemy POW treatment, reducing the draft 
age, and compensation levels. 9/105, 9% of U.S. requests. 
6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of 
the war effort. Including putting forces into Laos, invading Cambodia, and 








Figure 11. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S. to Vietnam 
 
 
Several trends emerge when comparing compliance among different subjects, including 
varying probabilities in compliance. From highest to lowest rates of compliance:  
1. Military Strategy 
2. Military Reform 
3. Economic Reform 
4. Development 
5. Political Reform 







Figure 12. Rates of Compliance by Subject Area - Vietnam 
Military Strategy. There are several factors producing the trends observed the 
above graph. First there is a higher probability of compliance with requests pertaining to 
military strategy ahead of other subjects. This may be because the South Vietnamese 
were more willing to take U.S. advice on military actions out of deference to U.S. military 
leadership. Additionally, Saigon was less likely to see such requests as threats to their 
regime as military actions target the enemy and usually do not require internal reform. 
Lastly, it is improbable that limited capacity would impact these requests, and increase 
the likelihood for non-compliance, as the U.S. would only ask the South Vietnamese to 
undertake strategic military operations Washington felt they could handle. U.S. military 
planners would have used U.S. forces if they thought its allies lacked sufficient capacity 
for the task at hand. There is less of a probability for bias based on perceived capabilities 
to arise among other issues, such as political reform, which the U.S. cannot undertake on 




before making claims that requests regarding particular subjects are more likely to be 
complied with than others.  
Counterinsurgency Projects.! !Requests pertaining to counterinsurgency strategy 
on the other hand had the lowest rate of compliance. This may be because many such 
demands required the adoption of U.S.-designed programs in which Saigon had little 
invested and did not necessarily support. Operation Hop-Tac, an early project intended 
to pacify contested areas near Saigon is one example. As the Pentagon Papers 
summarized, “While pacification received a low emphasis during troubled 1964-1965, 
there was one important exception: the Hop Tac program, designed to put "whatever 
resources are required" into the area surrounding Saigon to pacify it… General Taylor 
and General Westmoreland began Hop Tac, setting up a new and additional 
headquarters in Saigon which was supposed to tie together the overlapping and 
quarrelsome commands in the Saigon area. The Vietnamese set up a parallel, 
"counterpart" organization, although critics of Hop Tac were to point out that the 
Vietnamese Hop Tac headquarters had virtually no authority or influence, and seemed 
primarily designed to satisfy the Americans. (Ironically, Hop Tac is the Vietnamese word 
for "cooperation," which turned out to be just what Hop Tac lacked.)134 The plan failed, 
in part due to strategic flaws, and in part because of the lack of cooperation from Saigon. 
“The GVN has never considered Hop Tac its own plan and its own number one priority. 
The staff planning for the plan was done almost entirely by the United States, and then 
translated into Vietnamese. It is, in the eyes of many Vietnamese, ‘the plan of the 
Americans.’”135 !
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Furthermore, counterinsurgency programs tend to be time-consuming. Success 
comes slowly and may seem inglorious compared to large-scale conventional battles. 
Early in the war Saigon was reticent to commit troops to time-consuming population-
centered strategies. Regardless, by 1967 the U.S. began to increasingly value pacification 
programs that focus on the population in addition to operations attacking enemy forces. 
Washington applied more pressure to the GVN to participate. In mid-June 1967 Robert 
Komer, known as “Blowtorch Bob” for his potent administrative style,136 designed 
“Project Take-Off,” a pacification effort which Komer would head as deputy commander 
of MACV’s Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. 
U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker also backed Take-off, but felt “as is often the case… 
GVN performance remains the crucial factor,”137 and so focused efforts on pressuring the 
GVN to support Take-off.  
The timing of Take-Off worked against U.S. officials. Focused on the upcoming 
elections, President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky were not interested in new initiatives. 
According to one scholar:  
In the absence of an express top-level South Vietnamese direction, 
CORDS was forced to act on its own, bidding advisers and program 
managers in August to coordinate Takeoff programs with their 
counterparts. In other words, CORDS issued guidance to the South 
Vietnamese through its advisory network hoping its advisers would be 
able to get local officials committed to Takeoff. As an exercise in leverage, 
Takeoff was inauspicious since CORDS failed to convince the government 
to issue orders to its own officials. Without obvious, high-level South 
Vietnamese endorsement, Takeoff could be viewed only as an American 
effort.138  
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But not all counterinsurgency programs were sunk by a lack of cooperation from 
Saigon. Project Take-Off soon became better focused and reorganized under the Phuong 
Hoang or Phoenix program, a highly effective campaign against “VCI,” Viet Cong (NLF) 
infrastructure. It aimed to “neutralize,” via capturing, interrogating or killing communist 
NLF shadow government operators active in contested areas of South Vietnam.139 
Recently shocked by the Tet Offensive and hoping that without supporting 
infrastructure, guerrillas would be uncoordinated, unfed, and ideally ineffective, 
President Thieu complied with U.S. requests to support the program, signing a decree in 
July 1968. The GVN provided operators, interrogators, intelligence officers and 
infiltrators. Despite widespread criticism of Saigon’s implementation efforts, after 1968 
high-level GVN support for the program made a decisive difference to the program.140 
Under persistent American tutelage, GVN intelligence processes made the Phoenix 
program devastatingly effective. After the war, a senior NVA officer, Colonel Bui Tin 
admitted the program neutralized thousands of communist cadres, while communist 
authorities later said Phoenix was “the single most effective program you used against 
them in the entire war.”141 Therefore, there are several reasons why the GVN might have 
had difficulty complying with COIN projects early in the war. Nevertheless they did 
eventually cooperate with certain plans and had notable results.  
Economic Reform.!!There was also higher than average levels of compliance with 
demands for economic reforms. This is in part because U.S. suggestions for economic 
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139 Phoenix remains a highly controversial program. It has been categorized as a CIA assassination campaign 
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rehabilitation agreed with Saigon’s interest in economic stability. Additionally, because 
the U.S. was directly funding much of South Vietnam’s budget, it was able to put specific 
oversight mechanisms in place, providing Washington leverage dictating terms and 
conditions. USAID’s Commercial (Commodity) Import (CIP) Program is one such 
example. CIP was a complex aid program, but did a remarkable job balancing varying 
fiscal and economic pressures. From 1954 to 1975 under CIP the U.S. provided over $4 
billion worth of goods and materials to Vietnamese importers,142 an amount that made 
up 70% of non-military aid. A U.S. Congressional investigation summarized CIP’s 
multiple stages: “AID issues procurement authorizations permitting the purchase of 
certain approved commodities and sets up dollar credits against these authorizations in 
U.S. banks. In Vietnam, importers registered with the GVN invite bids… The United 
States makes payment to the suppliers in these countries through letters of credit… The 
importer obtains a letter of credit from his bank and an import license from the GVN. He 
then forwards his order to the supplier. The U.S. bank where AID has set up the dollar 
credits makes payment… The Vietnamese importer pays his bank the piaster (local 
currency) equivalent of the dollar cost… and then sells it on the local market. The 
Vietnamese bank pays the piasters received from the importers into a GVN-owned 
counterpart fund which theoretically is jointly controlled by the United States and the 
GVN.”143 U.S. MACV budget officials conducted reviews of GVN military budgets, and 
recommended programs to be funding from the CIP counterpart fund. Payments made 
from this fund are verified and additional spending is approved on a monthly basis by 
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MACV officials. “On occasion, withholding of monthly releases for military budget 
support has been used to achieve broad political objectives.”144 Therefore high levels of 
compliance with economic reforms may be the product of U.S. oversight over economic 
programs, conditions for aid and a shared U.S.-GVN interest in Vietnam’s economic 
stability. !
Military Reform.!Oversight of the GVN’s military budget may have contributed to 
the higher than average compliance with U.S. demands for military reforms such as force 
increases and reorganization schemes. But despite the supervision, not every demand 
the U.S. asked of the military was amended to suit American interests. U.S. officials 
became increasingly frustrated with Saigon’s execution of communist prisoners of war 
and asked the military to consult American officials before shooting prisoners. American 
military officials feared Hanoi would retaliate against U.S. P.O.Ws and wanted the GVN 
to stop. Regardless of U.S. requests, GVN military courts nevertheless intermittently 
ordered executions.145 !
Development.!!Requests pertaining to development had lower than average rates 
of compliance when compared to other demands. This may at first be surprising 
considering Saigon’s interest in development activities and the vast American funds 
available for projects. But there are several reasons why there isn’t a high likelihood of 
compliance with these requests. Large development projects require coordination, 
institutional know-how and time. As a result, partial compliance is almost twice as likely 
as non-compliance or full compliance, as projects are initiated, but get bogged down in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
144 “An Investigation of the U.S. Economic and Military Assistance Programs in Vietnam,” October 12, 
1966. 39. 
145 “A military court in Danang, South Vietnam, sentences a member of the Viet Cong to die before a firing 
squad for the murder of civilians in Hue during the Tet offensive.” Cable. Department of State. Secret. April 




the process. More than half of development requests were impacted by Saigon’s faltering 
capacity, 10% more than other requests. Additionally, almost 60% of development 
requests in the database were coded as being complicated by combat. Development is 
hard, but it is even more difficult in war. As an example, in 1966 U.S. asked the GVN to 
work with USAID providing schools for refugees. The task proved gradually more 
difficult as military activities throughout Vietnam produced more refugees. Greater 
demand raised the level required to sufficiently provide for this request. 146 Therefore 
development projects are prone to non-compliance due to limited state capacity and 
difficulties operating in a warzone. !
Political Reform.! ! The majority of demands from the U.S. were for political 
reform. This is not surprising. As a foreign power the U.S. would be unable to undertake 
internal reforms for the GVN, and therefore is required to ask. Furthermore, unlike the 
military budgeting process, the U.S. did not have much oversight over the GVN civilian 
government. “The control exercised by the United States over expenditure of the 3 billion 
piasters attributed to the civil sector of the GVN budget is, however, virtually 
nonexistent.”147 There are several reasons why the U.S. did not have supervision over the 
GVN civilian budget.  First, the U.S. State Department did not want to undermine the 
autonomy of the South Vietnamese administration. An important component of U.S. 
efforts in Vietnam were the reinforcement of an effective independent non-communist 
state administration. American policymakers feared that if the majority of internal 
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decisions in Vietnam were made in Washington, the GVN would grow overly reliant and 
the U.S. would be unable to withdraw in the future. Secondly, the GVN was defended its 
independent decision making process. Recovering from a long colonial legacy they were 
reluctant to sacrifice any undue influence to the U.S. Overall political reforms comprised 
41% of all requests, and although there was more compliance than non compliance 
among requests, there was less when compared to other issue types. This should not be 
surprising considering many of these requests, including adding legal provisions for run-
off elections or dismissing specific officials U.S. military officials deemed corrupt run 
against strong interests held by regime officials. !
These findings are helpful for understanding trends in compliance among various 
issues. However, according to the statistical models (Table 6), the results were not as 
significant as most other variables in the study. There are several reasons why this is the 
case, and why predicting compliance outcomes cannot be based on issue type alone. 
First, there are relatively few cases of requests for military strategy (5/105), military 
reform (9/105) and political-military counterinsurgency strategy (9/105) in the data.  
Second, there was no significant relationship between issue type and compliance 
when partial compliance and full compliance were incorporated into a single category. 
Issue type may help distinguish between compliance and partial compliance, but is not 
as useful helping to explain GVN compliance and non-compliance. Ultimately, the best 
approach is not to use issue type as a predictor of compliance or non-compliance, but to 
consider the findings within each type. Understanding, for example, that development 
requests are particularly prone to failing due to insufficient bureaucratic capacity and 
complications from combat may help explain the outcomes of those types of requests. 




and issue types.  Additionally, the U.S. budget oversight over economic and military 
areas of South Vietnam that was absent over GVN political affairs, illustrates that 
mechanisms for leverage can be built into aid packages and can make a difference in 
compliance. However, such mechanisms were a trade off for the U.S. They were useful in 
compelling reform, at least in the margins, but may have fostered dependencies that 
harmed GVN state building. Ultimately the fact that issue type may not be able to predict 
much about compliance on its own is itself an interesting finding. That the general 
subject of the request is secondary to other factors in determining compliance may help 
identify factors that make a sizable difference.  
Interests—Costs and Benefits 
Potential costs and benefits for each demand were coded by creating two dummy 
variables to help organize basic information about the demands. The first variable tracks 
whether or not the goal of the demand could potentially bring short-term benefits to the 
GVN. The second tracks whether or not the request could potentially impose short-term 
costs.148 These were coded separately, as they are not mutually exclusive. Some demands 
pose neither potential costs nor benefits, since the U.S. fully funded most requested 
projects, while some are one or the other and some are both. The 1966 U.S. request that 
the GVN collect larger amounts of revenue from domestic sources is one example of both 
potential benefits and political threats. In 1965 the U.S. estimated that domestic taxes 
only accounted for seven percent of South Vietnamese GNP.149 U.S. officials felt this was 
untenable and demanded higher tax revenue in order to minimize aid dependency. On 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
148 For more see Vietnam Methodology – Appendix. In short demands were coded for whether they 
promoted the creation a good that could be used by the domestic regime to consolidate its hold on power, 
profits or profit potential or if it promoted a public good that would not directly benefit the domestic regime 
in the short-term.  
149 James M. Carter, Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954-1968, 1st ed. 




one hand, Saigon could potentially benefit from increased revenue and diverse sources of 
funding that would continue to exist after the American withdrawal. On the other hand, 
an increase in tax revenue could potentially diminish public support, as higher taxes are 
unpopular, and there might be less aid from the U.S., as Washington calculated how 
much Vietnam would be given by filling in whatever the GVN could not raise 
domestically. As Robert Keohane noted, needing assistance “does not entail only 
liabilities;” it can create assets.150 
The potential for short-term benefits for Saigon was one of the highest predictors 
of compliance.151 If the goal of the demand could potentially be made to serve the private 
interests of head policymakers in the GVN, it had a much higher likelihood of being 
adopted than if it could not. 
One example of how potential short-term benefits can impact compliance 
decision is 1964 request that the GVN increase expand military forces “by at least 
50,000.”152 Because the United States was largely funding the military expansion, GVN 
officials reacted positively.  This increase would provide them greater forces and 
expanded reach into disputed parts of South Vietnam. Saigon agreed to implement the 
increase, but compliance did not come straight away. Due to enemy activity and high 
desertion rates in early 1965 U.S. officials determined that “not only was RVNAF 
[Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] strength considerably below the goals set and 
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agreed upon, it was in considerable danger of actually decreasing.”153 General 
Westmoreland reported in June 1965 that the ARVN’s failure to expand and their 
lackluster performance left “no course of action open to us except to reinforce our efforts 
in SVN with additional U.S. or Third Country forces as rapidly as is practical during the 
critical weeks ahead.”154 This sequence of events worked for Saigon, because the U.S. 
military would combat the NLF, while Washington paid for a larger Army for South 
Vietnam. After U.S. troops arrived, the RVNAF got larger. “RVNAF strength had 
increased by 152% from 1960 to 1966, going up by over 100,000 in the 18 months 
preceding the beginning of 1967.”155 This is an interesting example of how the GVN 
tended to comply with U.S. demands in ways that served their interests. Requests that 
had the potential to be adopted in ways that serve short-term GVN interests were more 
likely to be implemented.  
In accounting for interest, potential threats can be just as important as potential 
benefits. Interestingly, however, this was not the case in Vietnam as potential threats to 
the GVN were not as significant in determining compliance with U.S. demands as 
potential benefits. There are several interesting reasons why this was the case. In order 
to determine if prospective threats impact rates of compliance a variable was created to 
code requests according to whether or not they could develop into a threat to ruling elites 
in Saigon.156 Although the coefficient on this variable (Table 6) is consistently negative, 
indicating a correlation between potential threats and non-compliance, this factor is less 
statistically significant when compared to potential benefits. This lack of significance 
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may be surprising, as avoiding potential threats could be assumed as a major component 
of interest, but there are structural aspects of the U.S. alliance with Saigon that may have 
caused threats to factor less prominently in compliance decisions. Foremost of these 
structural factors is the impact of U.S. commitment to the alliance. 
As discussed in the introductory chapters regarding the foundation for the study, 
alliance dynamics are broadly based on aspects of alliance commitment, dependence and 
interest.  The form of alliance between a foreign power and domestic ally fighting a 
counterinsurgency war fosters a unique form of commitment, especially in cases 
analyzed in this study where the foreign actor has demonstrated a strong commitment by 
enduring over 1,000 combat deaths in the conflict. A high level of commitment from an 
ally may cause domestic threats to be less of an issue than would otherwise be the case. 
In this study, this means potential threats may not be very important in GVN compliance 
determinations.   
The impact of potential threats is also contingent on the political situation. If the 
foreign power has few options for viable domestic allies, the regime in power may feel 
secure in focusing on benefits instead of threats. Since many requests are potential 
opportunities for both costs and benefits depending on the turn of events, the regime in 
question may prefer to act on benefits, especially if threats seem less acute without 
domestic challengers and a strong foreign commitment to their survival. According to 
the Pentagon Papers, “by May 1955, Ngo Dinh Diem had demonstrated to his satisfaction 
that the U.S. was sufficiently committed to South Vietnam that he could afford on 
occasion to resist American pressure, and even to ignore American advice. Diem knew, 




communist South Vietnam.”157  
  With American consent Diem was overthrown in 1963, but to its dismay 
Washington found itself in similar positions with subsequent leaders. As the National 
Security Council reported to President Johnson in 1965 regarding the reigning 
Vietnamese official, “Our principal reason for opposing any sharp break with Khanh is 
that we see no one else in sight.”158 Without alternatives, U.S. interests in a stable, non-
communist South Vietnam became inextricably tied to the successes of the generals in 
charge, in effect providing them with plenty of bargaining leverage in negotiations with 
Washington. U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Ellsworth Bunker was reportedly 
convinced that to achieve [U.S. goals] he had to develop and maintain a 
close working relationship with Thieu. He saw no alternative leader whom 
the United States could trust to help it attain its objectives in Vietnam. 
Given this attitude, it is not surprising that he tried to avoid making Thieu 
look bad to the extent he could. Bunker’s warm and supportive relations 
with Thieu came under considerable strain after Lam Son 719, however. 
The problem was the conduct of the 1971 Vietnamese presidential election 
in which Thieu sought a second term. Its outcome—not the fact that Thieu 
won, but how he won—represented a serious setback to Bunker’s efforts to 
promote stronger political institutions in South Vietnam.159  
 
Thieu rigged the election, an event Bunker considered a major setback to his 
efforts developing political institutions in Vietnam. A less optimistic take on the trend of 
potential benefits having a greater impact on compliance than domestic threats may be 
that a regime such as Saigon’s has proactively undertaken sufficient actions to secure its 
position so it is not actually threatened by U.S. requests. Loyal institutions such as 
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patronage networks may have been so secure that Saigon felt it could risk sticking its 
neck out and adopting certain policies like forming groups with rival domestic political 
parties as such risks also posed potential political benefits. As Hilton Root wrote 
regarding the military establishment, “under Thieu the officer corps was packed with 
loyal generals, whose numbers increased from forty to seventy-three. The enlargement 
was intended to prevent the coordination of a coup by a few senior officers. Thieu often 
promoted officers to duties far beyond their abilities, and the new appointees gained 
shares of the state’s economic resources through sanctioned venues for corruption.”160 
Stacking institutions like the military with loyalists minimizes the threat of a coup, and 
therefore provides some breathing room for actions that may entail risk-taking behavior.  
Overall high foreign commitment and few domestic challengers may mean a 
regime such as Saigon can focus on benefiting ahead of worrying about short-term 
political threats. This is good news for foreign powers fighting counterinsurgency wars 
because allies may be more willing to take short-term risks and endure costs if there is 
high commitment from allies and strong potential short-term benefits. Nevertheless 
there are important examples of Saigon avoiding requests made by the U.S. due to the 
inherent threat posed by the American proposal to the Saigon regime. The U.S. assertion 
that Saigon offer a comprehensive amnesty program to the NLF is one example. In 1964 
the U.S. started insisting on a program of “national reconciliation” offering southern 
Vietnamese communists a role in the GVN in order to provide a legitimate route for 
political expression. However as the Pentagon Papers surmised: 
Those Americans who hoped that National Reconciliation would become 
a major new appeal to VC at middle and higher levels were to be in for a 
disappointment in the year following Manila. The GVN did not agree with 
the philosophy behind total forgiveness to the enemy, and continually 
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hedged its statements and invitations to the VC so that they resembled 
surrender with amnesty rather than “national reconciliation.” In fact, the 
GVN did not make an internal announcement on the National 
Reconciliation program until Tet, 1967, almost four months after the 
Manila conference, and three months after the GVN had "promised" the 
U.S. that it would make the announcement. Then, when the Vietnamese 
finally did make the announcement, they used the phrase “Doan Ket,” 
which is accurately translated as “National Solidarity,” rather than 
‘National Reconciliation.’161  
 
Ultimately, the GVN never enacted a meaningful reconciliation or amnesty plan, 
instead the efforts merely repeated surrender programs such as those run under the 
“Chieu Hoi” campaign which sought to turn NLF members to the non-communist side, 
which fell far short of offering a comprehensive inclusion plan to the NLF as a political 
identity such as the plan imagined by U.S. authorities.162  
Although requests that posed potential threats to Saigon are correlated with non-
compliance, statistical analysis of the data collected indicates that this correlation is not 
particularly strong (Table 6). Therefore, it is better to embed this variable within the 
context of other factors, such as capacity and potential benefits, part of the larger story 
determining compliance.  
Conditions of War, Internal Politics and External Threats  
As the American military and diplomatic corps in Vietnam were acutely aware, 
coercion and inter-alliance bargaining with the GVN took place amidst a sizable 
insurgency, adding a layer of complexity to accomplishing tasks in Vietnam. In order to 
provide a reflective model of compliance and coercion in U.S.-GVN relations it is 
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important to account for significant aspects of the war that impacted alliance relations. 
In particular I will examine shifts in demands and changes in the war and external 
threats that influenced behaviors.  
War Impacting the Compliance Environment 
Because the environment of the war impacted U.S.-GVN relations, it is important 
to analyze how hostilities may have affected compliance. Statistical analysis showed that 
complications from war, including violence, combat, and refugees, actually increases the 
probability of compliance. However, I will argue the relationship is not as simple as it 
may appear and should be analyzed cautiously.     
This variable tracks when complications from the war impacted circumstances 
surrounding compliance.163 One example that may illustrate the potential impact of 
military operations is Washington’s seemingly banal request in 1964 that the GVN “carry 
out a sanitary clean-up of Saigon.”164 This unexpectedly turned out to be one of the most 
interesting demands in the study, which illustrates how specific externalities from 
fighting a war impact alliance dynamics and compliance.  
Washington was receiving regular reports from U.S. advisors describing mounds 
of uncollected garbage and unsanitary living conditions in Saigon. The GVN municipality 
did not have the infrastructure to handle demand, and the U.S. was set on expanding 
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sanitation capacity by providing increasing amounts of non-military aid providing trucks 
specifically converted for garbage collection.165 
Nevertheless Saigon’s trash removal system vanished with the influx of American 
troops. Even though American bases took care of their waste, the American arrival had 
unforeseen effects on the rest of the city. According to Neil Sheehan in 1965, “sanitation 
services collapsed in Vietnam, because the workers quit en masse and rushed away to 
labor at the base construction sites for much higher salaries than the municipality could 
pay.”166 The problem became worse as military operations intensified, causing the cities 
to flood with people escaping the war. Before the U.S. buildup in South Vietnam, 80-85% 
of the population was located in rural communities throughout the country, primarily 
focused on farming.167 But activities by the NLF, GVN and the U.S. pushed hundreds of 
thousands into urban centers. Between 1960 and 1970 Saigon reported a 45% increase in 
population.168 American officials reported on the migration into the cities.  
Vietnam has become an urban society… Except for some efforts by AID in 
the area of public works (water, electricity and road building) and the 
Vietnamese government’s concentration on security measures, the cities 
of Vietnam have been residual claimants on the time, energy and 
resources of pacification officials. While such questions as poverty, 
pollution, sanitation, housing, traffic congestion, noise, and crime are not, 
strictly speaking, insurgency related, they do bear heavily on the 
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Sanitation conditions in Saigon were so dire that the bubonic plague resurged, to 
“alarming proportions” in 1967, decades after the French made notable headway 
reducing its incidence throughout the region.170   
Ultimately the GVN made an effort to expand sanitation projects in Saigon, but 
always seemed one step behind expanding urban demand. The GVN’s primary focus had 
to be security; everything else was secondary. American frustration with the garbage 
caused American military units to sporadically get involved, or military officials would 
hire U.S. contractors to organize Korean or Vietnamese workers to do the job.  
Nevertheless USAID and Department of State officials felt it was important that the GVN 
municipality provide services and so refocused projects around their participation.171 
This example of sanitation in Saigon illustrates how complicated achieving 
“compliance” can be.172 Furthermore, it shows how this variable on war changing the 
compliance environment requires careful handling.  Unintentional consequences of 
combat can suddenly increase what is expected of the domestic regime, making 
compliance more difficult to achieve. Under these conditions I would anticipate a 
negative impact on compliance. This assumption is supported by noting that the variable 
becomes statistically significant when partial compliance and compliance are counted 
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collectively as “compliance.” If the wartime environment creates obstacles for 
compliance, the war itself may be preventing full compliance and promoting partial 
compliance.  Friction from military operations makes compliance more difficult.  
Nevertheless, the coefficient in the statistical model is positive. The impact of war 
on the compliance environment is correlated with increased levels of compliance. This is 
an important observation discussed in depth in the next section, as there are conditions 
in which the war can actually provide strong motivations for cooperation with the 
demands of the foreign ally. Therefore, the general variable controlling for the 
complications of war should be handled cautiously, understood as an interesting warning 
of problematic situational factors involved in wartime, but it would be inappropriate to 
make further assumptions based on the statistical results due to variation within the 
cases.  
External Threats—The Tet Offensive 
Of the various potential impacts war can have on compliance measured in the 
previous variable, one was particularly effective in motivating cooperation from Saigon. 
As illustrated earlier in Figure 8 regarding compliance over time, the GVN became more 
prone to adopt U.S. demands in the years directly following the Tet Offensive. The 
proximity of the enemy seems to have driven allies closer.  Although some instances of 
compliance can be attributed to progression, (complex requests take a few years to 
implement), however qualitative analysis shows that much of this upward trend in 
compliance is due to the shock of Tet in 1968.  
 
For example, consider the shift of high-level GVN opinions on draft procedures 
for South Vietnam. Starting in 1964, the U.S. began to press the GVN to implement a 




would enforce a lower draft age. The Pentagon Papers describe how events related to this 
demand unfolded in 1964:  
General Khanh signed a mobilization decree on April 4; at the time the 
decree satisfied the USG as meeting McNamara's recommendation on the 
subject. However, Khanh delayed signing implementing decrees for the 
mobilization decree indefinitely; and it has never become clear what it 
would have meant, if implemented. In May, Khanh purportedly 
broadened the draft to include older and younger men, and announced 
formation of a new "Civil Defense Corps" but neither came to anything.173  
 
With the national draft age effectively set at 20 the U.S. continued asking the 
GVN to adopt programs lowering the draft age to 18 or 17 in order to add to ARVN 
strength.174 Meanwhile, according to U.S. estimates, the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
South Vietnamese insurgents drafted all males from contested areas between 15 and 
45.175 Saigon was concerned that lowering the draft age would impact public opinion and 
motivate an American drawdown. Their official reasons for avoiding enforcement 
focused on social stability. “Prior to Tet, the GVN had cited social and religious mores to 
resist American demands to lower the draft age from 21 to 18.”176 
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However, the immediacy of the threat brought home by the Tet Offensive seems 
to have provided sufficient motivation for Saigon to decide to go with the American 
recommendation and emphasize mobilization. According to General William 
Westmoreland,  
In March [1968] 19-year olds became eligible for the draft, followed on 1 
May by 18-year-olds. The false starts at mobilizing manpower in previous 
years were partly due to the weak and unstable nature of the central 
government. But in this critical time, the Tet offensive had further 
crystallized support for an already strengthened and stabilized 
government. This solidifying effect was, in my estimation, the single 
development which enabled the mobilization program to be successful.177  
President Thieu was able to secure permanent parliamentary authorization on a 
general mobilization law in June 1968, which “authorized the Government to conscript 
all men between 18 and 38 into the regular forces, and those over 16 and between 39 and 
50 into the Self-Defense Corps.”178  The conscription policies advocated by the U.S. since 
1964 were effectively implemented as U.S. sources reported:  
Under the mobilization decrees and later laws, the strength of the 
Vietnamese Armed Forces rapidly increased. In the first six months of 
1968 total strength rose by 122,000 men. The upsurge in volunteers was 
mainly attributable to the mobilization; effective enforcement of the draft 
and in the wake of the Tet offensive, a noticeably greater allegiance to the 
central government on the part of the people was a whole. This kind of 
growth of the South Vietnamese Army had been our goal for years.179  
 
In this case, Tet motivated compliance because it not only inspired high-level 
GVN officials to issue orders, but furthermore motivated the bureaucracy to work 
towards implementation. As Robert Komer noted in his influential 1972 RAND study,  
Most experienced observers on the scene have noted a marked 
improvement in overall GVN administrative performance beginning with 
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Tet 1968. In part this is attributable to increased U.S. advisory influence 
and, occasionally pressure. In part it is simply that the earlier efforts, of 
1965-1967, began to bear more fruit over time. But even greater influences 
on GVN behavior were the twin shocks of Hanoi’s Tet and post-Tet 
offensives and the resultant clear beginning of U.S. de-escalation. Thus in 
a way Tet 1968 marks a watershed for the GVN as well as for the U.S. 
effort in Vietnam, GVN realization that a far greater effort in its part 
would be required to survive finally led to actual national manpower 
mobilization, extensive training programs for local officials, a major 
acceleration of pacification efforts, several economic reforms and the 
like.180  
 
However, as influential as the external shock of the Tet offensive was on GVN 
compliance, not everything the American advisors asked for was adopted in 1968. In 
particular, specific bureaucratic reorganization measures the U.S. advocated for on the 
local and mid-level of the GVN went unfulfilled. In August 1967 U.S. Ambassador Bunker 
outlined two critical administrative reforms, 1) giving the province chief operational 
control in his province over military forces engaged in pacification in the province, 
resources for development programs, and control of technical cadre, including 
agricultural, engineering, education, public health and public works officials and 2) 
centralizing rural development planning and coordination efforts in non-Revolutionary 
Development hamlets.181  
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Regarding the first reform, province chiefs had difficulty coordinating 
pacification efforts including managing military forces and development cadre in part 
because they lacked the authority to issue orders across these organizations. Although 
most chiefs were ex-military commanders themselves, ARVN officers operating the 
region were reticent to surrender any authority to individuals outside the military chain 
of command. Similarly, the various development bureaucracies in Saigon refused to 
make their personnel accountable to outside organizations including local province 
authorities. The Tet Offensive did little to alter these calculations. As a comprehensive 
1969 U.S. Department of Defense report on South Vietnam’s military and political 
organization summarized 
Province chiefs have had considerable difficulty at times in getting 
cooperation and action out of a regular forces supporting them. (sic) Thus 
obtaining the necessary forces to deal with local force battalion has been 
difficult. Relationships between RD cadre, village councils and central 
government agencies. Technical service officials are often apt to look to 
their ministries for direction and ignore the province chief.182  
 
The same report tracked marked failure in Bunker’s second reform, centralizing 
rural development efforts in the areas requiring better coordination,  
province and district officials have had problems controlling ARVN and 
directing the PRU, Special Police Branch and National Police Field Forces. 
All of these attitudinal factors and other difficulties from Saigon to village 
and hamlet level combine to make it difficult to fully integrate and 
combine political/military operations which are required by the US/GVN 
methodology to provide adequate security…. In the past, there has been a 
constant balancing off of political and military forces by the various 
incumbent political powers in attempts to ensure the continuance in 
power. Previous American attempts to convince the GVN to centralize 
control over various internal security forces in accordance with our 
organizational principles often have gone astray because they ran counter 
to the realities of SVN political life.183   
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“Several problems soon developed” when efforts were made to introduce new 
organizational structures. 
There either was no follow-on government presence to continue the RD 
work, or there was an existing administrative structure in the hamlet 
village which resented RD Cadre interference and, further, which was 
often ignored by the cadre thus exacerbating the differences between the 
cadre and the existing structure.184  
Therefore a lack of interest as well as inadequate capacity on behalf of Saigon’s 
ruling policymakers to impose changes on entrenched GVN bureaucratic organizations 
at the provincial and district levels left these interests in power to maintain the status 
quo. Compliance in these areas was not impacted by the January 1968 Tet Offensive in 
the same way it had in other areas. This may be due to the strength of entrenched 
bureaucratic interests, as well the potential distance of these entities from the 1968 
offensive. Tet was an effective psychological campaign because it shocked Vietnam’s 
urban areas and American public opinion of the war. It was the first battle of the U.S. 
war in Vietnam fought in urban settings and proved the enemy could coordinate a sizable 
offensive in South Vietnam. GVN officials operating in more rural areas, some of whom 
were already accustomed to bloodshed from communist assaults, were either not 
attacked during Tet, or not nearly as shocked by the violence as Saigon. Therefore the 
external threat exposed during the Tet Offensive was instrumental in motivating GVN 
compliance with U.S. demands, but it was not a cure-all for Saigon’s bureaucratic 
failings.  
The End of the War and U.S. Withdrawal 
Testing the impact of changes in America’s commitment to its alliance with 
Vietnam by noting GVN compliance throughout the American intervention (high U.S. 
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commitment), juxtaposed against behavior when the U.S. is preparing to withdraw 
(lower U.S. commitment) would be useful for noting the impact of commitment on 
compliance. However following the Nixon election in November 1968, the U.S. began to 
make significantly fewer demands on the GVN, making it difficult to draw comparisons 
across the war. After 1968 Washington lowered its demands on the GVN for several 
reasons; U.S. officials had been pushing for certain reforms for years. Towards the end of 
the conflict those demands are revisited, but there is nevertheless a trend among 
American policymakers to ask the GVN for less. U.S. officials were focused in this period 
on signing a peace agreement with North Vietnam. As American attention fixated on this 
task, issues related to the internal workings of the GVN were secondary.  
According to the available data, there are only 16 new requests from the U.S. to 
South Vietnam between January 1969 and January 1973. Note that there were 18 new 
requests from Washington in 1965 alone.  As mentioned earlier, there are revitalized U.S. 
campaigns to get the GVN to revisit old demands such as reforms to improve ARVN 
leadership, but those drop off as the U.S. settles into accepting that certain requests will 
simply not be carried out.185 Because there is limited data (n=16), the study is limited in 
the inferences that can be made about this time period. Regardless it is interesting that 
there is a notably higher rate of full compliance (75%) among the 16 new requests made 
after 1969 when compared to the rate of full compliance made on average throughout the 
war (43.8%). Rates of partial compliance are lower (18.75%), compared to the 23.8% 
observed across the war, including the period in question (1969-1973) and the rate of 
non-compliance (6%) is much lower than the 32.4% average.  
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This higher rate of compliance at the end of the war is largely due to two factors. 
First, the kinds of requests being asked and second, the U.S. withdrawal, and threats 
made to exclude the GVN from agreements. At this late stage in the war, U.S. officials are 
only requesting new reforms they either believe are likely to be complied with by the 
GVN, or are critical for the process of finding an acceptable settlement agreement with 
communist forces. The U.S. has leverage over the GVN regarding compromises made in 
negotiations because the U.S. has the ability to sign agreements without GVN 
concurrence. As the primary military power opposing the NLF, the U.S. can agree to 
compromises at the negotiating table with or without Saigon. As discussed in the earlier 
section on unilateral action, independent action can be a critical factor in coercing an ally 
if there is divergence between allied interests.  
This was evident at various times throughout 1969 and 1973 as the U.S. pressured 
the GVN to comply or lose even more by being shut out entirely. President Thieu had 
learned this the hard way. In July 1969 Henry Kissinger began holding secret meetings 
without Thieu.186  According to historian Larry Berman, these talks “would establish a 
pattern of exclusion for the next four years – Kissinger negotiating an American troop 
disengagement with the North Vietnamese while informing Thieu only after the fact.”187 
The U.S. was under intense domestic pressure to bring an end American involvement in 
Vietnam. Kissinger was further motivated by the upcoming election, and in 1972 
reluctantly concluded that the American-GVN delegation was going to have to make 
substantial concessions to the communists in order to get the U.S. out of the war. The 
GVN had little interest in U.S. withdrawal or in conceding to the North’s demands. Such 
allowances would only leave them more vulnerable when the Americans left. The GVN 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
186 Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964-1968 (Texas A&M University 
Press, 2004), 361. 




did not like the way negotiations were going. In 1969 they held up talks for two months 
in 1969 with the “famously stupid” debate over the shape of the negotiating table 
previously discussed in the section on unilateral action.188 But such stalling techniques 
were in their best interest as they prolonged the American military commitment and 
held off concessions. Nevertheless it is important to note that both the GVN and the U.S. 
were frustrated by these difficulties. According to John Prados, Thieu did not appreciate 
being forced to compromise. “He did not want to be pushed from one position to 
another, ‘as was the case with the ‘shape-of-the-table’ issue.”189  
Due to these inter-alliance difficulties, Kissinger felt it would be best to hold 
secret negotiations without Saigon, and the U.S. was able to drop a key GVN demand for 
mutual U.S. and NVN withdrawal. President Thieu was informed of this concession 
later.190 Thieu could choose between accepting the compromise or walking out and 
risking future American aid. He reluctantly complied with Kissinger’s demand because 
Saigon did not have a better alternative. This happened repeatedly during this period of 
the war, as 7/16 (44%) of requests fully complied with after 1969 cite the impending U.S. 
withdrawal, and subsequent U.S. activities to push forward on a peace compromise as 
motivating compliance.191  
Instances of non-compliance during this period arise under one of two 
conditions. First, issues arise when the U.S. cannot substantively undertake the 
requested action unilaterally without Thieu. For example, the U.S. was also pressuring 
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Thieu to allow Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky to run in the 1971 presidential elections.  
Thieu refused and the U.S. was helpless to change the decision.192 
Second, when the GVN was opposed to the request and there is division within 
the American administration, which gives Saigon an opportunity to get out of 
compliance without sacrificing U.S. support. In October 1972, on the eve of the U.S. 
election, Kissinger attempted to force President Thieu into signing an agreement worked 
out in Paris that would effectively end the war right before the U.S. election. Historian 
George Herring notes, “ 
In his haste to get an agreement Kissinger badly miscalculated Thieu’s 
willingness to do what the United States told him and Nixon’s willingness 
to support Thieu. Kissinger spent five days in Saigon, going over the treaty 
item by item, explaining its advantages for South Vietnam and issuing 
only slightly veiled warnings that a refusal to go along could mean an end 
to American support. Thieu was not appeased. He was furious he had not 
been consulted in advance of the negotiations and that he had first 
learned of the terms through captured NLF documents. 
 
Thieu demanded mutual withdrawal and the establishment of a DMZ, and 
rejected NLF sovereignty.  
Outraged at this unexpected threat to his handiwork, Kissinger 
denounced Thieu’s demands as ‘preposterous,’ and urged Nixon to go 
ahead without Saigon’s approval... Nixon on the other hand was at best 
ambivalent. Increasingly suspicious of Kissinger’s ambitions, he suspected 
that his aide was rushing a peace agreement to be able to claim credit for 
the President’s reelection, and he feared that a peace settlement on the 
eve of the election might be dismissed as a political ploy… He seems to 
have shared some of Thieu’s reservations about the October draft, and 
although he had approved it on the condition of Thieu’s acquiescence, he 
seems to have sensed Saigon’s rejection as an opportunity to achieve what 
he had sought from the start… Nixon’s support of Thieu ensured the 
breakdown of the October agreement.193 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
192 “Telegram 10019 from Saigon,” June 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 VIET 
S, Telegram 6169 from Saigon; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 VIET S, “For the President’s 
Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations,” Sensitive, Camp David, Cables, 10/69–12/31/71,  “Telegram From the 
Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State,” Saigon, August 20, 1971,  See Documents 250 and 225 – 
Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969 -76, Vietnam, Volume VII, 1971. 
193 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950-1975; 3rd Edition, 3rd 




Therefore, although there are relatively few observations to draw from, I am 
nevertheless able to make several observations regarding the impact of a lower 
commitment on inter-alliance bargaining. The U.S. gained coercive leverage with a 
diminished commitment to the alliance from 1969-1973 by being able to credibly 
threaten to exclude its ally. Lower commitment, forced by U.S. public demand for 
withdrawal, allowed Washington to threaten to undertake activities that would harm 
Saigon, including, for example, Kissinger’s decision to drop the demand for mutual 
withdrawal. This effectively removed U.S. forces, but left Hanoi’s military in South 
Vietnam, a military situation that diminished Saigon’s chances of survival. If U.S. 
commitment had remained high in 1973, the GVN would not have believed that 
Washington would agree to such a concessions because it would hurt the non-
communist effort and in effect, the American mission. Lower commitment gave the U.S. 
the credibility to threaten actions that would hurt Saigon, in effect compelling the GVN 
to comply with American demands.  
Conclusion  
To summarize, four categories of variables (listed below) were tested in order to 
offer insight into Saigon’s compliance with U.S. demands in the Vietnam War from 1964-
1973.  
1. Capacity—Low government capacity is unsurprisingly correlated with non-
compliance. When Saigon’s institutions were unable to implement the reforms 
requested, the GVN was unable to comply with American demands. However 
capacity was cited as an issue in less than 27% percent of all demands, indicating 




2. Interest—Saigon was much more likely to comply with requests that could 
potentially provide it with short-term benefits; whereas the link between non-
compliance and requests posing potential short-term threats was much more 
tenuous. This may in part be due to America’s high commitment to the regime, 
which weakened the potency of potential domestic threats.  Interestingly, the 
general subject of request failed to have a significant impact on compliance, but 
patterns were observed as certain issues tended to have similar trajectories and 
outcomes. 
3. Dependency—There was an interaction effect between America’s ability to 
independently undertake the request and whether or not interests between 
Washington and Saigon converged. If the U.S. could undertake the activity 
unilaterally and interests converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance 
due to incentives to free-ride. If interests diverged and the U.S. could act alone, 
Washington was able to coerce Saigon into complying by threatening to act 
independently and exclude the GVN from benefits.  
4. War and External Threats—The consequences of military activities made it more 
difficult for Saigon to comply with U.S. demands; however the shock of an acute 
enemy threat exemplified by the 1968 Tet Offensive fostered high levels of 







“How can we get to self-sufficiency if we do not have control?” 
- Dr. Saad Qindeel, Iraqi Transitional National Assembly194 
A good deal has been written about the U.S. war in Iraq. Most materials address 
one of three aspects of the conflict: the decision to go to war, the rise of the insurgency, 
or the various counterinsurgency approaches adopted by the U.S. military. Very little 
specifically examines the U.S.-Iraqi counterinsurgency alliance. This chapter aims to 
help fill this gap while testing the hypotheses proposed in this study.  
Summary Findings 
There are several notable findings from the U.S.-Iraqi alliance relevant to the 
question of coercion and compliance. First, the Government of Iraq (GOI) had very 
similar rates of compliance with U.S. demands when compared with other wars 
examined in this study. Interestingly, Iraq however, had the lowest rate of full 
compliance identified. 35/106 (33%) of requests were fully complied with, 32/106 (30%) 
partially complied, and 38/106 (36%) unfulfilled.195 A contributing factor to Iraq’s lower 
rate of full compliance was the GOI’s low level of cooperation with demands regarding 
economic reform. This resistance to foreign financial advice was partially due to deficient 
institutional capacity, but was also a symptom of divergent economic philosophies 
between Iraq and the U.S. Iraq’s proclivity for statist solutions clashed with the 
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American promotion of free market reforms. In other conflicts, economic-related 
requests tended to have some of the highest rates of compliance when compared with 
other issues such as political reform or military strategy. This was true in Vietnam and 
the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan in particular.196 But in both of these conflicts allied economic 
ideologies matched more closely than was the case in Iraq. 
Second, in Iraq Washington negotiated demands with two domestic political 
authorities; the Shi’a dominated Government of Iraq in Baghdad, and the Kurdish 
Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil. This is unique among the wars examined. During 
the U.S. occupation the KRG was effectively independent of Baghdad, requiring a 
separate U.S. diplomatic envoy.197 Third, U.S. control of the Iraqi state from March 
2003-June 2004 under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was similar to the 
Soviet takeover of the Afghan state (1980-1989), providing insight into the political and 
strategic consequences of this type of intense political intervention. This era in U.S-Iraqi 
politics stands in contrast to allied relations after the handover of sovereignty to Iraqis in 
June 2004. From this point until the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011, America 
became progressively less influential in Iraq’s political decisions.198 Fourth, similar to 
other wars examined, compliance was affected by the convergence or divergence between 
allied interests interacting with America’s dependency on Iraq to implement reforms 
requested. If Washington could execute the actions requested of Iraq, and the goal of the 
request was in the interest of both allies, Baghdad was unlikely to comply due to 
incentives to free ride on American efforts.  
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But before providing more detail about the data, it is worthwhile to discuss the 
war and the evolution of the GOI-U.S. alliance. Changes in the institutions established 
between Baghdad and Washington to contain the insurgency and govern the country 
affected what sorts of requests were made by Americans, how much autonomy Iraqis had 
in decision making and consequently, how much the U.S. had to rely on Baghdad to 
implement policy in Iraq.   
The U.S., Coalition Provisional Authority and  
the Government of Iraq 
 
“The operating decisions were all being made by the [U.S.] military and 
the CPA.”  
 
- Charles Costello 
Deputy Chief, Local Governance Support Project 
Iraq May 2003-2004199 
The U.S.-Iraqi partnership varied widely over the eight years of U.S. occupation. 
American involvement evolved from a complete takeover of Iraqi political institutions 
during the initial years of the war under the Coalition Provisional Authority to a more 
traditional inter-state counterinsurgency partnership, ultimately leading to the 
withdrawal of American forces in late 2011. In virtually all aspects of the conflict aside 
from initial military operations, the war did not go as the U.S. planned. This was 
certainly the case in terms of developing a post-Saddam political partnership.  A task 
Washington did not expect to be expensive or complex turned out to be exceedingly 
complicated, time consuming and problematic.  
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The Coalition Provisional Authority 
“Bremer exercised supreme executive, legislative and judicial powers.”200 
On January 20, 2003, roughly two months before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the 
U.S. Department of Defense created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA) for Iraq. ORHA was intended to serve as a catchall organization 
addressing a wide variety of potential post-invasion developments. The Pentagon 
“assumed no more than a 2 or 3 month period” would be required to transfer sovereignty 
to friendly Iraqis.201 ORHA would handle this transition, and generally “deal with the 
post-Saddam conditions in Iraq.”202 This proved to be an overwhelming mission. During 
the run-up to the invasion, policymakers in Washington assumed Iraq would be more or 
less stable following the initial U.S. offensive. Iraq, U.S. policymakers assumed, was not 
only potentially rich from oil revenues, but also had relatively modern and well-
developed bureaucracies. Pentagon and White House officials expected to be able to 
remove high-level Saddam loyalists without having to engage in “nation building.”203  
In retrospect these assumptions were misguided. A much more costly and 
complicated reality emerged after U.S. troops captured Baghdad.  Years of sanctions, 
resource misallocation and mismanagement had gutted Iraq’s once reasonably well-
functioning bureaucracies. The assumption that Iraq’s ministries could readily function 
without high-ranking officials also failed to appreciate the nature of government 
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administration under Saddam Hussein. Baathist loyalists were promoted to positions of 
power while subordinates were kept ineffective. As Andrew Rathmell of the RAND 
Corporation articulated, “The nature of the bureaucratic authority structures in the 
Saddamite state meant that the removal of the ministers did not simply allow their 
subordinates to take over and carry on. Power and authority in the Saddamite system 
had been too centralized to allow competent subordinates to emerge… The real 
instruments of social control in Iraq had been Saddam’s extended family and patronage 
network, the internal security services and the institutions of the Ba’ath party.”204 The 
removal of those figures created chaos, looting and of course, the rise of an anti-
American insurgency.  
In early April 2003, immediately following the invasion, decision makers in 
Washington implemented a political plan opting out of a U.S. political takeover of Iraq. 
The Bush Administration was seeking an almost immediate transition to Iraqi control. 
On April 1, Secretary Rumsfeld wrote to the President, “The new regime is going to be a 
free Iraqi government, not a U.S. military government.”205 But this plan quickly became 
untenable.  As military personnel reviewing America’s performance in Iraq summarized, 
“chaos on the ground threw the plan for a rapid political transfer to an interim Iraqi 
authority into confusion.”206 The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance 
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(ORHA) was scrapped for a more aggressive, U.S. political entity for Iraq, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), led by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer.207  
By May 12, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority, back by the U.S. military, 
reigned as the political authority in Iraq. Although U.S. policymakers were 
uncomfortable discussing the CPA in plain terms, during their 14-month reign Bremer 
and the Americans staffing the CPA were the government of Iraq. “As administrator of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, [Bremer] was charged with governing Iraq… [He] 
could dispose of all Iraqi state assets and direct all Iraqi government officials. He 
possessed full executive, legislative, and judicial authority.”208 
What kind of office the CPA was, and where it fit in the U.S. government was 
unclear. Ambassador Bremer was a Presidential envoy that communicated directly with 
the White House, while also part of the Department of Defense, supposedly operating 
under Secretary Rumsfeld.  “The CPA’s relationship with Washington was also 
improvised and unclear, as was Bremer’s with his bosses. The CPA was, at one and the 
same time, an element of the Defense Department, a multi- national organization, and a 
foreign government.” 209 
In Bremer’s opinion it was “not entirely clear that the CPA was a U.S. government 
entity.”210 The U.S. Office of Management and Budget wanted to monitor CPA spending, 
like any U.S. executive branch agency. The CPA however was operating on Iraqi public 
accounts. U.S. Army Legal Services Agency defended the CPA’s status as a legal entity 
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outside the U.S. administration. “The CPA is not a Federal agency. The Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) is a multi-national coalition that exercises powers of 
government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq 
during the period of transitional administration.”211 Clayton McManaway a close aide to 
Bremer claimed the “CPA was the Iraqi government; it was not an American entity. 
[Even though] many American policymakers, including the Pentagon and Office of 
Management and Budget, didn’t see it that way.”212  
The Coalition Provisional Authority was tasked with improving Iraqi government 
institutions. Following the invasion, some Iraqi bureaucracies were severely 
handicapped, while others were gutted entirely. Seventeen of the 20 Iraqi ministries 
ORHA planned to run had been utterly destroyed in the extensive looting of Baghdad 
immediately following the U.S. invasion.213 Most senior Iraqi ministers had abandoned 
their posts, destroying files, records and data before fleeing.214  By some accounts by 
“mid-May no Iraqi ministry was working at more than 40 percent.”215 To physically 
reconstruct destroyed ministries, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 
issued a contract to Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), to implement 
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“Ministry in a Box.” Costing $122,000 per unit, this program supplied materials for a 
hundred public officials in order to jump start bureaucracies.216  
In the post-invasion chaos Bremer attempted to create and enforce law, building 
a new Iraqi government, with an American staff and acting under American authority. 
He was eager to create an Iraqi advisory body to weigh in on decisions and help 
legitimize CPA orders. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) formed on July 13, 2003 was 
given no official legislative or executive authority, but nevertheless became increasingly 
influential in governing decisions.217 Governing Council (IGC) representatives were 
appointed by the CPA, acting under the guidance of UN personnel and prominent Iraqi 
exiles.218 In order to coordinate Iraqi ministries the CPA created the Ministerial 
Committee for National Security (MCNS). The group was intended to play a role similar 
to the U.S. National Security Council. Bremer chaired the group from 2003-2004. 
Throughout this period Iraqi “ministers slowly assumed the role of decisionmakers and 
began to interact and communicate their needs within a legitimate governmental 
structure months before the transfer of authority actually took place in June 2004. In 
that month, the Iraqi prime minister took the reigns of the committee.”219 
The CPA’s first order (intended to have the weight of Iraqi law) “de-Ba’athified 
Iraqi society.” It banned senior Ba’athist party members from all leadership positions in 
the new government.220 When Bremer turned administration of the de-ba’athification 
order over the Iraqi Governing Council, headed at the time by Ahmed Chalabi, the 
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Council announced “new rules,” that would have “more depth and [affect] more 
people.”221 Bremer was not pleased. Washington feared this was a sign that influential 
Shi’a Iraqi exiles like Chalabi might be inclined to use their new-found positions of 
power in post-Saddam Iraqi politics for retaliation. For the Bremer and the Bush 
Administration, this action confirmed the necessity of America’s “extended occupation.” 
The CPA had to “walk the cat back in the spring of 2004“222 reinstating thousands of 
professionals that had been fired under the extended de-B’aathification order, including 
hundreds of teachers.223  
Much like the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Americans in Iraq under 
the CPA ran Iraqi ministries through “advisors.” These were Americans who acted as 
operating chief administrators issuing agency policies and directing subordinate Iraqi 
officials.224 The CPA had seven “line offices,” of varying specialties including security, oil, 
civil affairs, economic development, regional operations and communications. These 
offices assigned CPA authorities to Iraqi ministries. CPA “individuals were charged with 
actually running their respective [Iraqi] ministries.” By August 2003 the Iraqi Governing 
Council was appointing 25 interim ministers, which lessened the profile of CPA 
administers, but CPA officials maintained control of ministerial budgets and had veto 
authorization over agency decisions.225   
However unlike the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Americans in Iraq under the CPA 
did not stay, nor did they systematically purge lower-levels of the Iraqi bureaucracy. In 
fact, once the CPA announced that it was handing over government administration to 
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Iraqi officials, enforcement of CPA orders became a problem for Washington. “Iraqi 
lawyers and judges began to procrastinate in implementing or interpreting [CPA] law, 
preferring the established Iraqi version, even if it contracted the Bremer Orders.”226 
Similar to James Scott’s discussions in Weapons of the Weak, Iraqi subordinates 
engaged in repeated small acts of defiance against American authorities, incrementally 
imposing boundaries on American power brokers, drawing lines defining what could and 
could not be reasonably accomplished in Iraq.  
The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) 
 In 2004 as the security situation in Iraq deteriorated the U.S. pushed to transfer 
governance to the Iraqis. This action, it was hoped, would slow the insurgency, appease 
calls for Iraqi sovereignty and take some of the heat off Washington for the downward 
spiral in Iraq. U.S. policymakers feared the occupation was becoming politically 
untenable. As early as September 2003 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld communicated 
“enthusiasm for the concept of granting sovereignty as soon as possible to the Council or 
some other group of Iraqis.”227 
 On June 28, 2004, two days ahead of schedule, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority, which had promulgated 100+ orders over the course of 14 tumultuous 
months, formally transferred authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. In a rushed and 
rather unceremonious public announcement, at 10:26am Bremer ended the era of U.S. 
administrative governance of the Iraqi state. Two hours later Bremer was on a flight and 
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John Negroponte presented his credentials as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq to the IIG on 
June 29, 2004. 228 
 The 26 Iraqi ministries operating at the time had “been shifting to full Iraqi 
control” since June 1, 2004.229 This meant the Iraqi ministers appointed by the Interim 
Government (IIG) were legally independent of American authority. However, after June 
28, the same American advisers that had been running Iraqi ministries under the CPA 
largely stayed put. “Most of the CPA’s former senior advisors (now known as senior 
consultants)… would continue top provide technical and operational reconstruction 
assistance to the Iraqi ministries.”230 In addition, the Iraqi ministers in place had been 
nominated by the IGC, but vetted by Bremer.  Speaking of the June 28 ceremony, former 
U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski said, “This is not a transfer of power, 
a handover to a sovereign government. We are transferring limited authority to a 
satellite government, a satellite government that is still to establish its legitimacy and the 
longer we stay, the more difficult it will be before it to gain legitimacy.”231   
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The Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) and Permanent Government of 
Iraq (GOI) 
How much influence American officials had in Iraqi government institutions after 
the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004 varied by the Iraqi ministry in question, the U.S. 
agency in control (USAID, Defense and or State), U.S. interest in transferring control 
and what was happening in the war. The following section summarizes U.S. approaches 
to influencing the actions of the Iraqi government after the CPA recused itself as the 
guardian of the Iraqi state in June 2004. Understanding how the U.S. was involved in 
the Iraqi state is critical to understanding inter-alliance relations and the political 
conditions potentially influencing Iraqi decisions to comply with, or refute U.S. 
demands.  
The U.S. was eager to get friendly Iraqis to take responsibility for governing Iraq. 
But with security and governing capacity tenuous at best, compromises were made. Until 
2010, for example the U.S. maintained authority over Iraqi detainee facilities, detention 
centers and inmates, due primarily to the lack of capability of Iraqi security forces to 
cope with the problem and American concerns about the threat that released prisoners 
could pose to American forces.232 American policymakers were also wary of handing over 
control of Iraqi intelligence services to Iraqi authorities for fear intelligence would be 
used for sectarian vendettas.233 The U.S. also maintained direct military command and 
control over Iraqi military forces for more than four years. U.S. Secretary of Defense 
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Donald Rumsfeld found this troublesome. It brought up obvious questions about Iraqi 
sovereignty. Rumsfeld promised the President “The GOI will assume command and 
control of the Iraqi Army not later than June 2007.”234 Due to the deteriorating security 
situation, however the last Iraqi division was not transferred until November 3, 2007.235  
 While Office of the Secretary of Defense implemented policies designed to 
promote Iraqi self-sufficiency in the long-term, such as handing over control of Iraqi 
troops, U.S. forces were facing mounting security problems, which prompted the 
Department to promote U.S. involvement in the GOI to boost GOI performance. In 
November 2006 the Secretary felt the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) needed to 
“aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the 
success of the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] – the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, 
Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. – by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and 
Reserve/National Guard volunteers.”236 DOD sought to strengthen Iraqi ministries by 
embedding increasing numbers of American personnel while also recognizing the 
importance of transferring power to Iraqi authority. At times these were contradictory 
goals.  
The number of U.S. officials assigned to Iraq ministries varied. The U.S. 
Department of State was tasked with guiding efforts at ten civilian ministries: Oil, 
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Electricity, Planning, Water, Health, Finance, Justice, Municipalities and Public Works, 
Agriculture, and Education. In 2007 U.S. State Department advisory teams varied in size 
from 20 officials in the Ministry of Oil and 18 in Finance to three in Agriculture.237 These 
teams “typically interact with the minister, deputy minister, or department director 
levels.”238 U.S. advisers would present “options” to the Iraqi ministry indicating the 
decision stood with the Iraqis, but under American guidance.239  
The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) took the lead in advisory relationships 
with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior which controlled the Army and Police 
respectively. DOD, under the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq 
(MNSTC-I) was more aggressive than the Department of State and USAID in its advisory 
role. In 2007, for example, it had placed 215 American officials in the two Iraqi security 
Ministries (Interior and Defense). According to a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report on U.S efforts to augment Iraqi ministerial development, these officials 
“advise Iraqi staff about establishing plans and policies, budgeting, and managing 
personnel and logistics, among other things. According to MNSTC-I advisors, they work 
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with their Iraqi counterparts on a daily basis to develop policies, plans, and 
procedures.”240 
U.S. advisors also had varying influence across ministries depending on the 
relationships that developed. The 20 or so Americans241 advising the Ministry of Oil 
reportedly “played an integral part in drawing up contracts between the Iraqi 
government and five major Western oil companies to develop some of the largest fields 
in Iraq.”242 The State Department denied its officials chose which companies received 
development contracts in Iraq, yet admitted they regularly “provided template contracts 
and detailed suggestions on drafting the contracts.”243 State Department records appear 
to verify this claim.244 Despite this, multiple international oil companies have voiced 
skepticism over the “sovereign” process in the Iraqi Ministry of Oil. The biggest 
development contracts have thus far been awarded to western companies.245  
U.S. control over aspects of Iraqi ministerial budgets in earliest years of the war, 
including the intelligence budget246 as well as the U.S. military occupation also 
undoubtedly influenced Iraqi political decision making processes.  Until 2007 the U.S. 
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had final authority over the majority of state security apparatuses combatting the 
insurgency and protecting Iraqi ministers and ministries, including Multi-National 
Forces Iraq (MNF-I) various Iraqi Army units and private security details. Many if not 
most activities for GOI officials required coping with serious security concerns. With 
rates of violence skyrocketing from 2004-2007, American control of security 
organizations likely created a bargaining chip for Washington. Just weeks after the 
transfer of authority, for example U.S. officials wrote “The IIG knows that it has to 
consult with us on constructing a state of emergency law since its enforcement could 
involve coalition forces.”247  
From 2004-2008 the U.S. incrementally handed over authority to Iraqi officials 
making U.S. advisors less influential. In early 2008, the White House ordered a “surge” 
of U.S. development-oriented advisors, aiming to place at least 75 additional Americans 
in advisory roles within the government of Iraq, focusing on health, finance, electricity, 
oil and justice.248 However, American accounts of this “surge” indicate that these U.S. 
advisors were not directing day-to-day GOI activities. In fact, by 2008 many U.S. 
officials assigned to Iraqi ministries were having a difficult time regularly meeting with 
their GOI partners due to security constraints and the attitude of various ministers 
towards American agendas.249  In September 2007 Americans wee reporting “The Joint 
Planning Commission (JPC) and the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) in 
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Baghdad are fast becoming Iraqi-driven institutions… The JPC and JROC will go from 
being largely USG-led to completely Iraqi-led by early 2008.”250 
 Unsurprisingly at this time the U.S. was reporting difficulty negotiating certain 
issues with GOI partners. A cable on the Iraqi constitutional review noted U.S. 
Commanding General David Petraeus commented “It has proven difficult to urge 
movement from the GOI on practical concerns, let alone politically charged issues like 
new legislation.”251 Iraqi bureaucracies were no longer instruments of U.S. foreign policy. 
By now the GOI had consolidated itself into a political entity capable of acting 
independently of the U.S. and opposing American interests.  
In summary Iraqi ministers had authority over the activities of their ministries 
after the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty, but embedded American advisors remained 
influential for several years after this transfer. U.S. influence in the GOI varied widely, 
depending on the ministry in question, but generally decreased over time. The ministries 
of defense and oil were seemingly most influenced by U.S. advisors. By late 2007 when 
important institutions such as the Iraqi military have been transferred to Iraqi control, 
U.S. advisors are “visitors” to the GOI, rather than authorities. As the U.S. Embassy 
summarized in 2008:  
We have less influence than in 2004 - 2006, and will have even less 
influence as Iraqi politicians more and more can work together without 
our hovering over them...Our views on desired outcomes influence and 
shape Iraqi debates, but we can no longer dictate the exact shape of the 
outcomes.252 
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The post-CPA U.S. advisory role in Iraqi civilian ministries was more intense 
than what the U.S. had pursued in Vietnam, but less than the aggressive Soviet approach 
in Afghanistan and certainly less than the U.S. in Iraq from 2003-2004. In Vietnam the 
U.S. boosted the pre-existing anti-communist regime. In Iraq, it largely scrapped the 
Saddam-era government and constructed a new government. This tactic initially 
required extensive U.S. involvement, as evidenced by the CPA, a group of Americans that 
ran the Government of Iraq. This legacy later allowed for additional American influence 
in the internal affairs of the Iraqi government until finally expiring when Iraqis gained 
full authority over state institutions.  
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Iraqi Compliance 
Over 1,000 U.S. primary source documents (2,500+ pages) were analyzed to 
identify 106 unique demands from the U.S. government to their Iraqi allies from 2003-
2011. These documents were found in three locations. First, I examined declassified 
documents located online through U.S. government agency websites, including The 
Office of the Secretary and Joint Staff Freedom of Information Act Library. Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s documents in the Special Collections Library were particularly useful for this 
project.253 A second source of material came from declassified documents released to the 
National Security Archive Iraq project. Third, the largest source of data for this chapter 
was U.S. State Department documents published by Wikileaks.254 In November 2010 
Wikileaks, a non-profit organization dedicated to publishing classified information 







2010, including 6,677 from the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. This provided extraordinary 
access to correspondence between the U.S. and its Iraqi allies.  
In addition to public statements, declassified materials, and documents released 
by Wikileaks, there were two unique resources regularly clarifying the outcome of U.S. 
demands independent of what was in SIPRNET. One was the Special Inspector General 
for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), an independent U.S. agency established by Congress in 
October 2004 to monitor the use of U.S. reconstruction funds in Iraq.255 Since the U.S. 
would regularly provide funding for programs it asked the GOI to adopt, SIGIR reports 
provided reliable accounts of Iraqi performance. Another helpful resource for finding 
information on compliance outcomes was a set of reports the U.S. Department of 
Defense was required to produce according to House Conference Report 109-72 
accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13, entitled 
“Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.” Produced quarterly from July 2005-July 
2010, these lengthy reports monitored progress, growth and developments in Iraqi 
governance, frequently addressing on the ground Iraqi advancement on U.S. demands.256  
Documents analyzed date from March 1, 2003 to December 31, 2011 (The U.S. 
intervention in Iraq lasted from March 20, 2003 – December 15, 2011). The 106 
demands identified date from July 14, 2004 to February 23, 2010, providing relatively 
good coverage of demands made throughout the war. Note that the U.S. governed Iraq 
from March 2003- June 28, 2004 under the Coalition Provisional Authority. Therefore, 
as expected there were no demands from the U.S. to the “Iraqi Government,” as the U.S. 
had full governing authority. As discussed previously, this arrangement was similar to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
255 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. www.sigir.mil/index.html 




the approach of several authoritarian states including the Soviets in Afghanistan after 
1980 and the Vietnamese in the initial phases of the occupation of Cambodia.  
The last request analyzed in this study predates American withdrawal from Iraq 
by 22 months for two primary reasons. One, the last document in the Wikileaks database 
is from February 28, 2010. Primary source documents currently available to the public 
for the last two years of the war are limited at best. Due to the recent nature of the Iraq 
conflict, this information is usually classified. Secondly, at least in other conflicts 
including Vietnam and Sri Lanka, the later years of the war bring fewer demands as the 
foreign state prepares to leave. It would be reasonable to expect the same in Iraq. It is 
likely the U.S. made fewer new requests from 2010-2011 compared to other years of the 
occupation.  
It is also important to note that the “domestic regime” the U.S. negotiated with 
throughout the Iraq War was different than other domestic partners examined in this 
study in one notable aspect. There were two autonomous Iraqi political regimes. One, 
the GOI, was the national government of Iraq based in Baghdad. The Shi’a-dominated 
GOI is what most people imagine as America’s partner in Iraq.  There was a second 
entity however, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the governing body of the 
“semi-autonomous,” predominantly Kurdish northern region of Iraq. Officially the KRG 
remains a regional government operating under the GOI. In practice, however, de facto 
regional autonomy after the Persian Gulf War meant that the Kurds exercised an 
unusually high level of independence, while the history of ethnic antagonism – most 
notably genocidal offensives against the Kurds during the Iran-Iraq War - meant that the 
KRG had little interest in closer relations with Baghdad. If the U.S. sought to get 




ups in the GOI did not control day-to-day activities in the Kurdish region. This study 
treats requests made to the heads of state in the KRG and those made to the GOI, equally 
as requests made to the “domestic regime” because this is the approach Washington took 
in its dealings with the Iraqi state. The U.S. sent high-level delegations to negotiate with 
both governmental entities.  
Examples on this point may be useful although keep in mind the vast majority of 
requests (103/106) in the database were directed at the GOI. Only 5/105 of U.S. requests 
to Iraq located in the documents were for the KRG. Two requests were made to both the 
GOI and KRG. For example on July 25, 2007 U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker and 
MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus agreed in the “New Joint Campaign for 
Iraq” that it would be best to ask the GOI to agree to a delay a constitutional referendum 
on the status of Kirkuk.”257 However, in a cable to the U.S. Department of State from the 
Embassy, dated the same day, July 25, 2007 U.S. Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker discussed 
a meeting with Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) President Massoud Barzani on July 
19, in which the Ambassador asked the KRG President to work towards “transparent 
implementation” of referendum.258 Kurdish officials were frustrated with continual 
delays regarding the status of Kirkuk.259 In other words, with the KRG the U.S. 
Ambassador emphasized communications between the KRG and GOI, sidestepping the 
delicate issue of delaying the Kirkuk referendum. However with the GOI, he is more 
direct asking to postpone the referendum. As of 2012 the status of Kirkuk has still not 
been resolved.  
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Data on Iraqi Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary  
For 35/106 (33%) of U.S. demands the Iraqis were fully compliant, 32/106 (30%) 
there was partial compliance and 38/106 (36%) of requests concluded with non-
compliance.260 If partial compliance and full compliance are combined, Iraqis were 
compliant for 67/106 (64%) of U.S. demands—a very similar percentage to the rates 
observed in other conflicts analyzed in the study (see below).  
 
Table 8. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War  
 
War 
Rate of Full 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial and 
Full Compliance 
Combined 




35/106 (33%) 32/106 (30%) 67/106 (64%) 38/106 (36%) 
South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)  
46/105 (43.8%) 25/105 (23.8%) 71/105 (68%) 34/105 (32.4%) 
Afghanistan (Soviet 
Demands)  
11/22 (50%) 3/22 (14%) 14/22 (64%) 8/22 (37%) 
Sri Lanka 
(Indian Demands)  







92/148 (62%) 56/148 (37.8%) 
 
In terms of verbal compliance for 23/106 (22%) of requests there was no 
available evidence regarding whether or not the Iraqis provided verbal assurances that 
they would or would not fulfill the request.261 Of the remaining requests there was 75/83 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
260 The 35/106 (Complied) + 32/106 (Partially Complied) + 38/106 (Not Complied With) = 105/106. One 
request, a proposal for a MANPADS  (Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems) Reduction Program made on 
October 11, 2009 (See 09BAGHDAD2736) remains classified. Unclear using publicly available sources if the 
Iraqi government adopted the program.  
261 The number of missing data points is primarily due small number of available data sources. Much of the 
relevant U.S. documentation remains classified and Iraqi discussion of the period is mostly unavailable. 
With older conflicts such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka, sizable collections of materials have been released, 
allowing for greater available evidence regarding communications between allies. Whereas 23/106 demands 
had no available evidence regarding Iraqi agreement (verbal compliance), only 1/106 had no available 
evidence available regarding whether or not the request was executed (substantive compliance). This 
difference in evidence can be attributed to verbal compliance largely being contained to a specific subset of 
diplomatic correspondence files. If the particular file regarding the particular demand is not saved or has not 
yet been released, it is difficult to know what was said between officials. However substantive compliance (or 
lack thereof) can be discussed in a variety of public documents and sources, including media reports, 




(90%) of Iraqi verbal compliance with American demands, 2/83 (2.4%) partial verbal 
compliance (GOI agreed to only part of the request), and 6/83 (7.2%) refusals of 
demands.  
 
Table 9. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War  
 
War 





Rate of Partial 












75/83 (90%) 2/83 (2.4%) 77/83 (93%) 6/83 (7.2%) 23/106 (22%) 
South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)   
76/87 (87%) 0/87(0%) 76/87 (87%) 11/87 (13%) 18/105 (17%) 
Afghanistan 
(Soviet Demands) 
20/20 (100%) 0/20 (0%) 20/20 (91%) 0/22 (0%) 2/22 (9%) 
Sri Lanka 
(Indian Demands)  
51/70 (73%) 10/70 (14%) 61/70 (87%) 9/70 (13%) 9/79 (11%) 
Afghanistan  
(U.S. Demands) 
91/99 (92%) 0/99 (0%) 91/99 (92%) 8/99 (8%) 49/148 (33%) 
 
 Washington’s grew frustrated with Iraq’s pattern of passing legislation but not 
implementing the law. U.S. policymakers requesting policy reform in Iraq might receive 
verbal confirmation, the Council of Representatives (COR) along with the Prime Minister 
would write and pass new legislation, but then nothing would then materialize to 
implement the law. The U.S. promotion of the U.N. Convention Against Corruption 
(UNCAC) is one example. Iraq signed the UNCAC in March 2008, yet by December 2008 
had not implemented the provisions. The U.S. Embassy was reporting GOI Deputy Prime 
Minister “Salih's chief of staff told us in November he believed that by signing the 
agreement Iraq had fully met its provisions. There are 166 provisions in the UN-CAC 
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to track than words exchanged between authorities. If for example the U.S. asked the Iraqi national 
government to build a school, there would be physical evidence whether or not that school materialized. But 






which require Iraqi action in order to be fully compliant with the convention, of which 
ACCO estimates Iraq has completed about a third.”262  
 
Figure 13. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – Iraq 
 
Figure 13 charts the number of requests made by the U.S. by year juxtaposed with 
the Iraqi government rate of compliance with those demands.&A1 Some years have more 
requests complied than new requests made as Baghdad fulfills requests made in previous 
years later in the war. Complicated requests can take several years to complete. The 
number of requests made by Washington peaks in 2007, with compliance with demands 
made from 2003-2009 reaching a high in 2008-2009. This highpoint in the number of 
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262 U.S. Department of State, “Summing Up Iraq’s Year of Anti-Corruption,” 08BAGHDAD4058, December 
29, 2008, Confidential. 




requests complied with in 2008-2009 can be attributed to 1) numerous requests made in 
2007 for the GOI to contend with, 2) an expansion in GOI capacity to comply with 
various U.S. demands, 3) the fulfillment of multiple complex requests that took time to 
implement, and 4) a marked decrease in violence from 2008-2011 compared to 2007, 
allowing for greater GOI freedom of movement. 
The absence of requests from 2003-2004 is unsurprising. The Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA), an American entity, was governing Iraq during this period. 
After the June 2004 transfer of sovereignty from the CPA to the Iraqi Interim 
Government there is a steady rise in U.S. demands on its Iraqi partners each year until 
2007. This continual increase from 2004-2007 reflects the gradual nature of the transfer 
of authority from American caretaker organizations to Iraqi bureaucracies over the 
course of several years.  If the June 28, 2004 transfer heralded an immediate Iraqi 
assumption of responsibility across the board, it would be reasonable to expect a spike in 
demands in 2004-2005 (followed by a slow decline), similar to what was observed in 
Vietnam from 1964-66.  
Furthermore, before leaving office in June 2004 L. Paul Bremer’s CPA 
promulgated orders at a frenzied pace assuming it was easier to unilaterally implement 
policies under American authority in 2004, as opposed to negotiating policies through 
the GOI once they were sovereign.! &A? U.S. decision makers may also have made fewer 
demands in the years immediately following CPA activity because they had largely 
pursued their agenda while in command in 2004. Later in the war, more demands to 
Iraqis had to be issued in order to respond to developments in the war.  
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Furthermore, the decision-making capacity of the Government of Iraq was 
intimately tied to the violence.  As sectarian conflict and U.S. demands both rise in 2006-
2007, a corresponding increase in GOI rates of compliance (Figure 13) fails to 
materialize because Iraqi political leaders are frequently pressured to avenge violence 
against their supporters. The increase in attacks 2006-2008 made opportunities for 
compromise within the GOI increasingly scarce, against many of Washington’s demands 
during this period.&A@ 
For example, in August 2006, the U.S. asked Baghdad to “take measures to 
promote ‘even handed’ [non-sectarian] law enforcement.” According a GAO report in 
May 2007, 
Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government bears responsibility for engaging in 
sectarian-based human rights violations… death squads affiliated with the 
Ministry of Interior targeted Sunnis and conducted kidnapping raids in 
Baghdad and its environs, largely with impunity… the Iraqi government 
and many Iraqi security force units are still applying the law on a 
sectarian basis.266 
The American Embassy’s 2008 assessment of the Iraqi parliament discussed similar 
concerns. The Council of Representatives’ “problems are Iraq's problems: deep-seated 
sectarian, ethnic and personal animosities that inhibit and frequently prevent 
compromise, cooperation and agreement.”267  
Various summary statistical models are provided in Table 10, accounting for 
variables that potentially influence compliance. Each of the 106 demands identified from 
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265 For example, U.S. demands such as, “take measures to reduce sectarian violence” and “ensure the 
Baghdad Security Plan does not protect sectarianism,” July 25, 2007, “GoI to cease sectarian appointments 
and politically motivated prosecutions,” and seek the “prosecution of government and security officials who 
break the law” (ending protections based on sectarian affiliation) See 07BAGHDAD2464 and Section 1314 
Public Law 110-28. See also U.S. Department of State, “Allawi Back in Iraq; Seeks to Build Centrist 
Coalition,” 07BAGHDAD612, February 20, 2007, Secret. 
266 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq, Iraqi Government 
Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security, and Economic Benchmarks,” GAO-07-1195, September 7, 2007. 44-
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the U.S. to its partners in the Government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government 
was coded to account for each of these potential independent variables. 
Table 10. Compliance and Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Iraq 
 
Ordered Probit –Baghdad & Erbil’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2004-2011 
! !
(1)! (2)! (3) (4) (5) 












GOI Can be Excluded! 0.282 
 (0.286)!




Interaction Term:  
GOI Benefit and U.S. 
Unilateral Action &AC 
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!    -0.278 
(0.331) 
Military Strategy & 
Military Reform 














War or Internal Politics     -0.524 
(0.272) 
  
N (Observations)! 105! 105 105 105 105 
* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01 
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268 Interest in this model is estimated by using domestic regime benefit, a dummy variable measuring if Iraq 
can turn what is being requested by the U.S. into a way to bolster its short-term interests such as profit 
making position or electoral benefit.  
269 Interest in this model is estimated by a composite variable, “Allied Interest Convergence/Divergence,” 
which relies on the available documentary evidence to account for both private costs (threats) and benefits of 
the request for the domestic regime. The variable estimates in general if allied interests over the request in 















Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance 
Capacity 
Consistent with initial hypotheses and findings in other wars, the data indicates 
lacking government capacity is strongly correlated with non-compliance. Unsurprisingly, 
when the ability to execute a demand is lacking, compliance is unlikely. Low capacity was 
cited as a serious issue throughout the Iraq conflict. Nearly half of all requests (52/106, 
49%) made some mention of failing Iraqi ability contributing to compliance outcomes. 
This is a higher rate than what was found in other conflicts. In Vietnam and Afghanistan 
(U.S) just over 25% of requests included indications in American assessments that state 
capacity in Saigon or Kabul was impacting performance. Capacity was even less of an 
issue in Sri Lanka. Only 16.5% of requests made by the Indians had indications that a 
lack of capability contributed to compliance outcomes. Although these figures on 
capacity are not as straightforward as they might initially appear. Capacity failings being 
cited more frequently in Iraq than in Afghanistan does not mean Kabul had greater 
capabilities than Baghdad to cope with the counterinsurgency threat.270  
As discussed in Chapter 3 (Methodology) and Chapter 10 (Conclusion), in terms 
of capacity there is bias in the universe of demands that are made, as the foreign 
government is less likely to ask partners for concessions it does not believe can be 
delivered due to a lack of capacity. For the reasons discussed in those chapters, including 
the consistency of this bias across these types of wars, and the fact that selecting requests 
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270 See Chapter 10: Conclusion. It is likely that Vietnam and Afghanistan (U.S.) have relatively lower rates of 
capacity cited as issues in compliance processes because Americans aren’t asking those regimes for reforms 
they feel are beyond the abilities of the Vietnamese and Afghans. Whereas in Sri Lanka, it is very likely that 




based on capacity calculations doesn’t change the finding that low capacity is correlated 
with non-compliance, this selection effect does not change the findings of the study.  
Similar to Vietnam and Afghanistan (U.S.), the most common capacity issue 
affecting Baghdad’s ability to implement demands came from deficient GOI bureaucratic 
institutions. American dollars were readily available to pay for reforms, but Iraqi officials 
nevertheless had to cope with bureaucratic machinery that was sorely lacking in 
institutional capacity. There are multiple examples of faltering Iraqi state structures 
affecting compliance outcomes. Consider the U.S. concern regarding Iraq’s failure to 
effectively spend allocated money. By 2007 Washington requested that Iraq execute its 
budgeted expenses.271 But GOI ministries spending their allowances was complicated by 
limited capacity to execute the projects specified. According to the GAO there were staff 
shortages, weak accounting institutions, and security complications: 
U.S. government, coalition, and international agencies have identified a 
number of factors affecting the Iraqi government's ability to spend more of 
its revenues on capital investments intended to rebuild its infrastructure. 
These factors include Iraq's shortage of trained staff, weak procurement and 
budgeting systems, and violence and sectarian strife.272  
But this does not answer the question why capacity failures were cited twice as 
frequently in Iraq when compared to Afghanistan and Vietnam. All three domestic 
regimes had notable bureaucratic capacity failures. Furthermore, the rates of substantive 
compliance between these three wars are strikingly similar (roughly 1/3 full compliance, 
1/3 partial compliance, and 1/3 non-compliance). If Baghdad were significantly less 
capable than Saigon and Kabul, there would likely be a corresponding drop in rates of 
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compliance with U.S. demands since there is such a significant correlation between low 
capacity and non-compliance. But this is not the case.  
For Baghdad it seems capacity was cited twice was often as was observed in 
Vietnam and Afghanistan for reasons other than Baghdad being half as capable as these 
counterinsurgency partners, which is not the case. First, the U.S. directly governed Iraqi 
institutions through the CPA and became particularly well versed in Baghdad’s 
bureaucracy. This heightened sense of institutional awareness may have made U.S. 
officials more prone to recognizing specific capacity failures in Iraq and discussing them 
in diplomatic correspondence more frequently than was observed in Vietnam and 
Afghanistan. Secondly, violence in Iraq quickly intensified between 2004-2007. The 
intensity of the rising insurgency largely caught U.S. policymakers by surprise. This may 
have influenced the frequency of capacity being cited as an issue in Iraqi compliance with 
U.S. demands for a couple of reasons. Washington was desperate to get the situation 
under control and was making demands on Baghdad; even asking for reforms American 
policymakers likely understood would be complicated by capacity limitations. While at 
the same time, the increased violence strained Iraqi government capacity. A regime that 
would be able to handle certain challenges under normal circumstances may find itself 
incapacitated by a state of war. Perhaps limited in its capabilities within the violence, 
once the insurgency became more subdued in 2008, Baghdad was able to comply with 
American requests, as evidenced by the rise in compliance between 2008-2009 
illustrated in Figure 13.  
Dependency and Unilateral Action  
Similar to Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.) and Sri Lanka, the likelihood of Iraqi 




ability of the foreign ally to implement the task at hand, and agreement or disagreement 
between allied interests. The statistical model in Table 10 illustrates the interaction effect 
within the context of other data from the war, while Table 12 (below) isolates the effect. 
It indicates that if the U.S. could act unilaterally and Iraqi and U.S. interests converged, 
Baghdad was more likely not to comply due to incentives to free ride. If the U.S. could act 
unilaterally and allied interests diverge, there was a higher probability of compliance as 
Baghdad was more willing to agree in order to protect its interests since the action may 
be implemented without them anyway.  They might as well go along with the request and 
protect their interests in the process of implementation.  
The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible. If independent action was 
not possible and interests converged, there was a higher likelihood of compliance, as 
Baghdad was likely to adopt the requested actions for the sake of its own interests. If 
allied interests diverged and the U.S. could not implement the reform without Iraqi 
assistance, there were higher rates of non-compliance. The GOI had no interest 
motivating compliance and likely no immediate consequences for failing to comply.  
Table 11. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests Impacting 
Compliance Probability 
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Table 12. Ordered Probit—Baghdad’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2003-2010 


























    * Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01 
 
Examples of the dynamics described above may be useful for gaining perspective 
on the interaction between interests and unilateral ability.  
Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible—Predicted Non-Compliance 
Due to Free Riding 
In 2006 the U.S. urged the GOI to invest in the reconstruction of Fallujah, a city 
that had been devastated by U.S. military operations.&B? American policymakers felt it 
was important to have the GOI invested in this type of rebuilding effort in order to 
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273 The variable allied interest convergence/divergence is produced by combining two interest variables, 
“Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic Regime.”  The variable 
was created in order to have a robust measure of Baghdad’s interests based on costs and benefits, instead of 
substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while excluding the other. Since the foreign power (U.S.) is 
making the request, the model assumes Washington is interested in the request. Therefore interest 
convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic regime (Iraq). Interest is 
determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to Private Benefits for Domestic 
Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic Regime) for the domestic 
regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary evidence. For more on 
coding see Chapter 3 - Methodology. For more on interest variables see the section on interest as an 
independent variable.  
274 U.S. Department of State, “Fallujans Mobilized for Election Amid Increased Tension in City,” 
05BAGHDAD4971, December 13, 2005, Confidential. Note that not all U.S. policymakers backed the 
reconstruction of Fallujah. Two days before his November 2006 resignation U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld wrote in a classified memo, “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not 
working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of options:…. Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was 
done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our 
reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to 
reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, ‘If you want more of something, reward it; if 
you want less of something, penalize it.’ No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.” 




increase the likelihood of success, and to better ensure lasting domestic investment in 
reconstruction projects for Fallujah.&B@   
 Under U.S. pressure the GOI pledged a few hundred million dollars to the effort, 
an amount described by some analysts as “meager” at best in light of costs. Additionally 
there were large discrepancies between what was promised and what was delivered by 
Baghdad, as at least 25-30% of what was eventually paid by the GOI was funneled into 
security operations instead of reconstruction.&BA By 2008 the U.S. had taken primary 
responsibility for rebuilding the city.  Entry into the city required a U.S.-issued residency 
card while the U.S. executed the majority of reconstruction projects. As one Marine said, 
“We were here, the battle part, last time. Now I'm back here fixing it, which is kind of 
ironic.”&BB According to U.S. National Public Radio, “Americans are widely seen as the 
engine behind the rebuilding. Asked if he felt he was still being neglected by the Iraqi 
government, Sheikh Hamid al-Alwani, the head of the city council, didn't miss a beat. He 
says ‘naam’ or ‘yes.’ The Iraqi government has spent far less on rebuilding than the U.S. 
predicted.”&BC 
 The GOI failed to meet U.S. expectations for investment in reconstruction for 
Fallujah because the U.S. had the resources to fund the projects unilaterally, and was just 
as interested as Baghdad in rebuilding the city for the sake of security. Iraqis could free 
ride on U.S. reconstruction efforts, benefiting with minimal investment. As illustrated by 
a project to build a wastewater treatment system for Fallujah, Baghdad took advantage of 
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opportunities to stall issuing payments to contractors for years, and neglected to deal 
with critical components of a project. For the treatment system there was no plan to link 
houses to drainage, a significant component to making the project worthwhile. Without a 
link to homes, there would be no municipal sewage to treat. In 2008 representatives 
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers reported that although the Iraqi Ministry of 
Municipalities and Public Works had ‘verbally committed’ to ensuring home connections 
installed, U.S. Engineers were ‘extremely concerned’ that the Ministry would not provide 
any services, instead insisting homeowners install their own connections. This ad-hoc 
solution would risk harming the system, undermining the whole effort. The Army Corp 
of Engineers “stated that "M!+G,!S"*".+-<!4H**(+!M)*J!+G,!G().,!4(**,4+"(*.W!+G,!XLH4Y!)>!>9H*’!
".!M(-!+G,!Z[=[!/(#,-*3,*+!+(!).,!\4(*(3"4!=)>>(-+!;)*J.[]&BD!!
Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Compliance  
 In 2007 the U.S. asked Baghdad to issue an official letter requesting U.S. 
assistance to remove 550 metric tons of natural uranium “yellowcake,” a starter material 
for high-grade nuclear material from Tuwaitha. Having significant military presence in 
the country, the U.S. had unilateral ability to remove the material, but not to issue an 
official letter from the Government of Iraq requesting U.S. assistance in the process. 
Since the U.S. issued two separate requests to Baghdad regarding the Tuwaitha 
yellowcake, one for an official letter regarding removal, one for Iraqi participation in the 
sale of substance, this study similarly coded two requests, one (removal) the U.S. had 
unilateral ability to enforce, the other (letter) required GOI action.&CE 
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 It was in Baghdad’s interest to have the yellowcake removed. During this time 
Iraq was occupied by a military sent to overthrow Saddam Hussein, in part to ensure 
that regime did not achieve nuclear weapons. The GOI was acutely aware of the potential 
consequences for nuclear ambitions. Second, they did not have full control over their 
territory. There was a possibility that insurgents could get a hold of the material and do 
harm to Baghdad and others. Additionally, the U.S. offered Iraq a good deal. The U.S. 
Department of Defense would handle the difficult job of transporting this material, while 
the GOI could profit from the sale. Lastly, by issuing the letter Baghdad could better 
influence the terms of the process. It could lobby for a better price and legitimize itself as 
the sovereign authority over such matters and property. After some negotiation over the 
terms and joking with the U.S. that maybe Iraq could sell the yellowcake to Iran, 
Baghdad complied and issued the letter.&C% The end result of the request was in 
Baghdad’s interest and the task could not be accomplished without their participation. 
Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible—Predicted Compliance  
 The controversial U.S. strategic decision to fund the Sons of Iraq—SOI, (or 
Concerned Local Citizens—CLCs), an ad-hoc group of Sunnis that had turned against the 
insurgency has been lauded by many as a critical strategic victory. It was nevertheless 
not particularly welcomed by the Shi’a-dominated GOI.  Some officials in Baghdad saw 
the program as a unilateral American decision to arm a non-government Sunni militia 
that might compete for power in Iraq.&C& After 2008 what to do with the Sons of Iraq 
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program became a tricky question. In late 2007 the U.S. asked the GOI to match funds 
for the program to move towards incorporating SOI elements into the government.&C1  
 In January 2008, Baghdad agreed to match U.S. funds for the program.&C? 
Although uncomfortable with the program as an armed, Sunni, non-government group 
controlling territory, the GOI recognized that if the U.S. continued to run the program 
without their input, the Sons of Iraq program would not only continue to exist on U.S. 
funding, but would continue to operate outside their influence. Matching funds and 
running programs to incorporate SOI elements into GOI institutions would give Baghdad 
more influence over the fate of the group.  
 Initially Baghdad’s cooperation on SOI funding was tenuous. The Office of the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction reported that in in practice, GOI 
payments to the SOI were “consistently late.” “Between October 2008 and December 
2010, the GOI paid SOI salaries on time only about 42% of the time.” The U.S. had to 
provide additional payments to SOI entities due to Baghdad’s tardiness or failure to 
pay.285 Although the U.S. remained skeptical, Prime Minister Maliki expressed support 
for SOI integration into the government, earmarking $300 million in matching U.S.-GOI 
funds for the SOI.286 As the GOI gained authority over the Sons of Iraq program, reports 
emerged of Shi’a elements in the GOI targeting SOI figures.287 According to NPR “In 
2009, the fate of the Sons of Iraq was left in the hands of Iraq's Shiite-dominated 
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coalition government, which agreed to pay the men and eventually either integrate them 
into the armed forces or give them civilian jobs. But scores have been arrested over the 
past year by the government.”288 
 Nevertheless Baghdad complied with parts of American demands regarding the 
SOI.289 According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), the 
GOI was providing $196 million for reintegration programs and according to the U.S. 
military by July 2008 more than 14,000 SOI had been incorporated into the Iraq 
Security Forces, adding however, “developing broad support of the program has been a 
challenge.”290 Baghdad agreed to U.S. demands that it provide matching funds to the SOI 
program in order to placate American policy makers, but perhaps more importantly to 
gain influence over the program, since the U.S. had been running the project unilaterally, 
without their input. U.S. and GOI interests diverged in terms of the SOI program, but 
U.S. ability to run the program with or without Baghdad convinced GOI policymakers to 
participate in order to gain more influence over the program, even if they felt threatened 
by it.  
Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Non-Compliance  
 Understandably, if allied interests diverge and the foreign power is dependent on 
its domestic ally to implement the request, the end result is usually non-compliance. In 
Iraq this was observed in the November 2007 request from U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 
Ryan Crocker and U.S. Commanding General David Petraeus to Iraqi Prime Minister 
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Maliki asking that the GOI continue to offer legal immunity to U.S. contractors in Iraq.291 
Public outcry against alleged abuses by U.S. contractors had hardened GOI positions 
against contractor immunity even though such legal exemption had been afforded to 
contactors since the CPA. There was nothing the U.S. could do to compel the GOI to offer 
continued protection of contract personnel. The 2008 U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces 
Agreement specified: “Iraq shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States 
contractors and United States contractor employees”292293 The U.S. was dependent on Baghdad to 
fulfill the request as it had no authority over Iraqi law in 2009 Allied interests diverged, 
and the U.S. dependent on Baghdad to implement the request found itself without any 
leverage to compel cooperation. Indeed in February 2011 a British contractor, Daniel 
Fitzsimons, was sentenced to 20 years in prison in Iraq for the murder of two other 
foreign workers in 2009. 
Interests—Costs and Benefits 
This chapter has addressed the impact of capacity, the wartime environment, and 
Washington’s unilateral ability to implement reforms without Baghdad’s participation on 
rates of Iraqi compliance with American demands. This section complements these 
findings by accounting for interests, a principal variable impacting compliance. Whether 
or not certain actions are adopted is naturally dependent on what is being asked, and 
what potential consequences those activities will have on the domestic ally. 
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Subject Areas  
Requests were classified by general subject matter in order to observe if trends in 
compliance were based on subject areas. Issue areas were not found to be statistically 
significant, but there are nevertheless interesting findings regarding issues and rates of 
compliance.   
1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and 
expand infrastructure. Includes projects to reconstruct damaged urban areas, 
microfinance strategies, and vocational training programs. 14/106, 13% of U.S. 
requests. There is some potential overlap with requests classified as economic 
reforms, such as pricing for electricity services which is an economic policy, with 
growth and development goals.  
2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including 
reforms to state-run social services, banking and financial systems, WTO 
negotiations, pricing of public services and hydrocarbon profit distribution 
legislation. 26/106, 38% of U.S. requests. There is some overlap with requests 
classified as development requests and one that could also be considered military 
reform: the Iraqi Army protecting the central bank. This is a security protocol 
issue, but also one addressing physical banking security and messaging about 
financial security.  
3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and 
institutions. Including electoral, law enforcement, governance, protections for 
minorities, bureaucratic protocols, constitutional reforms, sectarian issues and 
reconciliation programs. 48/106, 45% of U.S. requests. 
4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Efforts intended to implement 
counterinsurgency strategy. Including COIN projects, negotiated ceasefire 
agreements, the provision of non-security services in damaged areas and the Sons 
of Iraq program. There may be overlap with requests classified as political 
reform. 4/106, 3.8% of U.S. requests. 
5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. 
Including increasing Iraqi security forces, increased authority for Iraqi military 




6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of 
the war effort. Including policies regarding the distribution and buying back of 
weapons, use and oversight of militias and sending three additional Iraqi 
brigades into Baghdad. 5/106, 4.7% of U.S. requests.  
 





Figure 15. Rates of Compliance and Issue Types - Iraq 
Military Strategy.!!In Iraq and Vietnam the subject area with the highest rate of 
compliance was military strategy. There is good reason why this may be the case.  Saigon 
and Baghdad may have been more willing to take U.S. advice on military actions out of 
deference to U.S. military leadership. Additionally, these domestic partners may have 
been less likely to disagree with requests regarding military strategy in contrast to 
requests for political reforms.  These actions focus on targeting the enemy and typically 
did not require difficult internal reform. Furthermore, it is less likely that low capacity 
would impact requests regarding military strategy (which would increase the likelihood 
for non-compliance), as the U.S. would likely only ask Saigon and Baghdad to undertake 
strategic military operations Washington felt they could handle. U.S. military planners 




for the task at hand. This means fewer military requests involving Iraqi forces should 
have failed due to capacity constraints. !
Counterinsurgency Projects.! ! There were only a few requests pertaining to 
counterinsurgency strategy (4/106), the majority resulting in partial compliance.  This 
number may be low because many other categories also incorporate aspects of 
counterinsurgency strategy, including development or political reform. Since 
“counterinsurgency” policies can encompass a range of political and military actions, 
many demands potentially overlap with other given issue categories.  These requests 
include management of Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs), also known as the Sons of Iraq 
program, a controversial U.S.-designed COIN program to pay young Sunnis to oppose al-
Qaeda. !
Political Reform.  Similar to other conflicts, the majority of demands from the 
U.S. were for political reform. This was expected. As a foreign power the U.S. would be 
unable to undertake internal reforms for Baghdad, and therefore is required to ask. This 
makes these types of request the most numerous in every conflict examined. Examples of 
political reforms requested include boycotting legislation to revoke immunities for 
American contractors, holding a constitutional referendum, accepting the transfer of 
inmates from Guantanamo Bay and passing de-Ba’athification legislation. !
Development.! ! As with other conflicts compliance with development requests 
were lower than average. This may be due to the complex, multi-stage process required 
for important development work. It often takes significant institutional capacity that 
domestic allied regimes rarely have at their disposal. Operating in a warzone complicates 
development progress even further. The insurgency in Iraq regularly targeted social 




years following the U.S. invasion, development work became important to the goal of 
promoting the idea of an effective Iraqi state, but it also became increasingly difficult.!
Economic Reform.! !Requests pertaining to economic reform had the lowest rate 
of Iraqi compliance, which is unique to Iraq.  In other conflicts including Vietnam and 
Sri Lanka, economics-related requests had some of the highest rates of compliance.  
Such cooperation between allies might be expected since both allies have a strong 
interest in economic stability. Similarly seeking greater domestic economic strength, 
allies would be expected to agree on various policies. However in Iraq half of all U.S. 
requests related to economic reform ended with non-compliance. (13/26, 50% Non-
Compliance, 6/26, 23% Partial Compliance 7/26, 27% Compliance). These results can be 
attributed to two major factors. !
First, the rate of low government capacity influencing compliance was 
significantly higher in requests for economic reform in Iraq when compared to other 
conflicts, and to other issues in Iraq. 20/26, 77% of economic demands cite capacity 
issues intervening in compliance, whereas 52/106 (49%) of all requests to Iraq discussed 
deficient capacity influencing compliance. This means demands pertaining to economic 
policy had a 28% higher rate of capacity problems. This is not surprising in light of the 
status of the tenuous economic infrastructure the U.S. discovered in 2003. According to 
the extensive report on the CPA written by the RAND Corporation, before the American 
invasion “the information systems of the [Iraqi] Central Bank and commercial banks 
were antiquated and—in some cases—nonfunctioning. The Rafidain and Rasheed bank 
branches had no interbank voice and data communications, and records were provided 
only once a month from branches to headquarters in Baghdad. The World Bank also 




suffered from the absence of any supervisory legislation.”294 The U.S. Under Secretary of 
the Treasury John Taylor, tasked with expanding Iraqi financial sector capacity wrote 
that after the U.S. invasion “the [Iraqi] banking system was in shambles. Electronic 
transfer of funds, widely made to people in developed countries was virtually non-
existent, making Iraq’s payment system the equivalent of a Model-T Ford.”295  
The second factor contributing to an unusually low rate of compliance with 
economic requests was a lack of interest by Iraqi officials to adopt the solutions 
promoted by Washington. Iraq historically had a high level of state intervention in the 
economy. American free-market solutions were unfamiliar. Americans in Iraq ran into 
cultural and institutional roadblocks opposing their promotion of market policies. This 
was the case even with seemingly straightforward development or economic programs. 
For example, the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Babil grew frustrated when six years 
after the invasion Americans were still unable to inspire GOI representatives to reform 
local statist economic agricultural policies:  
As the owner of around 70 percent agricultural land in the province, 
the government micromanages what farmers produce, guarantees the 
purchase of key crops, and, to a lesser extent, subsidizes agricultural 
inputs. These statist policies and other factors, from inadequate credit 
to the distortionary Public Distribution System (PDS), have restricted 
private sector development in agriculture. Having come to rely on 
government largesse, it is little surprise that Babil farmers look to 
intervention and protection rather than open markets for their 
livelihoods. Taking heed of these deep-rooted structural impediments, 
Babil PRT has promoted the establishment of an Iraqi-led agricultural 
advisory committee comprised of public and private sector 
stakeholders invested in the long-term agricultural viability of the 
province, once the breadbasket of Iraq.296 
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Furthermore, according to a Rand report, the Iraqi banking system was incapable 
of handling modern market financing. “Iraqi banks had been cut off from international 
technology, standards, and business practices for 30 years. After the fall of the Ba’athist 
regime, the Iraqi financial sector was dominated by two state-owned commercial banks—
the Rafidain and the Rasheed—and four state- owned specialized banks.”297 
Interestingly, this division between allied economic philosophies has not been present in 
other wars examined. Allies in other conflicts, including the U.S. in Vietnam and the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, share a common economic ideology. This was absent 
in Iraq. Iraqis did not agree with U.S. market approaches.  
 Low institutional capacity combined with a cultural tendency towards statist 
solutions affected compliance with U.S. economic-sector demands. One prominent 
example of both factors was observed in American attempts to compel the GOI to reform 
the Public Distribution System (PDS) mentioned in the previous paragraph from Babil. 
PDS was a ration system established in 1995 to provide Iraqis with staple household 
items. PDS was an attempt to mitigate the effects of food shortages produced by 
sanctions against the Saddam Hussein. The program was run by the Iraqi Ministry of 
Trade (MOT), and depended on food imports (up to 480 tons per month) even though 
Iraq had historically exported food.298 U.S. officials commented that with sanctions and 
PDS Iraq went “from breadbasket to basket case.”299 The World Food Program (WFP) 
took over running the program after the disintegration of the Saddam-era Iraqi state.300  
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 Washington put pressure on the GOI to reform the system in order to fix 
efficiencies, market distortions and the PDS burden on GOI finances. However according 
to the U.S. Embassy, 
despite almost universal acknowledgement of its failures -- its massive 
price tag, its distorting effects on domestic commodity markets, and its 
myriad opportunities for corruption -- there have been no significant 
reform efforts. In 2007, the COR passed legislation that would have 
rendered households of government officials at the rank of Director 
General or higher ineligible for PDS rations. The GOI has not 
implemented this reform, however, and even the wealthiest Iraqis remain 
eligible for rations.301 
The failure to reform PDS can be attributed to a lack of political will to modify the 
popular social program, capacity problems hindering better administration and GOI 
reticence to adopt market solutions.  
Issue Type—Conclusion.! !These findings are helpful for understanding general 
trends in compliance among various issues, in particular when contrasted against 
findings in other conflicts. However, similar to other counterinsurgency wars, in Iraq the 
correlation between issue type and compliance was not statistically significant (see Table 
10). This may in part be due to certain types of requests including military reform, 
military strategy and counterinsurgency strategies having only few observations.  Only 
tentative conclusions ought to be drawn from these few examples.  !
Interests—Costs and Benefits 
Similar to other wars including Vietnam, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, potential 
short-term benefits for Baghdad were one of the highest predictors of compliance.302 If 
the goal of the demand could potentially be made to directly serve the interests of the 
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regime or Iraqi policymakers, it had a higher likelihood of being adopted than if it 
couldn’t immediately yield benefits for the regime.  
For example, in August 2006 the U.S. was alarmed that the previously discussed 
food distribution program, the PDS (Public Distribution System), was running into new 
bureaucratic difficulties. The GOI had failed to issue the required letters of credit for 
contracts associated with the system for August. This, the U.S. feared, might lead to 
system failure and potential food shortages. The primary problem was a highly 
inefficient bureaucratic system, which required letters of credit for all PDS purchases, a 
“90 day process even under favorable conditions.”303 The U.S. Embassy “pressed” the 
Minister of Trade “and other leaders in the GOI” to move on issuing the letters in order 
to avoid disruption of service.304 It was in the best interests of officials in the GOI to issue 
the letters in order to avoid the massive potential political fallout that PDS failure could 
produce. Seeing the strong potential benefits for complying with the demand, for their 
own interests and benefit, the GOI successfully cobbled together the letters of credit and 
the PDS system was not interrupted. 
 In addition to potential benefits, compliance with requests from allies can also 
pose potential threats or impose potential costs on the domestic regime. Interestingly, 
similar to Vietnam and Sri Lanka the statistical analysis on Iraqi compliance (see Table 
10) reveals that potential threats are associated with non-compliance, but are not as 
significant as potential benefits in predicting outcome. Below is a graph of the impact of 
potential threats on rates of compliance in Iraq. 
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 Again, the Public Distribution System (PDS) provides a useful example. The 
American request that Baghdad comprehensively reform PDS posed a potential threat to 
short-term GOI political interests. Despite being “massive, inefficient, and expensive,” 
PDS continued to operate because GOI officials feared any alterations would threaten 
their political careers.305 However, just as not all requests that pose potential benefits for 
the regime are complied with (other factors such as capacity may be paramount), not all 
requests that pose potential threats end in non-compliance. One example is the 
previously mentioned U.S. demand that the GOI support the Sons of Iraq (SOI), also 
called the Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs). Maintaining the program posed a potential 
threat to the Shi’a-dominated GOI as it reinforced local Sunni militias. However 
Baghdad complied with key aspects American demands to back the SOI because GOI 
officials felt it was better to take over the program than have it operate beyond their 
influence.  
 Potential benefits and costs are not mutually exclusive. Certain requests, such as 
the 2009 request that Iraq issue provisions for Out of Country voting for Iraqis abroad, 
could either help or hurt short-term GOI interests.  The potential impact of out of 
country voting on the re-election bids for GOI officials was unclear at the time 
Washington made the request.306   
Conditions of War and Internal Politics 
 The GOI and KRG are not unitary political entities. Like all governments, there 
was internal debate, conflict and internal maneuvering that had potential influence on 
compliance outcomes. For example, in 2006 the U.S. insisted the GOI hold members of 
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the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) accountable for “killings, disappearances, and 
human rights abuses,” committed by MOI officers.307 The Iraqi Ministry of Human 
Rights (MOHR) and the Human Rights Directorate at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
investigated accusations of MOI misconduct. This was not a model of interagency 
cooperation. The Minister of the Interior Jawad al-Bulani complied in part with requests 
from MOD and MOHR by authorizing the arrest of multiple low-ranking MOI officials 
accused of human rights abuses.308 However high-ranking officials had also likely 
committed abuses. Commander of the 2nd National Police Division for example was 
“believed to have directly ordered torture and other abuse.” He was spared by Minister 
Bulani and instead reassigned to the Ministry’s intelligence division. The Commander’s 
“punishment for his alleged crimes has been the loss of four days of pay.”309 Some 
elements of the GOI were working towards U.S. demands while others worked in 
opposition.  
Similar to what was uncovered regarding capacity, domestic political conflict 
influencing the compliance environment was cited significantly more frequently in Iraq 
than in other conflicts. 38% of U.S. requests discuss domestic politics playing a role in 
the compliance process. This is in contrast to 11% in Sri Lanka. The high number of 
requests discussing domestic political strife in Iraq is likely a product of two factors. 
First, sectarian divisions made domestic political negotiations during this period in Iraq 
particularly rancorous. This spilled over into policy debates over U.S. demands. Second, 
materials available in the Wikileaks cable database provide more details than what is 
available for other conflicts such as Vietnam and Sri Lanka. Routine embassy cables on 
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domestic political conditions can be disposed of instead of archived if they are 
considered historically unimportant. There are tens of thousands of such documents, 
and prior to the digitization of communication, archiving, indexing and publishing these 
materials was considered excessively time consuming for their minor historical value in 
the greater context of the war. However, in the Wikileaks database, such routine 
documents are readily located, searchable and available for Iraq and Afghanistan. This is 
supported by the fact that 24% of U.S. requests in Afghanistan (gathered largely using 
Wikileaks as well) also discuss domestic political issues involved in the compliance 
process.  While less than Iraq, this is still twice as much as 11% in Sri Lanka and 9.5% in 
Vietnam.  
 Interestingly this greater or lesser availability of “routine” cables documenting 
details of domestic political issues does not affect the findings in this study. Consistent 
with other wars, including Vietnam, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, domestic political issues 
were statistically insignificant in explaining trends in compliance in Iraq.310 As was the 
case in other conflicts, domestic politics had varied effects on compliance outcomes. The 
U.S. demand that the GOI implement the 2006 National Investment Law (NIL) is an 
example of compliance in spite of domestic political infighting. Throughout 2008-2009 
Dr. Sami al-Araji, Chairman of the National Investment Commission successfully 
lobbied members of the Iraqi Council of Representatives to pass amendments to the NIL 
as well as other necessary financial regulations.311 There was internal opposition to the 
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revisions, but the GOI complied by passing the amendment to the NIL in part due to 
concessions made on other issues.312   
War and External Threats Impacting the Compliance Environment in Iraq 
 
 Because the government of Iraq was making decisions regarding compliance 
while threatened by an insurgency, it is important to monitor how the wartime 
environment affected compliance. As with other wars examined the study, a variable 
tracking complications from the war was created to capture aspects of coping with an 
insurgency, including for example, violence, combat operations, refugee influxes, and 
offenses by the enemy. One or more of these factors was cited as an issue affecting Iraqi 
compliance in 18/106 (17%) of demands in Iraq, which is not a terribly high rate 
considering that insurgent attacks in Iraq peaked at 180 per day in June 2007, a state of 
affairs that paralyzed movement in major cities and hampered development efforts 
across the country.313  
 One example of the war influencing a compliance outcome was observed in the 
2007 U.S. demand to the GOI that it speed up the paperwork and processing of 
detainees, a task intended to move towards a U.S. withdrawal. But as violence spiked 
from 2006-2008, there were more insurgents in Iraq and coalition forces were holding 
increasing numbers of detainees due to security concerns. As the U.S. Embassy observed, 
“Case processing is not improving fast enough to keep pace with GOI detainee intakes 
and the transfer of detainees from coalition forces in the coming months… The GOI 
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detention system will, under this scenario, become more of a warehouse than a detainee 
processing center for the courts.”314  
 However, unlike most conflicts examined in the study, in Iraq complications 
from operating in wartime environment was not found to have a significant impact on 
rates of compliance with American requests (see Table 10). However there were no 
incidences of full compliance if the war had an influence on the compliance 
environment.315 In other words the best Washington was going to get was partial 
compliance if violence from the war was influencing Iraqi activities regarding the 
demand in question. 
  In Vietnam an additional variable was created to measure the potential impact 
of a serious crisis on compliance patterns. However Iraq never experienced an acute 
enemy offensive, similar to the Tet Offensive, which posed a worrying threat to the 
continued operations of the domestic regime. Therefore, a study was not made of the 
impact of an acute enemy offensive for the Iraq war. The impact on continual violence 
and the increases and decreases of enemy activity have previously been discussed in the 
sections on the affect of violence on the compliance environment and earlier discussions 
of changes in compliance over time throughout the war  
Conclusion  
Two dynamics in Iraqi politics regularly complicated compliance outcomes with 
U.S. demands: 1) Sectarian divisions between Sunni, Shi’a and Kurdish blocs, and 2) 
tensions over the division of authority and resources between federal and regional 
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entities. These dynamics are worth a brief discussion because they stand at the heart of 
Iraq’s political future and were apparent throughout U.S.-Iraqi bargaining encounters.  
In an effort to preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity, the U.S. promoted a strong 
agenda for reconciliation between sectarian groups. The 18 highly publicized August 
2006 “benchmarks” the Bush Administration required Iraq to fulfill order to receive $1.5 
billion in Economic Support Funds, were actions designed to promote political 
reconciliation in Iraq.316 Some of these demands, such as establishing joint security 
stations in Baghdad, were fulfilled.  Others, such as passing critical hydrocarbon 
legislation clarifying oil rights between competing groups and regional government 
entities, were not completed.  Baghdad received the supplemental money from the U.S., 
but by many accounts, including the investigation carried out in this study, most of the 
benchmark requests ended with partial compliance at best. Several key requests went 
unfulfilled entirely.317  
Sectarian divisions are an unfortunate hallmark of Iraqi politics. Despite U.S. 
demands for reconciliation, critical aspects of the American occupation unintentionally 
reinforced sectarian identities. The American reliance on Kurdish and Shi’a partners to 
contain the Sunni insurgency and promotion of national elections hardened political 
identities around sectarian representation.318 Recurrent sectarian frictions complicated 
GOI compliance with American demands.  Washington promoted its vision of a unified 
Iraq, while sectarian groups fought to protect the future of their groups within the 
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emerging Iraqi political system. These tensions were partially captured by the variables 
on interests and domestic political dynamics.  
Four categories of independent variables were tested to offer insight into Iraq’s 
compliance (or non-compliance) with U.S. demands:  
1. Capacity—The inability of the Iraqi government (GOI) to implement certain 
reforms requested by Washington unsurprisingly led to a greater likelihood of 
non-compliance. Nearly half of all requests, 52/106, or 49% mentioned deficient 
ability (as opposed to will) contributed to compliance outcome. 
2. Interest—Baghdad was more inclined to comply with requests that could 
potentially provide short-term benefits, and less likely to comply with requests 
that posed potential short-term threats. Interestingly, the general subject area of 
requests was not statistically significant in determining compliance outcomes, 
but Iraq was uniquely unlikely to adopt U.S. recommendations for economic 
reforms, in part due to a tradition of statist economic solutions that clashed with 
Washington’s call for market-based solutions.   
3. Dependency—Similar to findings from other counterinsurgency alliances, there 
was an interaction effect between Washington’s ability to independently 
undertake the request and whether or not interests between the U.S. and Iraq 
converged. If the U.S. could undertake the activity unilaterally and U.S.-Iraqi 
interests converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance due to incentives 
for Baghdad to free ride. If interests diverged and the U.S. could act unilaterally, 
Washington was frequently able to coerce Baghdad into complying, by 




This was observed with U.S. requests for Baghdad to support the Sons of Iraq 
program.  
4. War and External Threats—The consequences of operating in a warzone made it 






THE U.S. IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
“A western diplomat said Karzai had given ‘two fingers’ to the western 
donors who had pumped millions of dollars into establishing democratic 
elections in the country.”319 
 
 
An element of tension is always present between foreign intervening forces and 
domestic allies. But the relationship between the Washington and Kabul was 
exceptionally antagonistic.  Afghan President Karzai blamed the U.S. for a myriad of 
Afghanistan’s problems, harshly condemning the U.S. mission for Afghan civilian 
casualties and the slow pace of development. In exchange the U.S. has called Karzai 
paranoid and conspiratorial—an ally requiring “frank…(and perhaps at times, 
confrontational) dialogue.”320 Peter Galbraith, the deputy chief of the UN mission to 
Afghanistan, insinuated that President Karzai had a drug problem.321 U.S.-Afghan 
tensions permeated into routine cooperative activities. In 2011 U.S. Treasury advisers 
“described the working conditions at DAB [Afghanistan’s National Bank] as ‘hostile,” 
while U.S. service members grew suspicious of their Afghan partners as U.S. soldiers 
were being killed by their Afghan trainees.322 This chapter investigates the U.S.-Afghan 
partnership, exploring the dynamics that lay at the heart of these tensions, in particular 
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investigating structures that fostered or inhibited American influence over Afghan 
behavior.  
Summary Findings 
The Government of Afghanistan (GOA or GIRoA) had similar rates of compliance 
with U.S. demands when compared with other wars examined in this study. 50/148 
(33.8%) requests were complied with, 42/148 (28.4%) resulted in partial compliance, 
and 56/148 (38.8%) went unfulfilled.323 Most of the demands made across the conflicts 
investigated resulted in approximately 1/3 full compliance, 1/3 partial compliance and 
1/3 non-compliance.  
Also similar to other wars examined, compliance was affected by the convergence 
or divergence between allied interests interacting with America’s dependency on 
Afghanistan to implement reforms requested. However, interestingly, as discussed 
throughout this chapter, one aspect of this interaction effect did not hold up in 
Afghanistan. There was a surprisingly low frequency of free-riding in Afghanistan when 
compared to other conflicts, including Iraq, Vietnam and Sri Lanka. The hypothesis that 
free-riding should be expected when 1) allies share interests in a request, and 2) the 
intervening ally is capable of implementing the request independently, was not robust in 
Afghanistan. In Iraq, for example, the rate of full compliance with this type of request 
was 12.5% (3/24 requests). This is significantly lower than Iraq’s overall rate of full 
compliance (33.3%), following the prediction of less-than-average cooperation under 
these conditions due to incentives to free-ride. Afghanistan, on the other hand, under the 
same conditions conducive to free-riding, tripled Iraq’s rate of compliance, 37.5% 
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(15/40). This rate is in fact even higher than the average rate of compliance across all 
demands made in Afghanistan 33.8% (50/148), contradicting the predicted outcome of 
non-compliance due to free-riding under these conditions.  
Why didn’t the Afghans free-ride off American efforts even when provided 
incentives to do so? Based on the available documents, I argue the answer is rooted in 
Afghanistan’s notorious problems with corruption. Kabul frequently chose to comply 
with American demands that the U.S. could implement independently, in part because 
these policy demands create opportunities to access American funds and to influence 
which Afghan actors gain and lose from these policies. Complying allowed Afghan 
administrators to access funding sources and hold decision-making positions. Detailed 
examples and more information are provided throughout the chapter.  
Additionally, patterns of Afghan compliance during the U.S. intervention were 
unique when contrasted against other counterinsurgency conflicts investigated in one 
other fascinating way. The probability of Kabul complying with an American demand 
was significantly correlated with whether or not that demand posed a potential short-
term threat or imposed costs on the GIRoA. In all the conflicts investigated there was 
unsurprisingly some degree of correlation between a demand posing a potential threat to 
the domestic regime, and an increased likelihood of non-compliance. But this finding 
was uniquely robust in Afghanistan. It was the only conflict in which a potential political 
threat or economic cost inherent in a demand was consistently statistically significant 
predicting a failure to comply. This finding, when taken in conjunction with the Afghan 
failure to free-ride due to an apparent GIRoA preference to tap into potential sources of 
revenue rather than risk unilateral American action, indicates the GIRoA was 




appears to be less willing than other counterinsurgency partners to accept short-term 
risks and to value actions, even those taken independently by their allies that would 
directly benefit their regime, above short-term sources of revenue and avoiding short-
term costs. This finding has interesting implications for U.S. policymakers managing the 
Afghan alliance, and may, at least partially, have contributed to the exceptionally chilly 
partnership between Washington and Kabul.  
 First, however because the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan did not exist 
prior to the U.S. intervention, it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the war and the 
evolution of Afghan decision making under American occupation.  
 
Hamid Karzai and the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan !
 
“Ultimately, the Afghan Government must be a genuine partner for our 
assistance efforts to succeed. It cannot be held accountable for processes 
over which it has little or no control.”324 
 
 As General David Petraeus once noted, the differences between Iraq and 
Afghanistan, are enormous.325 The previous chapter on Iraq centered on control of the 
central government and the transition from U.S. domination of the Iraqi state to 
increasing Iraqi autonomy. The following section on Afghanistan will similarly discuss 
the role of U.S. advisors in Afghan bureaucracies and the context of U.S. demands on the 
GIRoA. However, in Afghanistan this discussion of governance requires a different 
context. In contrast to Iraq, which experienced a long tradition of centralized state 
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control, Afghanistan had no precedent of strong federal government to build on. Local 
dynamics and traditional, non-state authorities dominate politics in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, the starting point of the Afghan state at the moment of U.S. intervention 
should not be conceptualized as an entity with unencumbered territorial control over 
Afghanistan. As Washington and Kabul worked out agreements in Kabul, Afghan 
territory outside the capital was frequently controlled by entities outside their reach, 
including warlords and reemerging elements of the Taliban. Afghanistan had never 
existed as a state with a strong center. The disconnect between control of the Afghan 
state and Afghan state control of Afghanistan made the job of post-Taliban 
reconstruction that much more daunting for Washington and Kabul. Although U.S. and 
NATO forces have made progress throughout 2012 and 2013 to promote a more visible 
presence for the Afghan federal government in rural areas, Afghanistan is still not 
traditionally politically oriented for centralized state control.  
 The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks 
gave the U.S. more responsibility for Afghanistan that Washington wanted. The Bush 
Administration was wary of getting bogged down in an Afghan quagmire, similar to the 
Soviet experience. U.S. policymakers sought to use the Northern Alliance as a proxy force 
to produce a quick Afghan political alternative to the Taliban. In 2001 and 2002 
Washington imagined the United Nations would be the premier international ally for 
post-Taliban operations, effectively freeing U.S. forces for other potential operations and 
to avoid involved development processes for Afghanistan. As expressed by Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld in October 2001, “The USG should not agonize for post-
Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban. 
The sooner the Taliban is pushed out of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kandahar and 




advance, the USG should begin discussing international arrangements for the 
administration of Kabul to relieve Pashtun fear of domination by Northern Alliance 
(Tajik-Uzbek) tribes.”326  
 The December 2001 Bonn Agreement brought together non-Taliban Afghan 
political groups and international representatives to select individuals to the Afghanistan 
Interim Administration (AIA), the political body that would develop into a post-Taliban 
Afghan state.327 Hamid Karzai, a Kandahari Pashtun, was appointed chairman with 
relative consensus.328 According to the agreement, the AIA cabinet would act as both 
executive and legislature, with Karzai as head of state. The AIA convened an “Emergency 
Loya Jirga” (Emergency Grand Council) in June 2002 to select 1,500 representatives, 
who in turn then voted to extend Karzai’s term of office as chief executive for two more 
years. The Afghan government was now called the Transitional Islamic State of 
Afghanistan (TISA).329 In January 2004, a 500+ person Loya Jirga passed a constitution, 
and presidential elections held in October 2004. Unsurprisingly the winner was Hamid 
Karzai.   
 During, the long transitional period between 2001-2005 the Afghan government 
(such as it was) did not control much of Afghanistan. Furthermore, President Karzai did 
not necessarily control much. According to one expert, “Even within Kabul, Karzai had 
only limited control over his own government, many of whose top officials led militias 
that had fought or were still fighting against the Taliban with U.S. support.”330 The varied 
regional, ethnic and militia leaders that had been cobbled together to form the post-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
326 Donald Rumsfeld, “U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan, Memo from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to 
Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith,” October 30, 2001. 
327 Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy 15, no. 3 (2004): 8, 
doi:10.1353/jod.2004.0051. 
328 James Dobbins, Conversation with the Author, May 2012.  
329Larry P. Goodson, “Afghanistan’s Long Road to Reconstruction,”  Journal of Democracy 14, no. 1 (2003): 
82; Barnett R. Rubin, “Crafting a Constitution for Afghanistan,”  Journal of Democracy 15, no. 3 (2004): 9. 




Taliban Afghan state vied to maintain control of their territories, resisting centralized 
state control. These tensions between regional commanders (also frequently termed 
“warlords”), and Kabul were dealt with on a piecemeal basis over the course of the 
American intervention, but never eliminated. In December 2012, Ismail Khan, a 
commander in western Afghanistan, called for a reorganization of forces to fight the 
Taliban, a direct challenge to Afghan national security forces that had been organized for 
this purpose.331 Since Kabul had only tenuous authority over anti-Taliban military forces, 
the U.S. frequently found itself negotiating directly with regional leaders, and bypassing 
the Karzai administration.332  
Both the nascent Afghan national government and U.S. strategy in Afghanistan 
were alarmingly uncoordinated in the initial years of the war. Internal divisions within 
political organizations planted the seeds for tension in the Washington-Kabul alliance. 
Furthermore, disarray in the greater counterinsurgency mission led to a good deal of 
distrust and confusion in the partnership. Six months after the U.S. sent forces into 
Afghanistan in April 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote to his deputies: 
“I may be impatient. In fact I know I’m a bit impatient. But the fact that Iran and Russia 
have plans for Afghanistan and we don’t concerns me.”333 This was not just Rumsfeld 
being sarcastic. According to Ambassador Peter Tomsen, there was a fundamental failure 
to coordinate U.S. strategy and approaches to the Afghan state. “Inside Afghanistan, the 
U.S. embassy, the U.S. military, and the CIA often operated in separate stovepipes and at 
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cross purposes. There was no integrated U.S. policy enforced by the White House to 
coordinate all U.S. agency efforts. Sometimes one agency back Afghans to compete with 
Afghan rivals supported by other agencies.” 334    
As Washington and Kabul struggled in Afghanistan, their lack of internal 
strategic and institutional coherence took a toll on the counterinsurgency alliance. 
Afghanistan’s 70% illiteracy rate and political inclinations against centralized state 
authority made it difficult for the U.S. to build bureaucracies or for Washington to expect 
those bureaucracies to perform. This extraordinary low institutional capacity motivated 
U.S. agents to circumvent Kabul and implement projects without Afghan government 
participation. According to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Most 
international donors, including the United States, channel much of their aid ‘off-budget,’ 
meaning it does not go through the Afghan Government…  the U.S. Government is 
working to meet its Kabul Conference commitment to fund up to 50 percent of our aid 
‘on-budget’ by FY 2012 from approximately 21 percent in FY 2009, 35 percent in FY 
2010, and 37-45 percent in FY 2011.”335 This tendency to fund projects “off-budget” was 
also a response to endemic government corruption in Afghanistan. Consider, for 
example, USAID’s decision to use Catholic Relief Services instead of Afghan government 
agents to distribute funds for a cash-for-work program in Ghor province because 
“villagers reported that some officials involved with government-run programs… 
diverted commodities to their own pockets. It is unclear if this is blatant corruption or 
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whether officials felt food they took was an expected return for their involvement in the 
organizing the activities.”336  
Although perhaps more efficient in the short-term, the practice of excluding 
Kabul from the aid process likely imposed long-term costs on the U.S. by delaying 
institutional growth of the Afghan state and reinforcing Kabul’s reputation as corrupt or 
incapable. From 2001-2009 less than 20% of aid was “on-budget,” or channeled through 
Afghan government institutions. This meant parallel governance institutions were 
competing with Kabul for political influence across Afghanistan.  
While considered by many as strategic successes for localizing the coalition 
military presence in Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have also 
been critiqued for perpetuating reliance on governance programs run by non-Afghan 
government entities.  
President Karzai criticized the PRTs as holding back Afghan capacity-
building and called for their abolition as ‘parallel governing structures’… 
The Afghan government and some outside organizations have long argued 
that the PRTs have hampered Afghan government efforts to acquire the 
skills and resources to secure and develop Afghanistan on its own. USAID 
observers say there has been little Afghan input, either into development 
project decision making or as contractors for facility and other 
construction.337  
Furthermore, the chronic shortage of educated Afghans reportedly created 
“donor practices of hiring Afghans at inflated salaries, [drawing] otherwise qualified civil 
servants away from the Afghan Government.”338 These salaries could be “10 to 20 times 
the amount of base government salaries … Moreover donors provide salary support 
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outside the Afghan planning and budgeting process, thereby hindering the GIRoA’s 
ability to assume responsibility for managing its civil service. Many of the donor-
supported positions are not even authorized in the government’s staffing charts.”339  
These dynamics have potential implications for the dynamics of the Washington-
Kabul partnership and perhaps for the demands issued by the U.S. to the GIRoA. Did the 
U.S. tendency to use other Afghan political players initially in the war, including 
warlords and regional actors, change the numbers, or types of demands Americans made 
on the GIRoA? And did the U.S. proclivity to provide “off-budget” aid, excluding the 
GIRoA from aid processes to protect U.S. funds from waste influence the characteristics 
of the demands made by Washington? The data indicates that this is not the case.  For 
the reasons outlined below, the length of the U.S. intervention in Afghan provided plenty 
of opportunities for the U.S. to make demands to both Kabul and other political actors. 
Almost 30% more demands were identified for the U.S. war in Afghanistan than any 
other war examined in this study, including Iraq, Vietnam and the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan. Additionally, Afghanistan’s unprecedented lack of modern governing 
institutions meant that the U.S. as an intervening force had a lot to ask for from Afghans 
that may have been take for granted in other conflicts that had more developed partners.  
Furthermore, the U.S. was well aware that long-term strategic success in 
Afghanistan hinged on the survivability of the GIRoA. Kabul’s development and 
inclusion was critical to the mission. As Ambassador Tomsen discussed, even though the 
U.S. Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency readily engaged in 
relationships with warlords and other characters that may have ultimately undermined 
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the GIRoA, the U.S. Department of State was dedicated to GIRoA inclusion. Furthermore 
if these dynamics influenced the kinds of requests made by Washington to Kabul, it 
would be reasonable to assume the U.S. would be less likely to ask the GIRoA for 
activities the U.S. could implement unilaterally. But the data shows that in Afghanistan 
the U.S. did not limit tasks requested of the GIRoA to only those requiring GIRoA 
assistance. For 93/128 (62.8%) of requests the U.S. was dependent on the GIRoA for 
participation, a figure similar to the findings from Iraq 71/106 (67%) and Sri Lanka 
51/79  (64.6%).340 It may be the case that in Afghanistan there was so much to ask for, so 
much to develop, that the U.S. had plenty of requests for the GIRoA as well as other 
domestic and international actors.  
The U.S. Civilian Advisory Effort 
The primary U.S. official tasked with overseeing advisory programs (AKA 
“building the capacity”) of the Afghan government is the Special Representative to 
Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP), an office first held by Richard Holbrooke in 2009. 
Prior to the creation of that position the duty fell to the U.S. Ambassador and NATO 
Senior Civilian Representatives reporting to the UN Assistance Mission Afghanistan 
(UNAMA).  Part of the Obama administration’s 2009 strategic review of U.S. policy was 
a “civilian surge,” a marked increase in U.S. non-military personnel sent to Afghanistan 
to assist in advising and building Afghan government capacity.341  By 2012 there were 
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1,300 U.S. officials serving in civilian advisory roles in Afghanistan, up from around 400 
in 2009 prior to the “surge.”342  
The role of advisors varied widely depending on the development condition of the 
Afghan office. The advisor guide to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI), which oversees 
the Afghan police, rated MoI offices according to competency. As of May 2011 the 
average office ranked on the level of “Ministry organization cannot accomplish the 
function without significant coalition assistance.” 343 No MOI office was yet ranked “self-
reliant.” 344 By April 2012 that rating had not shifted.”345 The Ministry of Defense was 
performing a little better. By April 2012 the MoD “was assessed as requiring some 
coalition assistance to accomplish its mission.”346  
After more than a decade, the United States maintains full responsibility for 
training and arming the Afghan military through administration of the NATO Training 
Mission and Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A). 
In short, the U.S. is largely embedded in GIRoA security agencies, but it does not control 
the high-level GIRoA policy process. U.S. personnel and leadership are integrated into to 
multiple Afghan government institutions, but unlike what existed in Iraq under the 
Coalition Provisional Authority, or in Afghanistan under Soviet control, U.S. counseling 
in Afghanistan is not tantamount to control from Washington. In fact, diplomatic 
documents are littered with examples of U.S. officials having good degree of difficulty 
coping with Afghan allies. Preparing for a February 2010 meeting on electoral reform, 
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U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry was growing weary of corruption and actions by Kabul that 
threatened electoral reform. The U.S. Ambassador wrote in a memo back to D.C. 
“Karzai's willingness or unwillingness to consider our perspectives and serious efforts to 
build a sustainable system of representative governance will be a good indication of his 
willingness to partner with us in the year ahead.”347 The U.S. does not have the type of 
partner it would ideally want, nor the influence over that partner it would like, through 
the intervention in Afghanistan. The U.S. and Afghans have an unruly partnership.   
Methodology—Tracking U.S. Demands and Afghan Compliance 
Over 1,000 U.S. primary source documents (2,500+ pages) were analyzed to 
identify 148 unique demands from the U.S. government to their Afghan allies from 2001-
2010. These documents were found in three locations. First, declassified documents 
located online through U.S. government agency websites, including The Office of the 
Secretary and Joint Staff Freedom of Information Act Library were examined. Secretary 
Rumsfeld’s documents in the Special Collections Library were particularly useful for this 
project.348 A second source of material came from declassified documents released to the 
National Security Archive. Many are available online, while others are pending 
publication in a declassified document set. Third, the largest source of data for this 
chapter was U.S. State Department cables published by Wikileaks.349 2,961 cables from 
the U.S. Embassy were contained in the Wikileaks database, providing access to 
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correspondence between U.S. and Afghan allies.350 A more detailed analysis of the 
Wikileaks materials is contained in Chapter 3 – Methodology.  
In addition to public statements, declassified materials, and documents pulled 
from Wikleaks, there were two unique resources regularly clarifying the outcome of U.S. 
demands independent of what was in SIPRNET. One was the Special Inspector General 
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), an independent U.S. agency established by 
Congress to monitor the use of U.S. reconstruction funds in Afghanistan.351 Since the 
U.S. usually provided funding for programs it asked the GIRoA to adopt, SIGAR 
materials provide reliable accounts of Afghan performance. Another helpful resource 
was a set of reports the U.S. Department of Defense was congressionally mandated to 
produce, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” These 
lengthy reports monitored progress, growth and developments in Afghan governance.352  
Documents analyzed date from September 11, 2001 to September 11, 2012 (The 
U.S. intervention in Afghanistan lasted from September 11, 2001 – (Expected) December 
31, 2014). The 148 demands identified date from January 10, 2002 to February 26, 2010, 
providing coverage of the war from its beginning to early 2010. The last request analyzed 
predates American withdrawal by four years for two primary reasons. One, as of writing, 
the war was still ongoing. It would be impossible to collect data on events that have not 
yet taken place.  Second, the last document in the Wikileaks database is from February 
28, 2010. Primary source documents currently available to the public for the last years of 
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the war are limited at best. Finding public, high-level U.S.-Afghan correspondence is not 
possible under the given classification requirements.  
Data on Afghan Compliance with U.S. Demands—Summary  
For 50/148 (33.8%) of U.S. demands the regime in Kabul was fully compliant, 
42/148 (28.4%) partially compliant, and 56/148 (37.8%) non-compliant. If partial 
compliance and full compliance are combined, Afghans were compliant for 92/148 
(62%) of U.S. demands. These are very similar percentages to the rates observed in other 
conflicts analyzed in the study. 
Table 13. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War 
 
War 
Rate of Full 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial and 
Full Compliance 
Combined 








92/148 (62%) 56/148 (37.8%) 
Afghanistan (Soviet 
Demands)  
11/22 (50%) 3/22 (14%) 14/22 (64%) 8/22 (37%) 
South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)  
46/105 (43.8%) 25/105 (23.8%) 71/105 (68%) 34/105 (32.4%) 
Sri Lanka 
(Indian Demands)  
30/79 (38%) 19/79 (24%) 49/79 (62%) 30/79 (38%) 
Iraq 
(U.S. Demands) 
35/106 (33.3%) 32/106 (30.5%) 67/106 (63.8%) 38/106 (36.2%) 
 
In terms of verbal compliance there were 91/148 (61.5%) instances of Afghan 
verbal compliance with American demands, no cases of partial verbal compliance, and 
8/148 (5.4%) refusals of demands.  For 49/148 (33.1%) there was no available evidence 
regarding whether or not the Afghans provided verbal assurances that they would or 
would not fulfill the request. This high number of missing data points is primarily a 
consequence the available data. Due to the relatively recent nature of the conflict, a large 
percentage of U.S. documents remain classified and Afghan discussion of the period is 




collections of materials have been released, allowing for greater available evidence 
regarding verbal communications between allies. Note that in terms of methodology, 
there is significantly more evidence regarding substantive compliance when compared to 
verbal compliance. The tangible evidence of a specific action undertaken is easier to track 
than words exchanged between authorities. If for example the U.S. asked Kabul to pass a 
piece of legislation, there is a clear public record of statutory developments. But locating 
reliable evidence of the specific words exchanged regarding a piece of legislation can be 
much more difficult.  
Table 14. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War 
 
War 






Rate of Partial 
and Full Verbal 
Agreement 
Combined 












20/20 (100%) 0/20 (0%) 20/20 (91%) 0/22 (0%) 2/22 (9%) 
Iraq 
(U.S. Demands) 
75/83 (90%) 2/83 (2.4%) 77/83 (93%) 6/83 (7.2%) 23/106 
(22%) 
South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)   
76/87 (87%) 0/87(0%) 76/87 (87%) 11/87 (13%) 18/105 (17%) 
Sri Lanka 
(Indian Demands)  
51/70 (73%) 10/70 (14%) 61/70 (87%) 9/70 (13%) 9/79 (11%) 
 
 Furthermore, due to the recent nature of the conflict, not every request currently 
designated as unfulfilled is certain to stay as such until the end of the U.S. intervention. 
Consider for example the 2009 request the GIRoA allow for legal lumber sales. In 2006 
Kabul banned timber sales in order to protect what remained of Afghanistan’s forests. 
This unfortunately caused sales to be conducted illicitly, and enabled the Taliban to 
dominate Afghanistan’s timber sales. In response the U.S. government will “push for the 
rapid implementation of licit timber sales.”353 As of 2012 the ban on timber sales has yet 
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to be overturned however that status can easily change. For now it is coded as non-
compliant for statistical analysis, but is flagged for review in 2014. Two other requests 
similarly fall into this category.  
 
Figure 16. Foreign Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance Over Time – U.S. 
in Afghanistan 
 
Figure 16 charts the number of requests made by the U.S. by year juxtaposed with 
GIRoA rates of compliance with those demands.354 Some years have more requests 
complied than new requests made as Kabul fulfills requests made in previous years later 
in the war. The choppy nature of the number of U.S. requests and level of Afghan 
compliance over the course of the war in Afghanistan compared with Iraq’s steady rise 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




and fall (See Chapter 5: Iraq) reflects differences in the nature of the two American 
interventions.  
Afghanistan experiences a significant drop in the number of U.S. requests from 
2004-2005. There are several potential reasons why this is the case. First, as Iraq grew 
increasing violent during this period, Afghanistan may have been sidelined as a priority. 
Although U.S. military officials, including CENTCOM Commander Tommy Franks, 
refute claims that Afghanistan was compromised because of Iraq, other officials argue 
Afghanistan languished in the shadow of Iraq.355 Representative Bill Delahunt stated in 
the 2006, “We became too focused on Iraq, and we forgot about Afghanistan.”356 
Ambassador Peter Tomsen argued it was undeniable. 
Air assets and sophisticated intelligence equipment were moved to the 
Iraq theater. Even the large U.S. Army generators at the Kandahar Airport 
were taken out of Afghanistan. A U.S. CENTCOM official explained why 
[to Tomsen]: ‘We’re simply in a world of limited resources, and those 
resources are in Iraq…Anyone who tells you differently is blowing 
smoke.357  
Second, as previously discussed, the extraordinary low institutional capacity of Kabul 
motivated U.S. agents to circumvent President Karzai and implement projects without 
Afghan government participation.358  
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The spike in U.S. demands noted in 2006 is largely a product of “The Afghanistan 
Compact,” a document emerging from the January 31 London Conference which 
compelled Kabul to negotiate a long list of reforms, benchmarks and priorities. The 2006 
increase in U.S. demands is also in part a response to the resurgence of the Taliban and 
an increase in ISAF troop deployments. Between 2005 to 2006 Taliban suicide attacks 
increased 400 percent and armed attacks in Afghanistan climbed from 1,558 to 4,542.359 
As the Taliban insurgency grew, the U.S. submitted more proposals to its Afghan 
partners to compel them to reform in an effort to counteract losing ground in the war.   
The decrease in U.S. demands to Afghanistan in 2008 may have been a symptom 
of the change in American administrations, while the spike in 2009 is likely a 
consequence of President Obama’s strategic review of the Afghan war, the start of the 
U.S. troop surge and an American reinvestment in the conflict. The approximately 
30,000 American troops in Afghanistan at the end of 2008 more than doubled to 63,000 
by 2010.360 As U.S. expenditures in Afghanistan rose, the number of demands Americans 
put on Afghan partners similarly increased in order to complement military operations 
with political and economic development.  
Various summary statistical models are provided in Table 15 accounting for 
variables that potentially influence compliance. Each of the 148 demands identified from 
the U.S. to its partners in Kabul was coded to account for each of these independent 
variables. 
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Table 15. Compliance and Non-Compliance with U.S. Demands—Afghanistan 
 
Ordered Probit – Kabul’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2002-2010 
! !
(1)! (2)! (3) (4) (5) 
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Economic Reform 
!    -0.311 
(0.298) 
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War or Internal Politics     -0.057 
(0.234) 
  
N (Observations)! 148! 148! 148! 148! 148!
* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01 
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Independent Variables – Explaining Compliance 
Capacity 
As expected, a lack of government capacity is strongly correlated with non-
compliance.  When the ability to execute a demand is lacking, compliance is less likely. 
Afghanistan has traditionally had very little infrastructure and has experienced 
significant problems establishing competent bureaucratic protocols. Yet despite chronic 
shortcomings in government, only 26% of U.S. requests (39/148) discuss a specific lack 
of capacity influencing the compliance process. This is likely due to American officials 
limiting requests based on perceived Afghan capabilities. The 26% frequency of capacity 
being cited as an issue was consistent with Vietnam where 27% of requests discussed 
capacity shortcomings, but stands in contrast to Iraq where 49% of all requests made 
some mention of limited Iraqi ability contributing to compliance outcomes.  
This selection in the requests that are made based on capacity calculations by the 
intervening state is not unique to Afghanistan. The Methodology chapter discusses this 
bias across the wars investigated as it a consistent phenomenon in the foreign policy 
decision-making process of intervening states. The foreign government is less likely to 
ask its partners to implement tasks it does not believe its ally is capable of implementing. 
However, as noted elsewhere in the study, in counterinsurgency wars, there is a strong 
motivation to ask partners to undertake tasks that extend beyond the capabilities of the 
domestic ally due to the political imperative for the intervening state to lessen the 
burden of intervention, or hasten withdrawal.  
Baghdad having almost twice the number of requests cited for capacity 
limitations than Kabul does not mean that Baghdad had fewer capabilities than Kabul. 




is being asked of Kabul due to the limited reach of the Afghan state and 2) Washington’s 
intimate knowledge of capacity constraints in Iraq. By running the Iraqi government 
under the Coalition Provisional Authority, U.S. officials were more prone to discuss 
organizational limitations in Iraqi institutions. This is reflected in frequent discussions of 
capacity constraints in Baghdad.  
Washington asked the Afghans to undertake tasks related to governance that are 
taken as a given by the Americans in Iraq, such as issuing a single identity document 
across Afghanistan instead of using widely varied regional documents, creating separate 
prison facilities for women and juveniles, or beginning to conduct rudimentary 
bookkeeping in government agencies. Due to the legacy of limited bureaucratic 
governance left by the Taliban, efforts to promote reforms had to confront fundamental 
challenges such as widespread illiteracy and the customary repression of women, who 
otherwise would have comprised 50% of the available workforce. The request, for 
example, that the GIRoA require anti-narcotics certification for new Afghan police 
recruits was complicated by the fact that 70% of new recruits were illiterate and could 
not meaningfully comprehend the anti-narcotics certifications presented to them.363 
Presumably if Washington had asked Kabul for the exact same reforms presented to 
Baghdad, there would be an increased rate of non-compliance in Afghanistan due to 
capacity limitations. However because U.S. officials understood the challenges (such as 
high illiteracy) in Afghanistan, requests to Kabul were tailored around these limitations.  
The most common capacity issue affecting Kabul’s ability to implement demands 
came from deficient Afghan bureaucratic institutions. This was also the case in Iraq and 
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Vietnam. U.S. soldiers were readily available for military operations and U.S. dollars 
funded projects, but U.S. and Afghan officials nevertheless still had to cope with 
Afghanistan’s dysfunctional bureaucratic machinery. As one high-level U.S. official 
summarized, “Governance is the most conceptually difficult area of the [U.S.-Afghan] 
strategic partnership.”364 Coping with issues in failing governance required tackling the 
worst of Afghanistan’s political problems.  
As discussed earlier on U.S.-Afghan relations, upon its creation in December 
2001, the GIRoA emerged as a weak political actor in Afghanistan. Washington 
frequently established programs unilaterally or worked with extra-governmental or 
pseudo-governmental Afghan political actors, excluding the Afghan government. The 
decade long U.S. intervention has not solved this problem.365 As a 2011 report by the 
Congressional Research Service noted, “Afghan governing capacity has increased 
significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001, but many positions, particularly at 
the local level, are unfilled or governing functions are performed by unaccountable 
power brokers.”366  
Overall, there were significant governance issues in Afghanistan affecting the 
outcome of U.S. requests, and almost certainly the substance of U.S. requests to Kabul as 
well. As in other wars examined in this study, capacity makes a significant difference in 
rates of compliance as it defines the domestic ally’s ability to implement a given task. 
Low capacity led to lower rates of compliance.  
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Dependency and Unilateral Action  
Similar to Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Iraq, there was no reliable linear relationship 
between Washington’s unilateral ability to implement the tasks requested of 
Afghanistan, and Kabul’s decision to comply with the request or not. This is indicated 
statistically in Table 15. As in the other wars examined in this study, foreign unilateral 
ability to implement the task requested of its ally interacts with the convergence or 
divergence of interests between the allies related to the task, having a consistent, indirect 
influence on compliance outcomes. The statistical model in Table 15 illustrates the 
interaction effect within the context of other data from the war, while Table 17 (below) 
isolates the effect. It indicates that if the U.S. could act unilaterally and Afghan and U.S. 
interests diverged, there was a higher probability of compliance as Kabul was more 
willing to agree in order to protect its interests since the action may be implemented 
without them, effectively isolating them from the decision making process, further 
harming their interests. 
The reverse is true if unilateral action is not possible. If independent action was 
not possible and interests converged, there was a higher likelihood of compliance, as 
Kabul was likely to adopt the requested actions for the sake of its own interests. If allied 
interests diverged and the U.S. could not implement the reform without Afghan 
assistance, there were higher rates of non-compliance. The GIRoA had no interest 
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Table 17. Ordered Probit—Kabul’s Compliance with U.S. Demands, 2002-2010 

























* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01 
 
Examples of the dynamics described above are useful for gaining perspective on 
the interaction between interests and unilateral ability. 
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Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible –Predicted Non-Compliance 
Due to Free Riding 
 When Afghan and American interests converge over a given request, and Afghan 
participation is not required to fulfill the task, Kabul can choose to fail to comply with 
the request and effectively reap the benefits of the task being implemented without 
paying the costs associated with fulfilling the request such as money, time or effort. 
There are multiple examples of Afghans free-riding off American efforts in Afghanistan. 
The outcome of U.S. demands that the Afghans invest more heavily in the development 
of their energy infrastructure and issue a single national identity card according to a 
reasonable timeline is one example. Noting that the Americans care as much, if not more 
about these issues, Kabul has largely preferred to have the U.S. make the investments in 
energy infrastructure and have relied on the U.S. to develop technological solutions such 
as iris scanning and biometric data protocol and storage to compile a national identity 
database.368 The Afghans can benefit from American efforts without making an 
investment.  
 The broad pattern of free-riding observed in the other cases in this project did not 
emerge in Afghanistan, however. There was surprisingly low frequency of free-riding in 
Afghanistan when compared to the other conflicts examined. For example, Vietnam and 
Iraq’s rate of full compliance with this type of request (interests converge, foreign 
unilateral ability) was 28.6% (10/35 requests) and 12.5% (3/24 requests) respectively. 
This is significantly lower than Vietnam and Iraq’s overall rate of full compliance 43.8% 
and 33.3% respectively. This correlates with the hypothesis of interaction effect, which 
predicts less-than-average cooperation under such conditions. By contrast, the Afghan 
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government complied with these demands 37.5% of the time, a rate that is actually 
higher than the overall rate of full compliance for all requests in the Afghan conflict, 
50/148 (33.8%). This finding contradicts the prediction of the model for these conditions 
and the findings from other conflicts.  
Why did the Afghans behave differently than the Vietnamese, Sri Lankans and 
Iraqis in failing to free-ride off foreign allied efforts when provided incentives to free-
ride? Based on the available evidence I argue the answer is rooted in Afghanistan’s 
notorious corruption. Kabul frequently chose to comply with demands that the U.S. 
could implement independently in part because these policy demands created 
opportunities to access American funds and to influence which domestic populations 
would benefit from these policies. Complying (at least in part) with these requests 
allowed Afghan administrators to access funding sources and augment their influence 
over the decision-making process, which allowed them to make more money.  
Take for example U.S. demands in 2002 that Kabul adopt a strong position 
against poppy cultivation. The Karzai administration made opium cultivation and 
trafficking illegal, published eradication goals, and created multiple counter-drug 
enforcement organizations.369 The creation of the Afghan-controlled Counternarcotics 
Directorate (CND) and Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) allowed Afghans to influence 
which organizations would be shut down and which could be left alone. According to the 
Congressional Research Service, “many Afghan government officials are believed to 
profit from the drug trade… Corrupt practices range from facilitating drug activities to 
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benefiting from revenue streams that the drug trade produces.”370 If counternarcotics 
operations were left entirely to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Afghans 
connected to the GIRoA that profit from the drug trade would risk being caught by more 
impartial actors. However by taking greater influence over the law enforcement process, 
at the request of the Americans, Afghans in charge can decide who gets punished, and 
can also turn these positions of influence into new opportunities to profit.   
This logic was evident across multiple other drug-related demands as well, 
including a request to enforce the poppy ban.371 Several Afghan officials appear to have 
taken an interest in this request because it allowed them to choose which opium 
operations could be shut down and which would thrive.372 This select enforcement of the 
ban and its potential profits for GIRoA officials was particularly well documented in 
Nangarhar province from 2005-2007.373 Chief Afghan officials in Nangarhar were not 
only able to solicit payments and shut down competitors, but limited opium production 
boosted prices (and profits), while putting Nangarhar on the U.S. list of “good 
performers.” This increased foreign aid, “which was all too easily siphoned off” by GIRoA 
officials.374  Similar situations emerged in other drug initiatives encouraged by the U.S, 
including requests that the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development take 
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responsibilities for alternative livelihood projects,375 and the establishment of Drug 
Intelligence, Investigative and Interdiction Units.376  
Aside from drug policies, other issues also appear to have been complied with (at 
least in part) by Afghan officials preferring to tap into U.S. revenue streams than free-
ride off American efforts. In October 2006 the U.S. sought to transfer responsibility for 
border management to the GIRoA.377 There were capacity limitations, but strong 
motivation for the GIRoA to control and profit from border customs revenues.  In Herat, 
for example, the U.S. Embassy reported there is “tremendous leakage in imported cargo, 
much of which either bypasses the customs house via other transport routes or else is 
sold into the local market before reaching the customs house.”378 Afghan customs 
organizations were “rife with corruption,” with “almost 70 percent of potential border 
revenue lost because of corruption.”379 High-level officials from the Ministry of Finance 
(Customs) and Ministry of the Interior (Border Police) had strong motivation to be 
involved to augment sources of income, both licit and illicit, which led to bureaucratic 
issues fighting for control over border management. In 2009, border management was 
still dominated by Americans, however the Afghan Ministries of Finance and Interior 
were playing an increasing role, and profiting from their positions of partial compliance, 
as opposed to not participating and letting the Americans carry the entire load.380 
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Customs collection and counternarcotics may be prone to corrupt practices. 
However, even issues that are not traditionally tied to corrupt networks became sources 
of illicit profits in Afghanistan. The theory proposed in this study predicting non-
compliance due to incentives to free-ride off allied efforts was trumped in Afghanistan by 
incentives to comply in order to profit in these areas as well. Consider, for example, 
disaster relief.381 Kabul’s disaster management bureaucracies relied on “provincial 
governors and warlords” to distribute aid locally.  This gave local officials “tremendous 
power to control allocations of aid and its disbursement.”382 GIRoA provincial 
administrators were documented as conducting “wholesale robbery “of humanitarian 
assistance intended for flood victims.383 Washington sought to channel disaster relief aid 
through the Afghan government in order to promote popular support for the regime, a 
strategic goal in the counterinsurgency campaign. However, analyzing the degree of 
corruption in GIRoA “compliance” with U.S. requests for participation in aid programs, 
the U.S. Ambassador commented that unless corrupt officials are removed, “efforts in 
the area of humanitarian assistance meant to gain the support of the local populace will 
more likely serve to underline local corruption and further erode local support for the 
GOA [Kabul].”384 
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Afghan compliance under conditions other allies tended to fail to comply, due to 
free-riding, seems to be at least partially motivated by incentives to protect and augment 
corrupt sources of influence. According to the data, in Afghanistan the motivation for 
profit has been more influential than motivations to free-ride off American efforts. Free-
riding risks U.S. unilateral action will cut off lucrative illicit sources of income and 
political power.  
Of course Afghanistan is not alone in corrupt practices, but it may be exceptional 
in its severity. With the rapid influx of foreign cash that corresponds with foreign troop 
deployment, corruption is a serious, and recurrent issue in every domestic regime 
examined in this study. In Afghanistan however, it has reached unprecedented 
proportions. As one U.S. DEA agent noted, “The big problem in this country is 
criminality and corruption. It’s huge. It’s just rampant. It’s rife. It’s beyond anything 
we’ve seen in Colombia or Mexico or any place else...”385 According to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime in 2009 Afghans paid approximately $2.5 billion in bribes, 
the equivalent of 23% of GDP.386 According to the U.N. the two greatest sources of 
revenue in Afghanistan are drugs and bribes.387 When ranked, Afghanistan has 
continued to be found more corrupt than Iraq, and listed second only to states such as 
Somalia and North Korea.388 A pervasive phenomenon, corrupt practices are well 
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documented in reporting between the U.S. Embassy and policymakers in Washington. 
For an example, consider the December 2009 report on a U.S.-backed pilot program 
designed to pay the Afghan police using mobile-money, an electronic, cell phone-based 
fund dispersal method intended to prevent superiors from siphoning cash intended to 
pay subordinates. Superiors accustomed to skimming off a percentage of their 
subordinate’s salaries were unhappy about the program. The Afghan National Police 
commander in Jalrez in Wardak Province called the company providing technical 
assistance for the mobile-money program, directly asking for “a cut of his subordinates' 
salaries. After his request was refused, he ordered his subordinates to give him their 
phones and PIN numbers. On November 22, the commander collected 45 phones and 
demanded payment of their salaries.”389  
What is striking about the activities of the commander in Wardak is the seeming 
lack of attempt to conceal corrupt behavior in Afghanistan. Even the most senior officials 
are guilty of blatant corruption. Consider for example the description by the U.S. 
Embassy regarding the “numerous occasions” in which the Attorney General and 
President Karzai have authorized the release of detainees based on personal connections 
and nepotism. “In April, President Karzai pardoned five border policemen who were 
caught with 124 kilograms of heroin in their border police vehicle. The policemen, who 
have come to be known as the Zahir Five, were tried, convicted and sentenced to terms of 
16 to 18 years each at the Central Narcotics Tribunal. But President Karzai pardoned all 
five of them on the grounds that they were distantly related to two individuals who had 
been martyred during the civil war… Separately, President Karzai tampered with the 
narcotics case of Haji Amanullah, whose father is a wealthy businessman and one of his 
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supporters. Without any constitutional authority, Karzai ordered the police to conduct a 
second investigation which resulted in the conclusion that the defendant had been 
framed.”390  
Although corruption was certainly rampant in Iraq and Vietnam, Afghanistan is 
even worse. This extra emphasis on opportunities to profit interestingly counteracted 
incentives to free-ride off foreign forces. The Afghans instead cooperated, at least in part, 
with U.S. requests that were in their interests that the Americans could implement 
without their participation, because they were hesitant to pass up any opportunity to tap 
into American funding.   
Interests Converge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Compliance  
 The interaction effect between allied interests and foreign unilateral ability 
predicts when allied interests converge and the foreign intervening state has an ability to 
implement a task unilaterally, compliance from the domestic ally is likely because the 
domestic state must participate in order to benefit. There is no option to free-ride off the 
efforts of the intervening forces due to the fact that their participation is required by 
nature of the task at hand. This relationship held in Afghanistan, as in the other cases in 
this study. 
To use an example again relating to Afghanistan’s serious problems with 
corruption, in 2006 Kabul was asked by Washington to move forward to ratify the U.N. 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). The GIRoA had signed the U.N. convention in 
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2004, but it had not yet been ratified by the legislature. By August 2008 both houses of 
parliament in Afghanistan completed the ratification process, effectively complying with 
the U.S. demand.391 There were several reasons why the GIRoA collectively held that 
there was more benefits than costs from signing and ratifying the convention, something 
that only they (not the Americans) could do in Afghanistan. First, with 140 signatories 
the UNCAC is a popular convention. States such as North Korea, Somalia and Chad that 
have refused to sign the agreement have risked deepening their international reputations 
regarding corruption. Second, for individual lawmakers in Afghanistan, taking a public 
stance against signing or ratifying the anti-corruption agreement would be tantamount 
to publicly endorsing Afghanistan’s systems of corruption, a highly prevalent and poorly-
concealed system, but nevertheless a despised part of Afghan political life. Third, there 
are aspects of the convention that can potentially benefit Kabul, or the elites in office, 
including asset recovery where signatories are able to pursue government monies that 
have been hidden in private bank accounts in other countries. This could potentially be 
used as a tool to punish various individuals, while perhaps allowing others to act with 
impunity.  
Fourth, the institutions tied to the convention, including the Afghan High Office 
of Oversight for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy (HOO or HOOAC) have 
been established under the guidance of Afghan President Karzai. In 2010, the U.S. 
Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction [SIGAR] stated that HOO “has not 
been able to do more because it suffers from significant gaps in capacity; It lacks 
sufficient independence… In contravention of generally accepted standards and ethical 






General of the HOO are also employed as presidential advisors within the Office of the 
President.392 The U.S. Inspector general found evidence for this creating a conflict of 
interest. 
Lastly, policymakers in Afghanistan likely rationalized that they could ratify the 
convention, but could neglect to follow up on promised reforms. This is pattern across 
political life in Afghanistan. As the U.S. State Department summarized in an investment 
risk summary for Afghanistan in 2012: 
Based on the Penal Code, corruption is a serious criminal act; articles 260 
to 267 state that anyone accepting or giving a bribe can be charged with 
criminal acts. While these anti-corruption laws exist, enforcement has 
been very limited. President Karzai created the High Office of Oversight 
for the Implementation of Anti-Corruption Strategy ("HOO") to 
coordinate anti-corruption measures for the government; this office, 
however, does not control penalties and fines and has been largely 
ineffective. Afghanistan acceded to the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC) in August 2008, but is not a party to the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. The 
early 2011 establishment of the Independent Monitoring and Evaluation 
Committee (MEC) for Anti-corruption should assist the Afghan 
Government in assessing its compliance with UNCAC. However, 
questionable Afghan Government commitment to supporting the MEC 
and early administrative challenges plague the new organization.393  
In other words, according to the evidence there were more benefits than costs for 
the GIRoA to ratify the UN Convention Against Anti-Corruption, because there were 
sufficient pathways to avoid actual against corruption, while simultaneously placating 
international donors by doing “something” about Afghanistan’s rampant corruption. 
Since Afghan participation was required for the demand to be implemented, and since 
they had interest in seeing the convention ratified, Kabul complied.  
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Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Possible—Predicted Compliance  
 Similar to other conflicts, in its intervention in Afghanistan, Washington was able 
to coerce its Afghan partners by threatening to implement reforms that went against the 
immediate interests of the Afghans if the U.S. had unilateral capacity and there were 
greater potential short-term costs than benefits for the Afghans. Kabul after all would 
rather participate and protect their interests to the greatest extent possible, rather than 
have their American allies implement the request unilaterally at a potentially higher cost. 
For the sake of consistency I will illustrate this point with another example of U.S. 
requests relating to corruption reform.  
 By 2009, Washington had grown frustrated with faltering Afghan efforts to curb 
corruption. The Americans aimed to set up a new anti-corruption commission. This time 
Washington was insisting on an organization with direct international participation, 
instead of previous models that relied ultimately on Afghan policy makers.394 Afghans 
with strong ties to the Office of the President dominated organizations such as 
Afghanistan’s High Office of Oversight (HOO or HOOAC). They did not have the 
necessary authority or motivation to promote painful anti-corruption reforms and the 
U.S. sought a new approach. By late 2010, Kabul complied and established the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), a board consisting of three Afghans and 
three international appointees. President Karzai was careful to appoint Mohammed 
Yasin Osmani, a Karzai loyalist and former chief of the High Office of Oversight (HOO or 
HOOAC) to the MEC, despite international resistance to Osmani. The Guardian 
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newspaper reported that under Osmani HOOAC “got nowhere.” According to one former 
official, Osmani’s inclusion in the MEC “was a real kick in the teeth for internationals 
and signaled Karzai had no intention of going after those who were corrupt.”395  
 However, the Americans were able to get at a limited level of compliance out of 
Kabul regarding the MEC and international participation because the Chief of the 
Monitoring Group (MEC) was being established by the United Nations (with the 
international and Afghan committee designating the MEC chair), not the Afghan 
government. U.S. officials appear to have grown weary of anti-corruption organizations 
made meaningless by being funneled through Kabul. The international community 
signaled to President Karzai that they were determined to establish a group other than 
the HOO to investigate corruption in Afghanistan. Because the U.N. was taking a large 
role establishing the MEC, the U.S. could threaten, at least in part, to establish an anti-
corruption organization in Afghanistan to publicize corruption in the GIRoA that would 
be outside the influence of elites in the GIRoA.396  
The GIRoA had more to lose from failing to participate, when compared to 
joining and having some influence over the MEC. The Special Inspector General for 
Afghanistan (SIGAR) has reported that the GIRoA has gone along with the MEC but has 
attempted to interfere with certain tasks. According to SIGAR, the Department of State 
lauded “the progress the MEC has made in a difficult environment and noted that its 
work is receiving proper attention from the Afghan government… [Nevertheless] the 
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HOO has also continued to interfere with the MEC’s work, although with diminishing 
effect. Although President Karzai had attempted to limit the scope of the MEC in 
February 2012, the Afghan government did not prevent the MEC from conducting its 
work this quarter.”397 
Interests Diverge and U.S. Unilateral Ability Not Possible—Predicted Non-Compliance  
 Understandably, if allied interests diverge and the foreign power is dependent on 
its domestic ally to implement the request, non-compliance is likely. This finding was 
undeniably robust in Afghanistan. There are dozens of examples of the Afghans not 
complying with demands they determine are costly if the U.S. does not have an 
independent capacity to implement the policy. The 2002 request that U.S. personnel be 
exempted from Afghan income tax is one example. The U.S. status of forces agreement 
signed between the U.S. and the Afghans stipulates “The Government of the United 
States of America, its military and civilian personnel, contractor, and contractor 
personnel shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar charge assessed within 
Afghanistan.” However GIRoA officials held that this did not cover income gained 
through foreign or aid contracts and pursued U.S. personnel in Afghanistan for income 
tax. “The international community should be happy we are implementing the rule of 
law,” said Said Mubin Shah, deputy minister of finance for customs and revenue. “We 
should work together to solve this problem and impose the rule of law, because a lot of 
foreign contractors are evading their taxes.”398  
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Interests—Costs and Benefits 
This chapter has thus far addressed the impact of capacity, the wartime 
environment, and Washington’s unilateral ability to implement reforms without Kabul’s 
participation on rates of Afghan compliance with American demands. This section 
complements these findings by accounting for interests, a principal variable impacting 
compliance. Whether or not certain actions are adopted depends on what is being asked, 
and what potential consequences those activities will have for the domestic ally. 
Subject Areas  
Requests were classified by general subject matter in order to observe if trends in 
compliance were based on subject areas. Issue areas were not found to be statistically 
significant, but there are nevertheless interesting findings regarding issues and rates of 
compliance.   
1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and 
expand infrastructure. Includes projects to reduce areas contaminated by 
landmines and allow for the legal sale of lumber. 27/148, 18% of U.S. requests. 
There is some potential overlap with requests classified as economic reforms, 
such as pricing for electricity services which is an economic policy, with growth 
and development goals.  
2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including 
reforms regarding currency conversion policies, import policies and customs 
reforms. 25/148, 27% of U.S. requests.  
3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and 
institutions. Including law enforcement, governance, bureaucratic protocols, 
constitutional reforms, sectarian issues and reconciliation programs. 89/148, 
60% of U.S. requests. 
4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Efforts intended to implement 
counterinsurgency strategy. There were no requests determined to fall into this 




5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. 
Including increasing security forces, and command and control protocols. 3/148, 
2% of U.S. requests.399 
6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of 
the war effort. Including policies regarding assisting U.S. forces and weapons 
employed in the field. 4/148, 3% of U.S. requests.  
 
 
Figure 17. Frequency of Subjects of Requests from the U.S. to Afghanistan, 2002-2010 
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Figure 18. Rates of Compliance and Issue Types – Afghanistan (U.S.)  
Similar to other counterinsurgency wars, in Afghanistan the correlation between 
issue type and compliance was not statistically significant (see Table 15). This may in 
part be due to certain types of requests including military reform, military strategy and 
counterinsurgency strategies having only few observations.  Only tentative conclusions 
ought to be drawn from these few examples.  
Interests - Costs and Benefits 
Similar to other wars including Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Iraq, potential short-term 
benefits for Kabul were one of the highest predictors of compliance. If the goal of the 
demand could potentially be made to directly serve the interests of the regime or Afghan 
policymakers, it unsurprisingly had a higher likelihood of being adopted than if it 




For example, in December 2005 the U.S. requested Kabul implement customs 
reforms and increase revenue from customs. Reform had been “lagging due to weak GoA 
[GIRoA] commitment and systemic corruption at all levels.”400 There were capacity 
issues, but also a strong motivation for Kabul to implement select reforms to increase 
revenue through customs duties. Although corruption through an “infrastructure of 
leakage” continued to thrive in Afghan customs institutions, many reforms have been 
adopted under U.S. and IMF guidance, with customs revenues increasing 700 percent in 
five years, jumping from $50 million in 2004 to $399 million in 2008.401  
Naturally, requests from allies can pose potential threats or impose costs on the 
domestic regime as well as benefits. An example of potential costs effecting compliance 
outcomes was evident in the 2006 U.S. demand for increased reporting and monitoring 
of human rights issues in Afghanistan. The government in Kabul on the whole was not 
interested in greater accountability for human rights issues. By 2007 the U.S. 
Department of Defense was reporting that journalists reporting on human rights faced 
an increased likelihood of detention and the government instituted additional controls 
over media coverage of human rights. In response the U.S. made attempts to 
independently implement programs, such as micro-loan programs, promoting gender 
equity and other rights.402 In this case the potential costs of implementing the request 
motivated the GIRoA to avoid complying with American plans.  
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Interestingly, in Afghanistan potential threats predicted compliance outcomes 
more reliably when contrasted to Vietnam, Sri Lanka and Iraq. Kabul appeared to be 
more sensitive to potential costs of requests than these other regimes in decisions 
regarding compliance. In every conflict examined, benefits were consistently a 
significant predictor of positive compliance outcomes. Potential threats or costs on the 
other hand, were associated with non-compliance, although not as significantly as 
benefits predicted a positive compliance outcome.  
In Afghanistan, potential costs of the request were highly reliable and statistically 
significant in predicting lower probabilities of compliance. The reasons for this finding 
may be related to Kabul’s surprising lack of free-riding off American efforts. As described 
earlier in the chapter, Kabul’s affinity towards participating in situations where other 
allies may have instead been free-riding, is likely the product of an exceptional penchant 
among Afghans to take advantage of opportunities to tap into American revenue 
streams. Although I want to avoid oversimplifying the dynamic at hand, the data 
suggests Afghan compliance decisions appear to be less based on the desire to capitalize 
on the actions of allies, and more motivated by getting at the money of allies, while 
avoiding short-term financial and political risks.  
Afghan decision makers appear to be exceedingly reactive to threats or costs of 
demands when compared to other counterinsurgency allies. When compared to other 
wars, in Afghanistan short-term costs and benefits are more critical in decision-making 
processes than the longer-term benefits of reform that are at the heart of each demand. 
Afghan decision makers appear to value profit over the benefits from free-riding off 
allied efforts, and seem to similarly value avoiding costs above accepting risks to 




plagued by invading forces, Afghan political life may have fostered a generation of 
leaders with exceptionally short horizons for decision-making when faced with weighting 
short-term costs and benefits against long-term costs and benefits. The volatile nature of 
Afghanistan’s modern history may have taught Afghans to prioritize the immediate over 
the long-term to such a degree that they are exceptionally reactive to potential short-
term threats and potential opportunities to make money when compared to other 
counterinsurgency allies. President Hamid Karzai has successfully maintained office for 
over a decade not despite these pressures, but in part because of them. Karzai has shown 
exceptional skill managing the immediate demands of Afghanistan’s domestic political 
interests, including warlords, political rivals, as well as Pakistani, Indian, Iranian and 
American interests.403  
This pattern in Afghan political life had an influence on compliance outcomes 
with American requests. If there was short-term benefit, there was a significantly higher 
likelihood of compliance. If there was a potential short-term cost to the request, there 
was a significantly greater likelihood of non-compliance (see Table 15)  
Conditions of War and Internal Politics  
As in any government, the characteristics of Kabul’s bureaucracies influenced 
whether or not the Afghan government complied with certain requests. Consider, for 
example, the 2006 U.S. strategy for increased Afghan private sector development and 
economic privatization of industries including Ariana Airlines. The plan failed in part 
due to competing domestic political forces including parliamentarian resistance against 
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proposed privatization reforms by!the Ministry of Finance.404 Additionally, the influence 
of domestic bureaucratic tension became evident for American policymakers managing 
Afghanistan’s borders. The U.S Embassy reported in 2005 that “when the [Afghan] 
Border Police worked by themselves, they generated serious disagreements with the 
Ministry of Finance (that controls the Customs Service). This disagreement has blocked 
further progress of the unilateral border plan designed earlier.”405 Two years later the 
relevant Afghan interagency situation had only deteriorated and with it the border 
management reforms sought by Washington. The Americans reported in 2007, “At issue 
during this meeting were the roles of [Government of Afghanistan] ministries at the 
border and in part the lack of mutual support and misunderstandings between MoF and 
MoI [Ministries of Finance and Interior].”406   
 In 24.5% of U.S. requests American documents mention some level of Afghan 
domestic political squabbling in the compliance process. This was less than the record 
showed regarding Iraq, in which 38% requests had a record of domestic political 
complications, but more than Vietnam and Sri Lanka (11%). However as with these other 
conflicts, domestic political tensions was statistically insignificant in explaining trends in 
compliance in Afghanistan. As was the case in other conflicts, domestic political 
complications had varied effects on compliance outcomes. For example, against all 
American demands to the contrary, Afghan President Hamid Karzai “Afghanized” the 
Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), a watchdog group intended to deal with fraud 
in Afghanistan’s shaky electoral process. The U.S. demanded the ECC contain at least 
two international members in order to prevent the watchdog organization from 
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becoming a rubber stamp for pro-Karzai election fraud. In this instance however, 
President Karzai was thwarted by the Afghan upper house of Parliament, which rejected 
Karzai’s plan to “Afghanize” the institution and the GIRoA effectively complied with U.S. 
demands, despite the President’s efforts to the contrary.407 !
War and External Threats Impacting the Compliance Environment in Afghanistan 
 Because Kabul was making decisions regarding compliance while facing a 
serious military and political threat from the Taliban insurgency, it is important to 
monitor how this wartime environment potentially affected compliance outcomes. As 
with other wars examined, a variable tracking complications from the war was created to 
capture aspects of coping with an insurgency, including for example violence, combat 
operations, refugee influxes, and enemy military activities. One or more such factors 
were cited as affecting Afghan compliance in 11/148 (7%) of demands. This group 
included for example, the 2006 demand for Kabul to organize a national census to 
provide much-needed information for aid distribution. However in 2008 due to security 
concerns the Afghans canceled the census plan.408  
 However when Afghanistan is compared to other wars, there is a notably lower 
frequency of the war disturbing compliance outcomes. Afghanistan is 7%, whereas Iraq 
experienced such instances in 17% of requests and Vietnam was 36%.  There are several 
potential reasons why U.S. requests to the government in Kabul were less frequently 
affected by the conditions of the war when contrasted with other wars such as Vietnam, 
Iraq and Sri Lanka. The U.S. war in Afghanistan has been long, but has had a lower level 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
407 “Karzai Appoints New Elections Chief for Afghanistan,” Google News, accessed January 3, 2013, 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hpciHEuDx1kuA5rnKA5j7GdXysuw; “Hamid 
Karzai Takes Control of Afghanistan Election Watchdog.” 





of overall violence than other counterinsurgencies investigated.409 The Taliban 
conducted fewer effective military operations to disturb the U.S. and GIRoA. Although 
casualty rates have lowered by advances in technology and battlefield medicine, it is still 
helpful to keep in mind the differences between the levels of violence between Vietnam 
in which over 58,000 U.S. troops were killed, compared to 4,487 in Iraq and currently 
just over 2,000 in Afghanistan. There has been less coordinated violence in Afghanistan 
to disturb the compliance process, although the Taliban can be quite disruptive when 
determined.   
 As would be expected, complications from operating in wartime environment 
were unsurprisingly found to have a significant impact on rates of compliance with 
American requests in Afghanistan. It is simply more difficult to get tasks accomplished in 
a more complex, violent environment than if those environmental factors did not exist.  
Conclusion  
There were several important findings regarding factors affecting Afghan compliance 
with American demands.  
1. Capacity—The inability of the Afghan government (GIRoA) to implement certain 
reforms requested by Washington unsurprisingly led to a greater likelihood of 
non-compliance. 39/148 or 26% of U.S. requests discuss mentioned deficient 
ability (as opposed to will) contributing to compliance outcome. 
2. Interest—Kabul was unsurprisingly more inclined to comply with requests that 
could potentially provide short-term benefits to Afghan politicians. Additionally, 
Kabul was more sensitive to potential threats posed by various threats when 
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compared to domestic governments in other conflicts. Requests that posed 
potential short-term threats to GIRoA interests were significantly less likely to 
result in Afghan compliance. In other conflicts, including Iraq, Sri Lanka and 
Vietnam, the correlation between potential costs of the request to the domestic 
allu and non-compliance was much weaker.  
3. Dependency—Similar to findings from other counterinsurgency alliances, there 
was an interaction effect between Washington’s ability to independently 
undertake the request and whether or not interests between the Americans and 
the Afghans converged over the given request. If the U.S. could undertake the 
activity unilaterally and U.S.-Afghan interests diverged, Washington was 
frequently able to coerce Kabul into complying, by threatening to act 
independently and excluding the Afghans from positions of influence. 
Interestingly, however, was a relatively low frequency of free-riding in 
Afghanistan when compared to Iraq, Vietnam or Sri Lanka.  Due to Afghanistan’s 
endemic level of corruption requests from the United States were often viewed as 
opportunities to make money, which outweighed the motivation to free-ride. This 





Chapter 7:  
THE U.S.S.R. IN AFGHANISTAN 
“Soviet officials reportedly occupy the senior positions in every Afghan 
Ministry except the Foreign Ministry; where Afghans—because of the 
Ministry’s visibility and its dealings with foreigners – occupy Deputy 
Director positions…  All decisions are Soviet, and most Afghan civil 
servants simply sit at their desks and collect their paychecks.” 
 
U.S. Department of State   
“Soviet Dilemmas in Afghanistan”  
 
This chapter explores the Soviet-Afghan alliance, as well as discussions of the 
Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen and Cuba in Angola. The Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan was so costly and difficult that it is frequently cited as a 
catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet empire.410 
Summary Findings 
The chapter has several notable findings. First, according to the available 
documents, the Afghans agreed to all Soviet demands.  Second, despite this perfect 
record of verbal compliance, there was no increase in rate of compliance when compared 
to other conflicts. Partial and full Afghan compliance totaled 64%, which is strikingly 
similar to the other counterinsurgency interventions examined in this study including 
Iraq (63.8%), Vietnam (68%), Sri Lanka (62%) and Afghanistan under the U.S. (62%). 
The discrepancy between verbal and substantive compliance in the Soviet-Afghan case 
implies there was a failure to follow-through with promises made to Soviet officials.411  
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The data collected for the Soviet-Afghan war is unfortunately limited to the first 
two years of the conflict, 1979 and 1980. Data was also collected for 1978, a year before 
meaningful Soviet military intervention.412 After 1980, the Soviet Politburo appears to 
have stopped directly asking its Afghan partners for new reforms, choosing instead to 
use internal Soviet agents embedded in Kabul to carry out requests.413 Because this 
takeover of Afghan governance structures is so critical to the Afghan-Soviet dynamic it is 
important to discuss the history of this relationship and the day-to-day functioning of 
the Afghan state under Soviet occupation before conducting analysis of the data collected 
regarding requests and compliance outcomes.  
Table 18. Timeline of Soviet Military and Political Takeover of Afghanistan 
Basic Timeline – Political and Military Events Related to the Soviet War in Afghanistan 
April 1978  Nur Mohammad Taraki overthrows Mohammed Daoud Khan and establishes a 
communist regime, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), run by the 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Taraki reaches out the Soviet 
Union, asking for military and financial assistance.  
September 1979  President Taraki is assassinated by agents working for his deputy, Hafizullah 
Amin. Both Taraki and Amin belong to the Khalq faction of the PDPA.  
December 1979 The U.S.S.R. invades Afghanistan, Soviet KGB officials assassinate Amin and 
install Babrak Karmal as head of the PDPA. Karmal is a leader of the non-Khalq 
faction of the PDPA, Parcham.  
May 1986 Mohammad Najibullah, head of Afghan Intelligence (KHAD), replaces Karmal as 
Secretary General of the PDPA. Najibullah is also in the Parcham faction of the 
PDPA.  
April 1988 Geneva Peace Accords signal the end of Soviet involvement in the war 
February 1989 Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan 
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After the December 1979 Soviet invasion Afghanistan, KBG agents assassinated 
President Hafizullah Amin.414 Installing Babrak Karmal as President, the Soviets inserted 
themselves in the Afghan government. As one U.S.S.R.-Afghan historian put it, “by the 
close of 1979 the PDPA (The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) no longer ruled 
Afghanistan, the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) did.”415 The number of 
Soviet counselors increased, and by early 1984 reportedly 10,000+ advisors were at work 
in various positions in Afghan military and civilian organizations.416 By 1987, 9,000 
Soviets worked in the Afghan civilian bureaucracy alone.417 According to Dr. M. Hassan 
Kakar, a professor at the University of Kabul imprisoned by the Karmal regime in 1982, 
thousands of Soviets “worked not only as advisers but also as executives in all the 
military and civilian departments to which they were assigned. Bureaucrats of the regime 
found that even routine orders had to be approved and countersigned by the Soviets.”418 
KGB documents confirmed Russian involvement in the Afghan government. “The KGB 
used one adviser as an example. N.K. Grechin said that he wanted “to be a shadow 
minister,” to run the economic and financial side together with the minister of planning, 
to be responsible for fulfilling the plans as well as drawing them up, in fact to be jointly 
responsible for everything.”419  
Due to the level of involvement, the Soviet takeover of the Afghan government 
was not secret for long. Writing in 1983 a U.S. intelligence official, described how 
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“Afghan bureaucrats, including those of ministerial rank, found that even the most 
routine of orders had to be approved and countersigned by the ubiquitous Soviets. In fact 
the roles of adviser and advisee had been reversed; in 1980 it was the Afghans who 
advised (if tolerated to do even that) and the Soviets who decide. Typical was the new 
role of Vassiliy Safronchuk, now assisted by eight subordinates: no cable could be sent 
from the Foreign Ministry without being approved (if not actually written) by one of this 
group. The situation was essentially the same in other ministries.”420   
Soviet involvement extended into the top echelons of Afghan government. 
President Karmal was surrounded by a staff appointed by the Kremlin and was under 
constant KGB surveillance. Having witnessed Moscow’s disposal of President Amin, 
Karmal seemed to be careful to agree to Soviet proposals. Nevertheless, according to 
Henry Bradsher, a historian on U.S.S.R.-Afghan relations, not everything was 
harmonious in the alliance. Late in his career Karmal lamented how “Soviet ‘advisers 
were everywhere… I was not a leader of a sovereign state. It was an occupied state where 
in fact [Moscow] rules.” Bradsher also perceptively points out how the extent of Soviet 
control is evident in a November 13, 1986 Moscow Politburo meeting. Members are 
discussing several minor issues they would let the Afghan leadership directly decide, 
implicitly indicating that Afghans were not expected to make any other independent 
decisions than those minor topics delegated to them.421 
Understanding the involvement of the Soviets in the Afghan state helps clarify the 
dynamic of the Moscow-Kabul alliance and elucidate how and if this relationship 
influenced rates of Afghan compliance with Soviet demands, at least in the period from 
1978-1980 where data is available. First it is necessary to analyze the institutions at work 
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and then it is important to examine how the organization of governance institutions 
impacted the greater counterinsurgency alliance and trends in Afghan compliance with 
Moscow’s requests.   
The KGB Factor 
The KGB was the most prominent Soviet political organization in Afghanistan. 
KGB operatives comprised the bulk of Soviet advisers, while the KGB’s extraordinary 
powers enabled it to dominate other in-country Soviet institutions.422 Vasiliy Mitrokhin 
explained how KGB personnel organizationally fell into one of two groups. The 
“Residency” worked from the Soviet embassy while “Representatives” “were KGB officers 
sent to assist the Afghan government in various functions—generally, but not exclusively, 
connected with security, covert operations, sabotage, intelligence, and prisons. In 
addition came hundreds of KGB intelligence operatives, both Afghans and Soviets, 
whose identities were not known to the Communist Afghan government.”423 Over the 
years the KGB expanded their control within the Afghan government and worked to 
make sure loyal Afghans allied to the KGB moved up in government.424 Ultimately, KGB 
officials were either working in the embassy, embedded in the Afghan government, or 
spying on everyone else who did.  
Moscow’s takeover of the Afghan state unsurprisingly had notable consequences 
on Afghan government institutions and the political conditions of the war.  Shortly after 
the invasion and KGB infiltration of Kabul there was a massive desertion of Afghan 
civilian and military personnel. Furthermore, not only were these officials leaving their 
government posts, but they were frequently defecting to the enemy, exponentially 
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strengthening the emerging mujahadeen opposition. Even those that stayed eventually 
grew weary of the Soviet system. In 1985 it was being reported that “many party 
members… have become disillusioned and deeply resent the way they are being treated 
by the Soviets.”425 This contributed to an acute shortage of Afghan personnel, a direct 
result of “the exodus of qualified personnel and strife from within the communist party... 
By the end of 1983, well over four-fifths of the county’s career diplomats had quit their 
posts, been forced to retire or transferred to other ministry. ” This only led to increased 
reliance on Soviet staff to fill in the gaps throughout the government.426 Remaining 
Afghan personnel were largely promoted for their loyalties. Since they were being shut 
out, many Afghans in the PDPA eventually gave up on their duties. One Russian official 
bitterly complained that the Afghan “leadership thinks that the U.S.S.R. will solve all the 
economic and military problems. All they can think about is motorcars, positions and 
amusements.”427  
To compound the problem of overreliance on the Soviets, the Afghan military 
suffered staggeringly high losses in manpower. Entire divisions deserted and combat 
casualties remained staggeringly high. The Afghan military shrunk “from an estimated 
90,000 troops in 1978 to 30,000 in 1981.”428 Soviet forces quickly grew frustrated with 
their allies. The KGB reported that Afghan “officers openly disobeyed orders, cooperated 
with the Dushmen [mujahadeen] and went over to their side. Over 17,000 men had 
deserted from the army by 30 April 1980. There were also vast numbers of deserters in 
subsequent years. In 1981 30,000 deserted from the army, and in 1982 from 2,500 to 
3,000 each month. The number of deserters was six times greater than the number killed 
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which was also very high.”429 What remained was a shell of a government and army that 
required increasing levels of Soviet support.  
The Soviet Bureaucracy  
The KGB reportedly falsified reports being sent up the chain of command and 
failed to implement requests from the Politburo for reforms in Afghanistan. Under these 
circumstances Afghan “non-compliance” would actually be partially or entirely KGB non-
compliance. This phenomenon can be observed in demands from Moscow that the 
Afghan communists observe laws regarding arrest, trial and detention. Moscow feared 
kidnappings and extrajudicial executions were becoming harmful to public support for 
the faltering regime.  Defector Mitrokhin discussed the extent of fraudulence from the 
KGB, including KGB Director Yuri Andropov’s presentations to other members of the 
Politburo. According to Mitrokhin, the “KGB compiled reports on the events in the DRA 
[Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] and the new leadership. A memorandum, 
No.2519-A, dated 31 December, ‘On the Events in Afghanistan on 27 and 28 December 
1979’ for the CPSU Central Committee was signed by Andropov, Ustinov, Gromyko and 
Ponomarev… The memorandum was written according to the rules of disinformation. 
Facts were distorted and rearranged, and a false interpretation of the situation was 
given. Andropov was the only signatory who knew the whole truth about the events. He 
had prepared and influenced them and had stage-managed what had happened. The rest 
knew only part of the truth and their role had been subsidiary as a form of insurance.”430  
This type of behavior was one of several notable dysfunctional trends in the 
Soviet bureaucracy impacting compliance with Politburo demands and the general 
administration of the counterinsurgency war. Corruption within Soviet institutions was 
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on the rise throughout the 1980s,431 while there were notable growing rivalries between 
the Soviet embassy, military, KGB and party that caused agencies to “work at cross-
purposes” in Afghanistan and elsewhere.432 The Soviet Army had by 1980 begun to 
behave in ways that alarmed the CPSU and Afghan officials, “D. Panjshiri, a member of 
the Politburo and chairman of the Party Control [Commission] of the PDPA CC, was very 
upset that the Soviet army was beginning to fight against the Afghan people, was 
displaying unheard of cruelty and ruthlessness and was acting on the principle of ‘the 
worse it is, the better.’ The soldiers and officers had no aversion to marauding and 
speculating with military property and fuel. They disregarded the traffic rules.”433  
Furthermore, because the Afghan state was staffed by Soviets, Afghan institutions 
quickly began to mirror their Soviet institutional counterparts – whether or not the form 
or operating procedures of that organization were appropriate for its designed mission 
containing the insurgency. In 1982 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported, “the 
Soviets are helping the Afghan Communists set up the same kind of party and 
government institutions that the U.S.S.R. uses to control its own population.”434 The 
Afghan intelligence and security agency, Khadamat-e Etela'at-e Dawlati, better known 
as KHAD, directly resembled the KGB, taking up intimidation campaigns and 
extrajudicial killings, against what Soviet leaders were advocating for in Moscow 
regarding rule of law and due process for the Afghans to make the regime more popular. 
In effect, the institutions being established in Afghanistan by Soviet officials were 
fundamentally not set up to comply with several critical demands of the CPSU Politburo. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
431 Gregory Feifer, The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan, First Edition (HarperCollins, 2009), 
171; Bradsher and Bradsher, Afghan Communism and Soviet Intervention, 130–131, 203. 
432 Mitrokhin, “Working Paper No. 40,” 3. 
433 Ibid., 120. 





These organizations were replicas of Soviet institutions that were also failing to comply 
with the Politburo’s demands.  
The face of KHAD was Mohammad Najibullah, an ambitious Afghan official who 
would take over as President for Babrak Karmal in 1987. Najibullah headed KHAD, but 
by most accounts the institution was fundamentally “controlled by the KGB. A Soviet 
journal said KHAD’s KGB advisors ‘used tools of Stalin’s great terror- secret 
denunciations, anonymous spies, ‘confessions’ extracted by torture, secret trials for tens 
of thousands and public show trials for a few, unannounced executions and long prison 
terms.”435 KHAD quickly became one of the most formidable political forces in 
Afghanistan. One of its more prominent victims later reported that KHAD “had the 
power and the means to torture men and women to the point of death with impunity. 
Although by law the execution of a prisoner after his trial in court was the prerogative of 
the head of state, KhAD determined the case one way or another.”436  
Structures within the KHAD bureaucracy modeled on KGB characteristics that 
would have been potentially effective maintaining an authoritarian state were potentially 
harmful in counterinsurgency conflict where control of the population is tentative at 
best, and public opinion is traditionally considered important in determining success or 
failure. Kidnappings were common and interrogation personnel were rewarded for 
confessions, whether such admissions were genuine or false. “The establishment of the 
truth, which was likely to lead to the acquittal of the detainee, would deprive the 
interrogator of the rewards (promotion cash, trips to the Soviet Union) that he was 
granted when he made the detainee confess to the crime of which he or she was 
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accused... It was in his interest to make the detainee guilty.”437 Counterinsurgency wars 
however require reliable intelligence enabling government forces to pinpoint insurgents 
without alienating the rest of the population, risking turning opinion towards the 
insurgency. False intelligence that led to false arrests and imprisonment of innocent 
Afghans was unlikely to have helped the war effort.  
Finding a Scapegoat 
KGB and KHAD interest in political consolidation reinforced Afghan communist 
party division, against the greater interests of the CPSU Politburo. In their official 
introduction to Mitrokhin’s KGB files Cold War historians Christian Ostermann and Odd 
Arne Westad comment “what is most striking (and most useful) about Mitrokhin’s text is 
the pervasive sense it gives of the distrust that the KGB fomented and spread among 
Afghan and Soviets alike. While it is clear that Moscow’s interest in the critical year 1979 
lay in finding ways for the two main PDPA factions to cooperate against their 
increasingly efficient Islamist enemies, the KGB’s operations achieved exactly the 
opposite—by concocting rumors and slander, the KGB contributed significantly to the 
destruction of the PDPA (complete in most senses before the Soviet December invasion) 
and to the dysfunctionality of Soviet Afghan policies.”438 Afghan leaders made the same 
speeches regarding reform and unity over the course of the Soviet war (1979-89), but 
little, if anything was ever done differently.439 From 1978-1980 the CPSU Politburo 
would make a demand, the Afghans would agree to it, and the KGB in Kabul would either 
implement the request or ignore it depending on how the request fit with KGB standard 
operating procedures. After 1980 the Afghans were largely cut out altogether.  
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The Soviet assumption of responsibilities largely deprived their Afghan allies of 
the ability to make decisions about the state, but it also allowed the Afghans to deny 
responsibility for the political or military state of affairs, focusing instead on aspects of 
policy that they could potentially influence. “No resolutions were passed unless they had 
been prepared beforehand by the Soviets. The Afghans paid an unreasonable amount of 
attention to internal party intrigues. They presumed that other matters would be settled 
by the Soviets. They behaved like dependants but, at the same time, were noticeably 
insincere with their Soviet comrades. Babrak held the view that an increase of Soviet 
influence and intervention in Afghanistan would increase his prestige and importance 
but not allow the Soviets to control him as they might wish.”440  
The Soviets similarly found it convenient to deflect blame to their Afghan 
counterparts. This became a particularly useful political tool later in the war once it was 
obvious to the Soviet leadership that the war effort was failing. According to M. Hassan 
Kakar, once “Karmal’s inability to consolidate his government had become obvious, 
Mikhail Gorbachev, then general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said, ‘The 
main reason that there has been no national consolidation so far is that Comrade Karmal 
is hoping to continue sitting in Kabul with our help.’ Colonel Nikolai Invanov, a Soviet 
military writer, even wrote that ‘he [Karmal] was a nobody.’ Both statements reflect a 
failure of Soviet foreign policy. It was because of this policy that that Karmal was unable 
to achieve ‘national consolidation,’ that he had become ‘a nobody.’”441 Karmal was 
initially chosen by the Soviets to front the Afghan state after the 1979 invasion precisely 
because he wasn’t “a nobody.” He was a founding member of the PDPA, was a high-
profile member of parliament and a well-known moderate figure in Afghan political life 
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in the 60s and 70s. His ineffectiveness and irrelevance was at least partially due to Soviet 
decisions.  
The use of the Afghan political leadership as scapegoats for the failure of the 
Soviet agenda in Afghanistan only intensified after Mohammad Najibullah took over as 
President in 1987. “After Karmal was replaced by Najibullah, however, Soviet media 
began quoting the latter’s strictures. At first this just indicated a new leaf had been 
tuned. But as Moscow began to back out of its Afghan quagmire, it became a way of 
letting the Afghans damn themselves as not deserving continuing Soviet military 
support. Later Moscow media added their own harsh judgments to justify the withdrawal 
of the Soviet Army.”442 
Strategy and the Soviet Intervention in the Afghan Regime, 1979-89 
What were the consequences for Moscow’s heavy-handed political approach 
towards its Afghan allies? Did Afghan compliance with Soviet demands have a positive 
impact on the Soviet-PDPA war? According to the available evidence, the answer is 
probably not. From the evolving political and military patterns, it seems more likely that 
the Soviet takeover of the decision making process harmed the U.S.S.R.’s military and 
political agendas in Afghanistan. The takeover took away what little sovereignty the 
PDPA enjoyed following Soviet military intervention, causing it to become increasingly 
reliant on Russian advisers, assistance, decisions, money, and military operations.  It 
increasingly lost credibility among Afghans looking for a domestic national political 
force. Continued Soviet intervention in the internal processes of the Afghan state made it 
increasingly difficult for Moscow to withdraw and for the Afghans to take over mid/high-
level leadership roles. Regardless of how much money they were given, every governance 
duty that was assumed by the Russians on their behalf effectively shrunk Afghan 
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bureaucratic institutional capacity. The more the Afghan communists were shut out, the 
more indifferent they became. “‘As the conference goes on the debate gets higher and the 
advisers move closer to the table, while the Afghans move away, and finally the Soviets 
are left to quarrel among themselves…’ the ‘large number of advisers…caused…a spirit of 
stagnation, laziness, irresponsibility, and corruption inside the [PDPA] party.”443  
The Soviets promoted Afghans loyal to Russian institutions such as the KGB. 
Although this policy likely contributed to greater Afghan-Soviet inter-alliance 
cooperation, it raises questions regarding the complex impact of alliances on the 
counterinsurgency wars they are formed to fight. Can the Afghan-Soviet dynamic be 
called cooperation? There seems to be a significant difference between inter-alliance 
cooperation, and disguise through verbal agreement accompanied by the confiscation of 
sovereignty and surveillance of all allied parties. What does it mean if domestic actors 
are loyal to the foreign power above other political and national associations? What 
impact could this have on the war effort and political dynamics inherent in 
counterinsurgent conflicts? KGB archivist Mitrokhin touched on this issue while 
discussing one of the KGB’a favorite Afghans, Abdul Kadyr. He noted that Kadyr “was 
completely trusted by the Soviet organs and military. The Residency had a high opinion 
of him and considered him to be a man of principle and devoted to the U.S.S.R.… Babrak 
was aware of his strong personality and secretly disliked and mistrusted him… A. Kadyr 
is loyal to the Soviet Union and will not make any important military or political moves 
without orders from the Soviets or their agreement.”444 The Soviets assumed that Kadyr’s 
loyalty to the KGB above Karmal and the Afghan ruling leadership benefited them and 
the war effort. But having glimpsed into the potential effects of the Soviet takeover of the 
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Afghan state on the political dynamics of the counterinsurgency war effort in this study, 
it is questionable whether domestic figures placing the interests of the foreign ally above 
the ruling domestic regime helps the war effort, or hurts the mission of building an 
independent domestic state.  
Additionally the Soviet-Afghan alliance is interesting for illustrating that the 
foreign ally does not necessarily have superior strategic plans than its domestic ally, and 
compliance with those demands may not lead to greater rates of success in war. There 
were substantial reports that Soviet strategies to combat the insurgency were poorly 
designed for Afghan social and political life. In 1982 the CIA wrote:  
In our view, Babrak’s policies have generally failed because they have the 
conflicting goals of winning popular support and turning Afghanistan into a 
socialist state on the Soviet model. The land reform program illustrates most 
of the problems government efforts have encountered. The Taraki 
government intended the program to win peasant support and destroy the 
power of the “feudal” landowning elite through redistribution of land, to 
increase production, and to lay the basis for organizing Afghan agriculture on 
the Soviet model. Like many other government programs, it reflected 
doctrinaire Marxist misconceptions about Afghan society. Most peasants had 
little reason to support the program. Fragmentation of holdings was a more 
serious problem than large estates. Land reform threatened mutually 
beneficial relationships between the large landlords and the tenants or small 
landholders… Notwithstanding earlier failures, the Marxists still seem to 
regard the program as both a means of restructuring Afghan society and – 
despite widespread opposition – winning rural support. Babrak announced 
that land reform would be one of his immediate goals. His government did 
little about the program until the summer of 1981, when it announced a 
revised program that virtually abandoned the original Marxist goals in favor 
of winning popular support. Almost anyone who agreed to support the 
government would have his holdings restored… still, the government kept 
grievances alone by discussing such unpopular institutions as “cooperative” 
farms and in January it issued a probably fictitious survey of land reform that 
both promised that reform would follow Afghan traditions and proposed 
measures hat violated those traditions.445  
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Try as Moscow and Kabul did to implement the political and military plans 
designed by Russian strategists, the counterinsurgency coalition saw multiple 
devastating policy failures. As Kakar explained, “on 15 January 1987, while inaugurating 
the policy of “national reconciliation,” [a Soviet demand] Najibullah invited political 
groups for a dialogue about the formation of a coalition government. He also invited 
leaders of the Islamic groups, but in reply they reiterated their view: “the continuation of 
armed jehad until the unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops, the overthrow of the 
atheistic regime, and the establishment of an independent, free and Islamic Afghanistan. 
The former king Mohammad Zahir also rejected the call. Even within the PDPA the 
opposition was felt. The followers of Karmal, who numbered more than he followers of 
Najibullah, set up a separate faction, the SNMA.”446  
When the Soviets made concurrent efforts to negotiate with the Afghan resistance 
in order to find a way to withdraw, they too witnessed their policy proposals fail due to 
the decisions of enemy commanders.  Ahmad Shah Massoud, the famed mujahedeen 
commander who later lead the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance until his assassination on 
September 9, 2001, was contacted later in the war by Soviets seeking to negotiate a 
compromise. His sent the following response:  
Mister Adviser! 
 
I already wanted to go to the place to meet the Soviet representatives 
when I received your latest letter. I should say for the sake of clarity: we 
have endured war and your presence of 10 years. God willing, we will 
endure it a few more days. But if you begin combat operations then we 
will give you a fitting rebuff. That’s all. From this day we will assign our 
detachments and groups the mission of being in full combat readiness. 
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With respect, Ahmad Shah Masoud, 26 December 1988447  
The failure of Soviet policy despite compliance of the domestic Afghan regime is 
of course not unique to the Soviets. There were numerous devastating strategic failures 
for the U.S. in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the Indians in Sri Lanka. But the 
Soviets in particular chose an extraordinarily harsh military approach to Afghanistan,448 
were working with an extraordinary unpopular Afghan regime and had a particularly 
difficult time getting any of their political initiatives to succeed. The fact that they 
effectively took over the Afghan state, taking intervention to the point of depriving the 
Afghans of their sovereignty, seems to have reinforced strategic failure as it bred 
deepening dependency and a lack of legitimacy.  
Methodology 
 One important reason for investigating counterinsurgency alliances across various 
wars is to capture variation in the political-military strategies employed by both allies. A 
product of such varying strategic approaches is deviation in the degree of foreign 
interference in the internal domestic state bureaucracy. American strategists in the 
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan were reluctant to take over political functions for their 
allies in fear that such activities would undermine the mission to create an indigenous 
independent government capable of resisting the insurgency without American aid. As 
the U.S. Department of Defense summarized for Vietnam in a 1972 lessons learned 
study,  “Americans should help, not substitute for, the government of our ally. To the 
extent that we Americans “take charge,” we postpone (and may even jeopardize) the 
achievement of our ultimate objectives. The application of this lesson in practice, as we 
have discovered in Vietnam, is difficult and calls for a careful selection and training of 
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advisers. If we could turn back history, the process of “Vietnamization” would have been 
started in 1962, not 1969.”449 The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was guided by a 
very different philosophy. According to KGB records, by the end of the invasion, Soviet 
advisers “delved into all the crevices of the [Afghan] ministries.”450 This contrast in 
approaches to counterinsurgency alliances provides an important opportunity to 
investigate compliance in different environments.   
In accordance with the methodology utilized across this study, high-level primary 
source decision documents were identified from relevant archives and analyzed to 
identify specific demands from the foreign power on the domestic ally. The fall of the 
Soviet Union in December 1991 led to an unexpected opening of archives containing files 
from the CPSU Politburo (Communist Party of the Soviet Union). This allowed scholars 
in the 1990s to collect and translate critical decision documents on the Afghan war. Over 
200 high-level Soviet documents have been organized and made publicly available 
through the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) at the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars as well as through electronic briefing books by the 
Russia project at the National Security Archive at George Washington University.451 
These documents were used in this study to compile a list of 22 demands placed on the 
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Afghan communist regime, the PDPA (The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) by 
the CPSU Politburo.452  
Analyzing individual requests for compliance outcomes and conditions similarly 
relied on primary source documents as well as secondary sources, including statements 
from former KBG officials, former Afghan political prisoners, declassified U.S. 
government documents analyzing the war and historical accounts of the Afghan-U.S.S.R. 
alliance. Note that documents from the Afghan regime were not included because they 
were largely destroyed when the regime collapsed in 1994. Even if PDPA documents 
survived and were available, there would be good reason to doubt their validity. Former 
KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin defected to the UK with six cases of transcribed KGB 
documents commented, “For the sake of personal interests the [PDPA] history of the 
period before and after the coup was re-written and falsified. The role and place of the 
party and its leaders in the life of the country were deliberately distorted. Documents, 
articles and letters were rewritten and altered. Approval of a person was given for 
personal and subjective reasons rather than on a realistic basis.”453 Therefore, although 
such PDPA documents would be interesting to analyze, the inability to obtain such 
records does not affect the validity of this analysis.  
The Soviets on the other hand, being accustomed to unwavering state control and 
absolute secrecy, could afford to be much more candid in their internal memos at the 
level of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Politburo. After all, Soviet officials 
writing from 1979-89 would have had difficulty imagining a scenario where internal 
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policy documents would become public. This is reflected in released documents that 
include highly sensitive details including specific covert operational orders to 
intelligence agencies such as the 1979 order to send “a parachute battalion disguised in 
the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team. For the defense of the 
Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB U.S.S.R. (125-150 men), 
disguised as Embassy service personnel.”454 Equivalent information in U.S. documents 
would almost certainly continue to be classified even thirty years after the event for 
revealing details about intelligence methods.  
All 22 demands from Moscow to Kabul were identified by examining hundreds of 
documents from CPSU Politburo meetings between 1978 and 1980, despite the fact that 
the documents examined extend from January 1, 1978 to December 31, 1989.455 After 
1980 Soviet Politburo members were working directly with Soviet handlers in 
Afghanistan and not discussing specific policy demands during meetings with Afghans, 
were repeating demands already made, or were concerned about Soviet military strategy 
over policies of the Afghan government.  
Of course, because not all documents from CPSU Politburo meetings throughout 
the war are available, it is possible that demands made on the Afghans from 1981-89 are 
simply not yet in the available records. It is impossible to know what materials continue 
to be withheld from public release, but there are several reasons why I do not think the 
document record is to blame for the lack of post-1980 CPSU Politburo demands. First, 
Soviet implantation in the Afghan state meant that high-level Soviet officials did not 
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have to negotiate directly with Afghan leaders on most issues as Soviet subordinates in 
Kabul had the ability to bypass Afghans and directly implement any sought-after 
reforms. Second, the record shows discussion throughout the war regarding reforms the 
Soviets first demanded from 1978-80. The Russians acting on behalf of the Afghans 
typically could not conduct these reforms without Afghan assistance. One example is the 
recurrent Soviet request for unity in the Afghan communist party. Regardless of the 
policy approach they adopted, the Soviets simply could not force the Khalq and Parcham 
factions of the PDPA to unite in a meaningful fashion. Factionalism continued until the 
regime collapsed. Both Khalq and Parcham representatives repeatedly promised they’d 
cooperate, while some simultaneously undermined the other side at every opportunity 
possible.  
Afghan Compliance with Soviet Demands 
From the available Politburo documents 22 requests from Moscow to Kabul were 
identified including requests to strengthen the border patrol, implement land reform and 
negotiate with trial leaders. For 11/22 (50%) of Soviet demands the Afghans were fully 
compliant, 3/22 (14%) partially compliant and in 8/22 (37%) there was non-compliance. 
This is not necessarily as high of a rate of compliance as one might expect considering 
Soviet intimidation techniques and their infiltration of Afghan government even in the 
early period of the war from which these requests date. However these numbers are 
largely consistent with rates of compliance across the types of wars investigated in this 
study including Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. This section of the chapter 





There was evidence of verbal compliance for 20/22 requests, and no evidence of 
instances where the PDPA said “no” to requests from the Soviet CPSU.456 Soviet 
domination over Afghan bureaucracies and pervasive KGB intimidation techniques gave 
Afghan officials incentives to agree to Soviet demands, regardless of their intention to 
follow through or not. Full verbal agreement with Soviet policies came from the very top 
of the Soviet and Afghan leadership as the KGB reported that President “Babrak 
[Karmal] asked the KGB representatives to assure [KGB head] Andropov that he would 
unswervingly carry out all Andropov’s suggestions and advice.”457 This was also said in 
public. In 1982 a reporter asked Karmal if he “disagree[d] with the Soviet Union on any 
matter of policy or principle?’ ‘Not at all,’ he replied. And in 1987 President Najibullah 
was asked ‘Are there any differences between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan on how to 
resolve the afghan problem?’ ‘No, none whatsoever.’ He said. ‘There is complete 
unanimity of views between us.’”458  
There were also ritual acts of agreement from lower levels of the Afghan 
bureaucracy towards their Soviet advisers. “Niyaz Muhamad, the head of the economic 
department of the PDPA Central Committee, who was in Moscow for medical treatment, 
said, in confidence, in December 1980 that the Afghans had been instructed to tell Soviet 
officials they met that there was unity in the party, the safety of the population of the 
whole country had been secured and good conditions for economic activity had been 
established. The Khalq supporters were being punished for giving Soviet specialists true 
information.”459 Moscow was demanding unity in the PDPA, Afghanistan’s communist 
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party,460 which nevertheless remained perpetually divided between two groups, the 
Parcham and Khalq. However due to their policies, the Soviet leadership unwittingly 
deepened this divide by overthrowing Amin, a Khalqi, and replacing him with Babrak 
Karmal, a Parchami. This did not unite the PDPA under Parcham domination, as the 
U.S.S.R. intended. Instead, because Afghan military leadership contained a sizable Khalq 
presence, a consequence of Taraki and Amin’s pre-Soviet invasion anti-Parcham military 
purges, there was perpetual in-group conflict. Furthermore, Karmal was quick to 
undermine Khalq forces in an effort to promote Parcham agendas and to neutralize what 
Taraki and Amin had done to promote the Khalqis. The anti-Amin Soviet move intended 
to minimize division ultimately reinforced it.  
Capacity was another variable impacting rates of compliance. The Afghan state 
failing to have the capacity to carry out the requested reform was cited in the historical 
record for 6/22 (27%) of requests, while the other 73% of requests did not have reported 
capacity issues. Of demands that did not cite capacity as an issue, 5/22 (23%) ended in 
non-compliance despite the PDPA reportedly having sufficient ability to undertake the 
request. 11/22 or (50%) of requests that did not have lacking capacity as a limiting factor 
concluded in either full or partial Afghan compliance. Some of the requests in which a 
lack of capacity was an issue illustrate the possible naiveté of Soviet planners as they first 
entered the war. In March 1979 Soviet officials asked the Afghans to seal its border with 
Pakistan.461 After the invasion the U.S.S.R. took over this duty and found it impossible 
due to terrain, cross-border culture. This, as an example, was an extraordinarily difficult 
task and was beyond the reach of Afghan communist forces in 1979.  
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Figure 19. Foreign Allied Requests and Rates of Domestic Allied Compliance  
 
Figure 19 illustrates the number of requests made by the Soviet Politburo in 
Moscow to their Afghan allies in the war. Again there are no new requests made from 
high-level Soviet leadership to the Afghans from 1981-1989 because Soviet forces were 
directly entrenched in the Afghan bureaucracy, enabling the CPSU Politburo to 
circumvent negotiating with Afghan leaders. Certain requests including promoting a 
comprehensive program of national reconciliation to insurgent forces, publicizing 
political settlement opportunities or implementing propaganda political programs for 
the Afghan Army were requested from Soviet leaders early in the conflict (1979-80), but 
nevertheless not complied with until later in the war as the strategic focus moved away 




For 12/22 (55%) of demands the Soviets had the ability to unilaterally accomplish 
the task on their own without the Afghans; the rest of the time (45.5%), they were unable 
to do so. Usually this incapacity to act without the Afghans was due to political 
considerations. Despite their deep involvement in the Afghan state after 1979, there were 
several activities the Soviets did not want to unilaterally carry out without Afghan 
participation as such action risked public admission of their annexation of the Afghan 
state. The U.S.S.R. wanted to be careful not to fall into U.S. or mujahadeen propaganda 
chastising Moscow as an aggressive foreign invader. The Soviets decided they needed the 
Afghans to participate in stopping repressive techniques against other Afghan 
communist or politically sympathetic groups in Afghanistan, to follow rule of law 
procedures instead of extrajudicial proceedings, and to enact a constitution. 
Theoretically, for example, the Soviets could have drafted the constitution for the 
Afghans, although this was deemed unnecessary since the version of the constitution 
passed in April 1980 was based on a draft written under Amin in 1979.462 Regardless the 
Soviets were still dependent on the Afghans to go through the motions of enacting it, 
passing it into law, including presenting, voting on and signing the constitutional 
proposal. This they could not do without Afghan participation unless they wanted to 
admit they had commandeered the Afghan state.  
Analysis of the data from the demands identified reveals that if the U.S.S.R. had 
the ability to unilaterally take over a task, there was s higher probability that the Afghans 
would comply with the request (see Table 19). This is different from what was observed 
in the U.S. wars in Vietnam and Iraq for example. In those conflicts, Saigon or Baghdad 
was not more or less likely to undertake the activity demanded by Washington based on 
the American’s ability to implement the request without their participation. Instead, in 
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the other war examined in depth in this study including Afghanistan (U.S.), Iraq, 
Vietnam and Sri Lanka, there was an interaction effect between allied interest and 
foreign allied unilateral capacity predicting compliance, not foreign allied unilateral 
ability alone.  
The situation in the U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan war was quite different. Because 
Soviets officials became embedded in the Afghan state, taking shadow leadership 
positions and redesigning state policies, tasks that the U.S.S.R. could accomplish in 
Afghanistan without the necessary participation of their Afghan allies were either 1) 
complied with by the Afghans under the supervision of their Soviet advisors 2) complied 
with by the Afghans because resistance would fail to change the task (as U.S.S.R. 
personnel could carry it out any way) and such resistance could result in severe 
punishment.  
The potential for foreign unilateral implementation of the requested action 
merits discussion for understanding instances of Afghan non-compliance. As discussed, 
despite their efforts, the Soviets were not able to unilaterally take over every duty 
requested, leaving the Afghans some room for the choice of non-compliance. The Soviet 
demand for PDPA party unity is one such example. Because it was strategically 
important to uphold the appearance of the PDPA government as a domestic communist 
revolutionary movement governing Afghanistan, Moscow could not completely destroy 
the Afghan communist political party, or its leaders. Furthermore, as early as 1980 the 
Russians wanted a way out of the conflict. Eliminating the Afghan communist leadership 
was seen as problematic because it would only embed them deeper in Kabul. This 
effectively gave the Afghans some influence over party politics. This fundamentally 




single party as well as other demands such as refraining from purging potential rivals 
from the military, Afghans in power were frequently able to avoid substantively 
complying with such demands. To Moscow’s frustration, there was nothing they could do 
about it as long as they wanted the PDPA to continue to function. After only a year of 
Soviet intervention, in 1980 the KGB was reporting that Karmal was “adopting the 
tactics of positive inaction. He listened attentively to advice, but did little to put it into 
action. He often complained: “It was not my idea that I should sit at the same table as the 
Khalqists. What unity is this?...[Karmal’s] only concern was how to compromise the 
leaders of the Khalq faction. He was not concerned about consolidating the situation in 
the country as he considered that the Soviets must do this.”463 
Lastly, the PDPA was more likely to undertake the action requested by the Soviets 
if they could directly profit from the request or use the action to better solidify their hold 
on power. For example, consider the Soviet request that Kabul implement communist 
political programs within the Afghan army. The request provided Kabul with an 
opportunity to expand its political base of support and inculcate the military.464 Table 19 
provides a model for compliance based on the 22 demands available, accounting for 
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Table 19. Ordered Probit—Kabul’s Compliance with Soviet Demands 
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*Indicates P <.05, **Indicates P <.01 
 
The data indicates the Afghans were less likely to comply with the demand if they 
did not have the capacity to implement the given request. However Soviet allies in Kabul 
were more likely to adopt the given demand if they had the potential to profit, or if the 
U.S.S.R. could undertake the given demand without their help. Overall, there is more 
compliance than non-compliance with Soviet requests, but nevertheless over 1/3 of 
requests are not fulfilled.  
Conclusion 
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan illustrates an important dynamic impacting 
compliance with allied demands in counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign 
interventions. The greater the foreign intrusion into the domestic state and the more 
violent the means used by the foreign power in coercing its domestic partners, the more 
verbal agreement the foreign ally will receive. According to the available record, Kabul 
never told Moscow it wouldn’t do what Moscow asked. Yet 37% of requests ended in non-
compliance, a figure comparable to the percentages found in Afghanistan under U.S. 
occupation, Vietnam, Iraq and Sri Lanka. Comprehensive compliance with allied 




by the foreign intervening force and regardless of the rate of verbal compliance with 
demands.  
As James C. Scott stated, “the more menacing the power, the thicker the 
mask.”465 The more heavy handed the intervening state is in its dealings with domestic 
allies, the more “yeses” it will hear regarding reform, but the less such statements will 
mean.  The likelihood of non-compliance with demands is likely to stay the same 
regardless of promises made.  
 In light of these findings on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, it is worthwhile 
to briefly discuss how other authoritarian intervening states handled the political 
problems inherent in their counterinsurgency alliances to contrast these alliances with 
the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan.  
Other Counterinsurgency Interventions by Non-Democratic States 
Vietnam in Cambodia, Egypt in Yemen, Cuba in Angola, Syria in Lebanon  
Vietnam in Cambodia 
 On December 25, 1978, 364 days before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
150,000 Vietnamese troops crossed into Cambodia to overthrow Pol Pot and the Khmer 
Rouge. On January 10, the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) the new pro-
Vietnamese regime was tasked with picking up the pieces of Cambodia left behind by the 
Khmer Rouge and genocide. In just four years, Pol Pot had killed nearly 2 million people, 
including eighty percent of schoolteachers and ninety-five percent of doctors.466 For the 
Vietnamese, solidifying the post-Khmer Rouge PRK regime and fighting a 
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counterinsurgency war against remaining Khmer would take more than decade, finally 
resulting in Vietnamese withdrawal in September 1989. 15,000 Vietnamese soldiers had 
been killed in the process, but in the end Hanoi was largely successful in the mission. By 
the end of the cold war Vietnam had essentially turned both Laos and Cambodia “into 
good neighbors. Indochina was tuned into a Vietnamese bloc, the next best thing to a 
Vietnamese empire.”467 
 Following a similar model to the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan, the 
Vietnamese dominated decision-making processes in the PRK. As stated by one scholar, 
“To ensure the survival of both the infant regime in Kampuchea and Vietnamese 
dominance in Indochina, Hanoi felt it necessary to hold Phnom Penh’s hand through all 
decisions big and small.”468 This effectively avoided managing an “alliance” between two 
political organizations and the messy process of inter-state negotiations examined 
throughout this study. Like the Soviets in Afghanistan after 1981, and the U.S. for the 
first 16 months of American involvement in Iraq, the Vietnamese dictated domestic 
policy in Cambodia by dictating high-level policies for Cambodian bureaucracies. “Long 
after Vietnamese advisors had set up the PRK, its Party structure, and its state 
bureaucracy, they continued to wield tight control over the regime. Deference to the 
advisors was a matter of official policy.”469  The Vietnamese advisers, similar to their 
KGB counterparts in Afghanistan, infiltrated various levels of the domestic bureaucracy 
during the occupation. There were three organizations charged with implementing 
Vietnamese policy in Cambodia. At the top was A-40. Led by Le Duc Tho, A-40 consisted 
of high-level political experts from Hanoi’s Central Committee tasked with controlling 
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the top level of the PRK. B-68 was a mid-level group tasked with overseeing everyday 
government functioning in the PRK. And lastly, A-50 was created to promote 
Vietnamese-friendly policies in the provinces.470 As one historian on the war 
summarized, there was “direct political control of the Phnom Penh administration – the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), later re-named the State of Cambodia (SOC) in 
1989 – by the Vietnamese. According to the accounts of defectors from the regime, the 
PRK operated under the tutelage of Vietnamese advisers at all levels.”471   
 The Vietnamese drafted the PRK constitution and selected higher-ranking PRK 
officials, but turned to Cambodian nationals to staff fledgling bureaucracies.472 This led 
to a good deal of bureaucratic nepotism.473 The Vietnamese combatted this trend by 
instituting protocols for personnel authorization and inculcating top PRK personnel in 
Vietnam. According to one historian, the “maze of Vietnamese advisers making most 
decisions in Kampuchean public life was further augmented by Vietnamese selection and 
training of Kampuchean party and government personnel. Vietnamese advisers screened 
potential party members. Those selected would be sent to Vietnam for training.”474 
 The Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia is particularly interesting as the 
Vietnamese had themselves just previously perpetuated an insurgency in South Vietnam 
against American forces. Policymakers in Hanoi had a unique perspective on insurgents, 
which almost certainly influenced their policies in Cambodia. They invited reformed 
Khmer Rouge elements into political life to defuse the political basis of the insurgency, 
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adopted an outwardly inclusionary brand of Cambodian nationalistic communism, and 
were wary of PRK corruption and retaliatory violence that could foster sympathy for 
anti-government forces.475 In light of the unique experience of the Vietnamese from 
occupied to occupier, it is all the more disappointing that primary source documents 
from Vietnam on the issue cannot be accessed. The only documents that have been 
released are mid- and low-level records from the PRK.476  
Egypt in Yemen  
 The Egyptian military similarly took an authoritarian approach in Yemen, 
dominating the political decision making process in the early stages of the Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR). With Cairo’s blessing, on September 26, 1962, a coup led by Abdullah 
al-Sallal overthrew Iman Muhammad al-Badr. Al-Badr had inherited north Yemen a 
week earlier from his deceased father, Imam Ahmed, a leader described as “the bulging-
eyed tyrant of Yemen.”477 The newly established Republican regime led by al-Sallal was 
shortly thereafter propped up by a military intervention from Egypt. Those loyal to the 
overthrown Imam regrouped in the mountains to initiate an insurgency funded by Saudi 
Arabia. Saudi leaders were threatened by Egypt’s posturing, Cairo’s geostrategic interests 
in oil, and announcements that “soon after the deposition of the imam that they [Egypt] 
were also interested in creating a Republic of the Arabian Peninsula.”478 Disturbed by the 
counter-monarchial revolution orchestrated on its border by Cairo, the Saudis provided 
millions in cash and arms to the royalist insurgents.  
 Due to the weakness of the post-Imam regime in Sana’a, Egyptians quickly 
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dominated the Yemeni republican government. As expressed by one scholar, “the 
Egyptians bore the major responsibility for the republic (from 1962 to 1968), all the 
functions of a modern state bureaucracy and administration were carried out essentially 
by (and even for) the Egyptians, and then only in those areas that were under the 
government’s control.”479  The Egyptians invested as many as 70,000 troops in Yemen at 
one time, losing as many as 15,000 soldiers in six years. Cairo was anxious about the 
success of the regime, and considered Yemen “to be a backward and medieval 
country.”480 Dana Adams Schmidt, an American New York Times reporter who 
documented the Yemeni experience under the Egyptian occupation once colorfully 
described the Egyptian presence in the following terms:  
At all times the Egyptians were at once the [Yemen Arab] republic’s 
mainstay and its greatest handicap. The republic needed Egyptian help 
and protection, but the condescension of Egyptian teachers, experts, and 
officials infuriated the quick, intelligent Yemenis; the Egyptian soldiers, 
though well behaved and docile, were increasingly resented. In Sana the 
Egyptians entirely dominated the scene; on the outskirts stood acres and 
acres of tents surrounded by barbed wire; in the streets their fleshy 
bodies, clad in yellow-brown uniforms, forever bent over counters, broad 
buttocks facing the streets endlessly choosing rolls of cloth to send home 
to their wives…481  
 Typical for foreign counterinsurgency interventions, the task for Egypt in Yemen 
became increasing protracted, complex and political.482 As one study based on Arabic-
language accounts described, “with Egyptians holding key positions in every ministry 
and throughout the bureaucracy, and the YAR’s economy increasingly tied to 
Egypt’s, the military task force became an external prop for what was essentially an 
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Egyptian--sponsored experiment in republican politics.”483 Only escalating costs, the 
British withdrawal from South Yemen, growing public distrust of censored reports, and a 
humiliating military defeat at the hands of the Israelis in 1967 convinced Cairo to 
withdraw. At the same time, the Saudis backed allowed the two sides to negotiate a 
political integration strategy known as the Compromise of 1970.484 North and South 
Yemen were then subsequently united in 1990.  
 Similar to the Vietnamese in Cambodia, and the Soviets in Afghanistan, the 
Egyptians left behind a functioning bureaucracy in Yemen, but during the military 
intervention dominated their Yemeni allies. For the period of occupation Egypt was 
institutionally embedded in decision-making processes of Yemen’s domestic political 
organizations. 
Cuba in Angola  
Unlike the Soviet Union, Vietnam in Cambodia and Egypt in Yemen, the evidence 
indicates that Cuba did not enjoy de facto control of the Angolan state during its period 
of intervention in Africa. In fact, due to reliance on the Soviet Union for arms, advisors 
and funding, it has been reported that Cuba had to make sacrifices in its authority in 
Angola in order to satisfy Soviet demands.  
A Portuguese oil-rich colony for almost 500 years, Angola gained independence 
on November 11, 1975. During the period of Portuguese exodus, three Angolan 
nationalist groups vied for control of the new state, the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA), backed by Cuba and the U.S.S.R., the National Front for 
the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) aided by Zaire (and at points the United States and 
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China), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 
supported by apartheid-era South Africa and the United States. By summer 1976 the 
Marxist-Leninist MPLA backed by Havana had successfully driven the other two groups 
out of the Angolan capital Luanda, and by October was holding 12 of 16 district capitals.  
Uprooted, the FNLA and UNITA tentatively allied together to contest the MPLA in an 
insurgency funded by outside powers including the United States.  
 At independence Angola was in pieces. Not only were competing paramilitary 
groups ripping it apart, the rapid withdrawal of the Portuguese governing class was 
creating massive political instability. 485 Cuba staged a large military intervention to 
support the Marxists and stabilize the country. Havana’s operation began in earnest the 
fall of 1975 and lasted 26 years. The Cuban force that intervened in Angola to support the 
MPLA counterinsurgency grew to include as many as 50,000 Cuban troops at once, 
complemented by 2,000 Soviet and Eastern bloc advisers.486 How many military and 
civilian casualties the Cubans suffered in Angola is surprisingly difficult to estimate. In 
fact, tallying Cuban deaths has been called “the single most contentious issue of the 
Angolan operation.”487 Accounts range from 2,200-15,000 Cuban deaths.488 
 Only approximately 7% of Cubans in Angola were reportedly engaged in 
humanitarian or political projects although Cuban personnel regularly switched between 
civilian and military roles.489  Cubans involved in civilian projects were credited for 
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laying the foundations for Angolan government services, but evidence of Cubans 
dominating the Angolan state during the intervention was not as strong as accounts 
regarding the Soviet Union, Vietnam and Egypt controlling the government agencies of 
their allies.490 In 1977, the CIA claimed, “Cubans are frequently criticized for being 
arrogant and for ignoring African sensibilities. They are also faulted for their tendency to 
take command of a given situation instead of acting as advisers.”491 But this is not 
necessarily indicative of systematic policies to control Angolan government institutions. 
Unfortunately, evidence is so lacking on the war that the nature of the Cuban 
intervention is unclear.492 
The Cuban intervention is interesting because it relied on Soviet financing and 
strategic guidance. Unfortunately, again, exactly how Moscow was involved in Angola 
and the effect of their role on the Cubans is relatively murky due to a lack of 
documentation. Accounts of the Russian role in Angola range from claims that Moscow 
masterminded operations and used Cubans as fodder for Soviet policy, to Moscow acting 
as a relatively disinterested source of money and weapons for Cuban policymakers. The 
reality of the Soviet role is likely to lie somewhere in between. The available evidence 
indicates the U.S.S.R. was a vital, long-standing supporter of the MPLA and the Cuban 
effort in Angola, but was seeking to avoid taking over the war. During this period 
Moscow was preoccupied in Afghanistan and likely did not want to inherit Angola as 
well. The Soviets supplied advisers (likely between 1,500-1,700), spent over $4.9 billion, 
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and by the mid-1980s held a small, but important number of command positions in the 
Angolan government army (FAPLA). The Soviets also focused on advising Angolan 
financial ministries, “particularly in the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank and have 
reportedly replaced Cubans in the Transportation, Fisheries and Trade ministries.”493   
By simultaneously accepting (or perhaps even insisting on) key leadership and 
advisory roles in Angola later in the war, but refusing to become entrenched, the Soviets 
likely influenced Cuban-Angolan relations, including how intimately Havana involved 
itself in the domestic regime in Luanda and the amount of leverage Cuba had over the 
Angolans.494 Consider, for example, the following account of Cuba dealing with the 
Angolan army (FAPLA): “Castro insisted that the FAPLA needed to be playing a more 
prominent role in [counterinsurgency operations], but when [Angolan President 
Agostinho] Neto suggested that the Cubans simply take over command of the FAPLA, 
Castro resisted, fearful of upsetting his Soviet patrons who were not only supporting the 
weaponry for the Cuban operation, but who were also involved in strategic planning at 
the FAPLA’s highest levels. As Castro saw it the Soviets would not take kindly to Cuba 
taking control of the army they were bankrolling, and he did little more than admonish 
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Neto to take the UNITA threat more seriously.”495 In other words, Castro held back on 
taking a controlling role over the Angolan military in order to avoid confrontation with 
Moscow.  
 The reliance on the Soviets highlights a unique dynamic in Cuba’s intervention. It 
was reported that the Cubans won over their Angolan allies by demanding little in terms 
of comfort. The Cubans reportedly accepted harsh conditions unlike their Eastern 
European allies.496 It is possible that Cuban personnel were more willing to accept 
difficult conditions and perhaps even demand less from their Angolan partners both in 
terms of their own circumstances, and in terms of development. Personnel coming from 
resource-rich, rational-legal bureaucracies such as those in the U.S. or U.S.S.R. may have 
elevated expectations compared to bureaucrats from developing states.  
Lastly, another potentially unique dynamic in the Cuban intervention are reports 
that until 1984, Angolan authorities compensated the Cubans using profits from oil 
revenues.  Most western accounts claim the Angolans covered room and board for Cuban 
nationals, but whether or not the Angolans also paid Cuban salaries, or how much the 
Cubans were given remains a contentious issue.497 Regardless of the amount, the fact 
that an initial assumption of the alliance included compensation for the foreign 
intervening force is unique to the Cuban intervention.498  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
495 George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 125. 
496 Ibid., 159. 
497 Bender, “Angola, the Cubans, and American Anxieties,” 9; Owen Ellison Kahn, “Cuba’s Impact in 
Southern Africa,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1987): 48; George, 
The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 150. 
498 Among large-scale foreign military interventions with a counterinsurgency mission, with over 1,000 




Syria in Lebanon 
Another counterinsurgency intervention perpetuated by an authoritarian regime 
that provides contrast to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is the Syrian occupation of 
Lebanon that lasted almost 29 years.499 Restrained by Israel, Damascus did not enjoy 
uncontested control the Lebanese state, but it nevertheless strong-armed Lebanese 
policymakers and enjoyed a fair degree of control. Lebanese representatives regularly 
traveled to Damascus before making policy announcements and Lebanese President al-
Hirawi reportedly quipped, “we now disagree on the appointment of a doorman and go 
to Damascus to submit the problem to the brothers [there].”500 Syria also allegedly 
directed Lebanese foreign policy decisions,501 and had notable influence over the 
Lebanese electoral process by picking candidates and building domestic political 
coalitions.502 But despite this influential role, Syria was limited in Lebanon by the Israelis 
and by the fractured nature of Lebanese politics.  
 Most accounts of Syrian influence in Lebanon describe Damascus dividing 
Lebanese groups to consolidate Syrian influence over Lebanon, yet trying to avoid 
provoking Israel. Syria maintained between 20,000 and 40,000 troops in Lebanon 
between 1976 and 2005.503 Through military and political pressure Damascus effectively 
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made itself “the godfather of Lebanese politics,” rigging elections and subverting 
Lebanese foreign policy.504 But due to the influence of Israel balancing Syrian 
domination of Lebanon as well as Iranian meddling through Hezbollah, Syria did not 
control Lebanese politics. Damascus fractured groups to create opportunities to mediate 
and maintained clients across Lebanon that allowed it bypass the Lebanese state 
whenever national politics became too messy.505 These processes differ from other 
counterinsurgency interventions that more typically support one side and work to 
strengthen a regime against an insurgency. To assert its influence in Lebanon, 
Damascus, however, would frequently exploit “the rivalries of the various Lebanese 
factions while using the anarchy they created to make its peacekeeping indispensable 
and deter the involvement of rival external powers.”506  
Syria’s policies of historically supporting the insurgent group (factions associated 
Palestinian Liberation Organization), then instigating a large-scale military intervention 
in alliance with counterinsurgents to broker an agreement between groups that is 
favorable to their interests is an excellent introduction into the next chapter on India in 
Sri Lanka. As one historian writing on Syria summarized, “An invasion calculated to put 
a swift end to an embarrassing political situation thus served in fact to aggravate it.”507 
This statement is just as accurate for India in Sri Lanka as it was for Syria in Lebanon.  
!  
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Chapter 8:  
INDIA IN SRI LANKA 
“India is engaged in threatening the future of Sri Lanka and perhaps the 
region. Unless India acts positively, the future of Sri Lanka will witness 
hard times but so will the future of India. You cannot play with fire 
without worrying about the spread of it to beyond what you can 
control.” 
-  Sri Lankan President Jayewardene, 1987508 
 
This dissertation examines counterinsurgency wars with large-scale foreign 
military interventions, identifying conditions where the domestic partner regime 
complies with the demands of their foreign ally and when they are likely to dismiss such 
demands. This chapter is a case study of the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, a war 
referred to as “India’s Vietnam.”509 The Indian mission in Sri Lanka lasted less than 
three years (July 1987 – March 1990), but escalated quickly within this brief period into 
a large-scale counterinsurgency campaign. 1555 Indian soldiers died (including 49 
officers), 2987 were injured and New Delhi spent more than $1.25 billion on the effort.510 
Despite these expenditures, the endeavor is largely considered to “have been a political 
and military failure.”511  
Summary Findings 
This chapter has several notable findings regarding the India-Sri Lankan alliance 
and trends in coercion and compliance. First, Sri Lankan rates of compliance with Indian 
demands were remarkably similar to other conflicts examined in this study:  38% full 
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compliance, 24% partial compliance and 38% non-compliance.512 Second, due to the 
relative competency of the Sri Lankan state when compared to other domestic regimes 
examined, non-compliance due to insufficient capacity to implement requested reforms 
was significantly less frequent, allowing for better examination of other factors 
contributing to non-compliance outcomes. Third, despite India’s seemingly strong 
coercive leverage over Colombo, demands that failed to provide the opportunity for 
short-term benefits for Sri Lankans were less likely to be fulfilled. This implies that only 
under specific circumstances will a domestic regime regularly submit to requests that do 
not also serve to benefit them as well as the alliance effort. Forth, similar to the U.S. wars 
in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan there is an interaction effect between interest and 
dependency. If India could undertake the requested activity unilaterally and Sri Lankan 
and Indian interests converged, there were higher levels of non-compliance due to 
incentives to free ride. If interests diverged and India could act unilaterally, New Delhi 
was able to coerce Sri Lanka into complying. Lastly, an increase in enemy activity made 
Colombo less likely to comply with New Delhi’s requests. Tamil offenses motivated 
Colombo to ignore its Indian partners and seek independent security solutions to the 
Tamil problem.  
In order to understand the dynamics of the compliance environment in the 
Indian-Sri Lankan counterinsurgency effort from 1987-1990, it is first important to 
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Sri Lanka, India and the Tamil Insurgency (LTTE)—A Briefing 
India’s shifting alliances between the insurgents and government 
counterinsurgents make this a fascinating and complex counterinsurgency intervention. 
From 1983-1990 New Delhi alternated between belligerents in the Sri Lankan conflict, 
switching from arming, funding and training Tamil independence groups to just years 
later sending Indian troops into Tamil regions of Sri Lanka in order to fight those same 
Tamil separatists. Hundreds of Indian soldiers were killed by Tamil militants Indian 
intelligence agents had trained and armed just years before. New Delhi sought to coerce 
the Sri Lankan government into compromising with Tamil leaders by funding the Tamil 
Tiger insurgents (LTTE), while coercing the LTTE by sending troops to uphold a 
primarily Indian-designed agreement signed by Colombo and New Delhi seeking to 
disarm the LTTE. This overestimation of its coercive influence over all parties in Sri 
Lanka cost India politically and militarily. After almost three years of fighting, New Delhi 
withdrew when the Tamil insurgents and the Sri Lankan government counterinsurgents 
covertly worked together to expel Indian forces from Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankans battled 
each other for another 20 years until the government finally triumphed in a notoriously 
bloody and drawn out campaign.  
Understanding the dynamics of the Indian-Sri Lankan alliance requires a 
summary of the dynamics of the insurgency underpinning the war. Following its 1948 
independence from British rule, Sri Lankan Sinhalese nationalists promoted Sinhalese 
social, cultural and political dominance of the multi-ethnic Sri Lankan state on behalf of 
the Sri Lankan Sinhalese majority. Measures such as making Sinhala and Buddhism the 
sole official language and religion of the state, as well as taking over education systems, 




plantations constituted specific discriminatory practices against Sri Lanka’s Muslim and 
Tamil minorities.513  Tamils were effectively excluded from government positions and 
benefits. The extent of such exclusion is evident later in this study in several demands 
made by India to the Sri Lankan government as part of the Indian counterinsurgency 
strategy. In 1989, for example, New Delhi requested that Colombo recruit more Tamils 
into the security forces. Indian military officials were alarmed to learn that Tamils, which 
make up approximately 20% of the population, had in the 1950s made up 40% of the Sri 
Lankan state military.514 However by the 80s, “of the total sanctioned strength of 72,665 
Security Personnel, Tamils and Muslims do not constitute even 1 per cent.” India asked 
that “immediate steps… be taken to ensure that the Army, Navy and air Force reflect the 
ethnic composition of the country both among the Regulars and the Volunteers.”515 Sri 
Lankan officials agreed, but the percentage of Tamils included in government forces did 
not notably change.516 
In 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Colombo were set off by increasing activity by the 
emerging preeminent Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, 
(LTTE). The violence precipitated an exodus of almost 300,000 Tamils refugees to India. 
The 60 million-strong sympathetic Indian Tamil population petitioned New Delhi to 
intervene to protect the Sri Lankan Tamils, an action signaling the start of India’s direct 
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involvement in the Sri Lanka’s Tamil problem.517 By March 1988 more than 100,000 
Indian troops would be deployed in Northern and Eastern Sri Lanka.518  
Following the 1983 riots, India began covertly aiding Tamil separatists in order to 
pressure Colombo to embrace Tamil rights. New Delhi hoped this action would 
effectively push Colombo towards a political solution acceptable to the Indian Tamils 
and inspire Colombo to abandon its attempts to achieve a military victory over the LTTE. 
Furthermore, India was concerned Colombo was becoming dangerously close to 
Pakistan, Israel, China and the U.S. According to the strategic logic of Indira Gandhi, 
strengthening the LTTE would draw Sri Lanka away from those states as Pakistani and 
Israeli trainers would prove ineffective at guiding the Sinhalese to stifle the Tamil 
independence movement. A stronger LTTE would force Colombo to compromise with 
the Tamils and New Delhi. Addressing the Tamil militant safe haven growing in Tamil 
Nadu, the pro- LTTE region of India could not be accomplished without India. And Sri 
Lanka could not win decisively without addressing the Indian LTTE safe haven. India 
could corner Sri Lanka and demand it cut ties with Pakistan, Israel and the U.S. 
Simultaneously, the Gandhi dynasty would be in better position to win elections with 
Indian Tamil support, a reward for its efforts to promote the rights of the Sri Lankan 
Tamils.  
Although never officially acknowledged by the Indian government, it is open 
secret that by 1986 Indian intelligence, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) was 
arming as many as 20,000 Tamil militants.519  These insurgent forces were reportedly 
given offices, weapons and training in Tamil Nadu in as many as 32 different camps. 
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During this period these militant groups were reportedly better armed and potentially 
better trained than the Sri Lankan government troops stationed in northern Sri Lanka 
tasked with putting down the Tamil uprising.520 The insurgents received assistance from 
the population and local political leaders, but according to unconfirmed sources, also 
had direct Indian state ties through RAW agents and other prominent Indian officials. 
Reportedly “some militant leaders were in fact living in the quarters provided by the 
State Government to Tamil Nadu politicians.”521 This sanctuary for Tamil militants in 
India meant that Sri Lankan forces could never militarily crush the insurgents, in effect 
creating notable bargaining leverage for New Delhi. Colombo would have to deal with 
India if it were to deal with the LTTE; much like the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. quickly found 
they would have to deal with Pakistan to strike insurgents threatening Afghanistan.  
Due to India’s support for the Tamil insurgents prior to 1987, significant tension 
grew between Colombo and New Delhi and relations came to a boiling point in spring of 
1987. Sri Lankan forces launched an aggressive military campaign to clear LTTE 
operatives from the northern city of Jaffna. Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
immediately condemned the strategy as well as Sri Lankan reliance on military measures 
for approaching the Tamil issue. New Delhi reportedly sent Sri Lankan President J.R. 
Jayewardene a blunt message, “India will not allow Jaffna to be taken… India will arm 
the LTTE with Surface to Air Missiles (SAM-7 and 8)”522 In part due to Indian pressure, 
Sri Lankan forces stopped short of taking the town, but the Jaffna crisis was not over yet.  
On June 1, 1987 Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit announced that due to 
suffering in Jaffna caused by recent Sri Lankan government offensives and Colombo’s 
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five month blockade of the Jaffna port, India was sending aid and relief supplies to the 
Tamils in Jaffna.523 In a public announcement Dixit asked Colombo to let Indian Red 
Cross ships through the Sri Lankan naval blockade in place to deny supplies to the LTTE. 
Sri Lankan officials were irate. Colombo issued a statement calling the allegations of 
suffering “unfounded. While pointing out that the tragic situation in Sri Lanka would not 
have become as acute as at present but for the patronage of separatist terrorism by the 
State of Tamil Nadu, a constituent of the Republic of India, the Government of Sri Lanka 
wishes to point out that neither has the Government of Sri Lanka solicited any 
humanitarian aid nor does the situation prevailing in the North require any assistance 
from any outside sources as the Government of Sri Lanka is in a position to meet all the 
requirements.”524  
On June 3, 1987, 19 Indian boats arrived with humanitarian supplies for the 
Tamil population of Sri Lanka. After a lengthy negotiation between navies, the Indian 
fleet was denied entry. Part of the Sri Lankan strategy to break the will of the Tamil 
separatists was to turn the public against the insurgents. Allowing Indian supplies into 
the region worked against that strategy by easing suffering and portraying Colombo as a 
regime that could not, or would not, provide for its citizens. New Delhi did not agree and 
was embarrassed by the denial. Despite its size and power, it failed to coerce Colombo to 
let its ships through. But Indian embarrassment did not last long. The next day Indian 
Air Force pilots entered Sri Lankan air space without approval and dropped 25 metric 
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tons of food and supplies over Jaffna. The message was clear. India could do what it 
wished in Sri Lankan territory, regardless of the resistance put forward by Colombo.525  
In light of this hostile interaction, as well as India’s size, regional domination, 
military superiority, and Tamil population three times the size of total population in Sri 
Lanka, it is not surprising that Colombo considered India its primary security threat.526 
What is surprising then is how New Delhi and Colombo became military and political 
allies working to suppress the Tamil insurgency less than two months after the Jaffna 
airdrop.  
After several years providing covert support for Sri Lankan militants, by 1987 
New Delhi was losing influence over the LTTE. Prime Minister Gandhi was reportedly 
told by RAW intelligence officials, “India was losing control over the militants. The 
militants in general and the LTTE in particular, were not responsive to India and were 
charting their own plan of action…a settlement must be reached quickly.”527 Furthermore 
the presence of the LTTE was destabilizing Tamil Nadu, a sizable Indian state which has 
been referred to as “the Kashmir of the South.” Its strong Tamil identity, sympathy for 
the LTTE, and ethno-political fault lines made it a potential “problem for the unity of 
India.”528  Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi wanted to diffuse the Tamil conflict in Sri Lanka 
in order to avoid further destabilizing the Tamil-dominated parts of India. If successful, 
the LTTE’s goal of Sri Lankan Tamil independence could pose a threat to India, which 
perennially struggled to balance its powerful regional ethnic groups. Additionally caring 
for the 150,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu was getting expensive.529 For 
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India, a political solution in Sri Lanka would also put an end to Colombo’s military 
relations with the Pakistani and Israeli contractors India found threatening. New Delhi 
wanted to promote a unified Sri Lanka that provided sufficient concessions to its Tamil 
minorities to pacify the insurgency and its supporters in Tamil Nadu. 
The Indian and Sri Lankan governments held bilateral negotiations on the Tamil 
issues in the summer of 1987. India “represented” the Tamil groups, who were not 
directly present during the drafting process. On July 29, 1987 the two states signed the 
Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. Sri Lankan President Jayewardene argued that the July 1987 
accord, as well as the 10,000 Indian troops initially deployed to Sri Lanka to impose the 
ceasefire and LTTE weapons surrender posed no threat to Sri Lankan sovereignty.530 
Nevertheless there was trepidation regarding India’s intrusion into a domestic Sri 
Lankan issue. As a prominent congressional member articulated, “These matters have 
caused a grave sense of fear that Sri Lanka has lost her independence and sovereignty – 
whatever the Government might say to the contrary… Our people are tired of being 
lectured to about the how independent we are and that our sovereignty has not been 
violated, when the events that are unfolding daily show proof to the contrary.”531  
The ambitious agreement intended to put an end Sri Lanka’s insurgency with 
India’s help delivering the Tamil militants. Sri Lankan President Jayewardene conceded 
a great deal in the accord, including agreeing to (temporarily) unify the Eastern and 
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Northern provinces of Sri Lanka (effectively uniting Tamil areas), granting amnesty to 
militants, adding Tamil as an official language and withdrawing all Sri Lankan military 
forces from the Northern and Eastern regions. It was far more than Colombo had ever 
previously agreed to give the Tamils, in no small part because of pressure put on 
President Jayewardene from New Delhi. As Sri Lankan National Security Minister, R. 
Wijeratne lamented, “If we did not sign [the] Accord we would have had to fight with 
India. India would not have come forward [to help the Sri Lankan government], but 
would have given arms [to the Tamil separatists] to shoot down helicopters.”532  In 
exchange for the concessions given the Tamils, India promised to enforce a ceasefire, 
oversee a surrender of arms by Tamil militants and effectively ensure the unity of Sri 
Lanka by delivering the militants without giving into Tamil demands for independence.  
The implementation of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord did not go according to plan. 
All sides initially greeted Indian troops landing in Jaffna warmly: LTTE sympathizers, 
Tamil civilians and Sri Lankan government forces.533 Nevertheless, Tamil goodwill 
towards the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was short lived. By the end of August 
1987 difficulties arose, and the LTTE began to turn against the IPKF. Among other 
issues, a mass suicide of LTTE commanders captured by the Sri Lankan Navy led 
remaining LTTE officials to distrust Indian mediation attempts. They rejected IPKF 
authority to enforce the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, and the Accord itself as an agreement 
they never explicitly approved. The IPKF became a direct LTTE target and as hardened, 
well-trained insurgents, the “peace-keeping” mission quickly became violent.   
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The ensuing Indian-led counterinsurgency effort to disarm the LTTE continued 
until the March 1990 withdrawal of Indian forces at the request of newly elected Sri 
Lankan President Premadasa. Elected in 1989 Premadasa had worked secretly with the 
LTTE to come to an agreement to drive Indian forces out of Sri Lanka.534 They 
succeeded, but the LTTE did not cooperate with any government for long. Three years 
later Premadasa and former Sri Lankan National Security Minister Lalith 
Athulathmudali were both killed by attacks orchestrated by the LTTE. LTTE operatives 
also assassinated Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi with a suicide attack in Tamil 
Nadu, India on May 21, 1991. In 1992 India declared the LTTE a terrorist organization.  
Methodology—Tracking Indian Demands and Sri Lankan Compliance 
Over 500 Indian and Sri Lankan primary source documents (900+ pages) were 
analyzed to identify 79 unique demands from Indian forces to their Sri Lankan allies 
from 1986-1990. The documents were available in English in a five volume document 
collection, “India-Sri Lanka: Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic Conflict Documents 1947-
2000,” edited by Avtar Singh Bhasin, the former Director of the Historical Division at 
the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MEA), published by India Research Press. The 
collection contains a wide variety of document types including press releases by the 
Indian and Sri Lankan governments, transcripts from parliamentary debates, formerly 
classified memos and “Top Secret” correspondence between the Sri Lankan President 
and Indian Prime Minister. In order to determine the outcome of requests I relied on 
documents in the previously referenced collection, collaborated with other sources such 
as Ministry of External Affairs Publications as well as media reports, accounts published 
by retired Sri Lankan and Indian military officials, reports by international 
organizations, and historical accounts of the Indian involvement in Sri Lanka. Lastly, I 
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conducted interviews with former Indian officials and Indian counterinsurgency experts 
in New Delhi in February 2013, including Lieutenant General Amarjeet Singh Kalkat, 
former commander of the Indian Peace Keeping Force.  
Documents analyzed dated from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 1990 (The 
Indian intervention in Sri Lanka lasted from July 1987 to March 1990). The 79 demands 
identified date from December 19, 1986 to November 3, 1989, providing good coverage 
of demands made across the duration of the war. As found with other conflicts, fewer 
demands are made towards the end of the intervention as the foreign state prepares to 
leave, and reiterations of older demands have already been captured in the data 
collection process.  
Data on Sri Lankan Compliance with Indian Demands—Summary  
In 30/79 (38%) of Indian demands the Sri Lankans were fully compliant, 19/79 
(24%) they were partial compliant and for 30/79 (38%) of requests Colombo was non-
compliant. If partial compliance and full compliance are combined, the Sri Lankans were 
compliant for 49/79 (62%) of Indian demands - a very similar percentage to the rates 










Table 20. Comparison Chart of Compliance with Demands By War 
 
War 
Rate of Full 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial 
Compliance 
Rate of Partial and 
Full Compliance 
Combined 
Rate of Non 
Compliance  
Sri Lanka 
(Indian Demands)  
30/79 (38%) 19/79 (24%) 49/79 (62%) 30/79 (38%) 
South Vietnam  
(U.S. Demands)  
46/105 (43.8%) 25/105 (23.8%) 71/105 (68%) 34/105 (32.4%) 
Afghanistan (Soviet 
Demands)  
11/22 (50%) 3/22 (14%) 14/22 (64%) 8/22 (37%) 
Iraq 
(U.S. Demands) 







92/148 (62%) 56/148 (37.8%) 
 
Regarding verbal compliance there were significantly more instances of 
bargaining, or partial verbal compliance between the Sri Lankans and the Indians than 
observed in other cases. Colombo was less willing to readily agree to a demand to the 
extent that South Vietnam or the PDPA/Afghan regimes appear to have been. Such 
instances of negotiation were coded as “partial verbal compliance,” as Sri Lanka openly 
amended requests from New Delhi. To clarify with an example, in January 1988 the 
Indians requested that President Jayewardene make a public announcement regarding 
the announcement of the “Sri Lankan Government’s decision to hold Provincial Council 
elections. President may also appoint Governors for each of the Provinces of Sri Lanka 
especially one Governor for the North-Eastern Province who should be a prominent 
Tamil figure acceptable to a wide cross section of Tamil opinion.”535 President 
Jayewardene replied that the request was “Approved, except the names of the 
individuals.”536 The President was under strong domestic political pressure not to give in 
to Indian and Tamil demands that Tamils govern the newly unified North-East Province. 
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It is also likely that he needed more time to compile a list of potential officials who would 
be acceptable to the Indians, Tamils, and Sinhalese nationalists who had disparate goals. 
This is a case of partial compliance as Colombo announced the decision to hold 
Provincial Council elections, but the President ultimately appointed Nalin Seneviratne, a 
Sinhalese Sri Lankan Army officer as governor of the North East Province in November 
1988. This fell short of the “Tamil figure” the Indian government requested be given the 
position.537 The verbal component was similarly coded as “partial verbal compliance,” as 
Sri Lanka agreed to some aspects of the demand, but not all.  
Overall in the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka there were 51/79(65%) instances 
of Sri Lankan verbal compliance with Indian demands, 10/79 (13%) partial verbal 
compliance in which they agreed to only part of the request, 9/79 (11%) outright refusals 
of demands and in 9/79 (11%) of demands there was no available evidence regarding 
whether or not the Sri Lankans provided verbal assurances that they would or would not 
fulfill the request.  
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Table 21. Comparison Chart of Verbal Agreement with Demands By War 
War Rate of Verbal 
Agreement 
Rate of Partial 
Verbal 
Agreement 
Rate of Partial 










Sri Lanka        
(Indian 
Demands)  
51/70 (73%) 10/70 (14%) 61/70 (87%) 9/70 (13%) 9/79 (11%) 
Iraq                       
(U.S. Demands) 
75/83 (90%) 2/83 (2.4%) 77/83 (93%) 6/83 (7.2%) 23/106 (22%) 
South Vietnam   
(U.S. Demands) 
76/87 (87%) 0/87(0%) 76/87 (87%) 11/87 (13%) 18/105 (17%) 
Afghanistan    
(Soviet 
Demands) 
20/20 (100%) 0/20 (0%) 20/20 (91%) 0/22 (0%) 2/22 (9%) 
Afghanistan       
(U.S. Demands) 










 Figure 20 charts the number of requests made by the Indians by year juxtaposed 
with the Sri Lankan rate of compliance with those demands.538 Both the number of 
requests made and the number of requests complied with follow the same trajectory. An 
increase in requests corresponds with an increase in the number of requests complied 
with. This result appears straightforward, but it is actually distinctive when compared to 
the other conflicts analyzed in this study, including the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and the U.S. in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. In other conflicts, 
compliance fluctuated, not necessarily with the number of demands made, but with 
developments in the conflict itself such as the Tet Offensive or inter-alliance dynamics 
such as the Soviet decision to replace Babrak Karmal as head of state. Were there factors 
inherent in the Indian-Sri Lankan alliance or the types of demands issued by New Delhi 
that can account for the above-illustrated symmetry between demands made and 
demands complied with? Why are trends in Sri Lankan compliance different than 
Vietnam and Afghanistan-USSR? 
 First, the U.S. and Soviet interventions in Vietnam and Afghanistan each lasted 
almost a decade. Indian military involvement in Sri Lanka, although costly for New 
Delhi, lasted from July 1987 to March 1990, which is less than 3 years, or less than 1/3 of 
the duration of Vietnam and Afghanistan. If Colombo had not worked with Tamil 
insurgents to expel Indian forces in 1990, a longer Indian intervention might have 
resulted, and may have shown different trends in rates of compliance over time. This is 
an interesting reminder why cross war comparison is important. In addition to its 
primary investigations, such comparisons provide potential insights into aspects of 
conflicts, such as duration, that may impact inter-alliance dynamics. That said, one 
important factor to keep in mind is that the leadership of all three intervening states, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




India, the United States and the U.S.S.R., believed their military deployment would be 
substantially shorter than they actually were. When the initial decision to deploy troops 
was made, Moscow and Washington never believed that they would be fighting those 
wars for ten years. Based on estimates provided by Indian intelligence (RAW), Rajiv 
Gandhi thought the LTTE disarmament process begun in July 1987 would be completed 
by the end of 1987 or early 1988.539 Each power became involved in significantly longer 
and bloodier interventions than anticipated.  
 Second, the Soviet and American missions in Vietnam and Afghanistan differed 
from the Indian mission in Sri Lanka in respect to what they were trying to accomplish. 
Washington and Moscow intended to rapidly build up allied domestic regimes that could 
defend themselves and the interests of their American or Soviet sponsors. India was not 
necessarily interested in bolstering the government of Sri Lanka. In fact India’s years of 
sponsoring the LTTE prior to their counterinsurgency commitment was an attempt to 
weaken the military position of Colombo to coerce them into a political compromise with 
Tamil interests. Although there is more similarity than dissimilarity in the types of 
demands made by India, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on their domestic allies, certain 
aspects of different demands reveal divergence in the foreign missions of these states. 
For example, New Delhi only made one request regarding Sri Lankan economic reform. 
It asked for a finance commission.540 This contrasts with 11% (12/105) of American 
requests to South Vietnam regarding state economic policies. Demands regarding 
development projects also have a similar trend. Indian demands regarding development 
made up 5% (4/79) of requests, whereas the American demands in Vietnam regarding 
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such types of projects made up 26% of total requests, (27/105). Appendix B attached to 
the study contains a chart comparing types of requests made in various wars.  
Table 22. Compliance and Non-Compliance with Indian Demands—Sri Lanka 
 
Ordered Probit – Sri Lanka’s Compliance with Indian Demands, 1986 - 1990 
! (1)! (2)! (3) (4) (5) 
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War or Internal Politics    -0.743* 
(0.354) 
  
N (Observations)! 79! 79! 79! 79! 79!
* Indicates P <0.05, ** Indicates P <0.01 
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Independent Variables—Explaining Compliance 
Capacity  
 Unlike the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan, the 
Indian intervention in Sri Lanka’s counterinsurgency against Tamil militants was not 
motivated by impending failure of the Sri Lankan state. Colombo was not at risk of 
collapse in 1987. On the contrary, a notable motivation behind New Delhi’s decision to 
interfere was the fear in the mid-1980s that the Sri Lankan military would succeed 
against the Tamils, driving increasing refugees to India and leaving Indian politicians 
vulnerable to accusations that they did nothing to protect Tamil rights.  
 In light of the competence of the Sri Lankan state in comparison to other regimes 
analyzed in this study such as Saigon or Kabul, it is not surprising that capacity was not 
nearly as important of an issue limiting compliance as it was in other conflicts. 
Colombo’s military and political infrastructure was expansive enough to handle most of 
New Delhi’s demands. In only 13/79 or 16.5% of requests was a lack of capacity cited as a 
factor contributing to a lack of compliance, leaving 83.5% of requests unaffected by 
capacity limitations.  
 Again, although there were more similarities than differences in the types of 
requests made by India, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., differences in what was being asked for 
may also have contributed to capacity being less of a factor in the Indian intervention. 
New Delhi was generally not after broad institutional reforms. Its requests tended to 
focus on short-range issues such as the official recognition of the Tamil language or a 
specific election announcement made by a given date. This, in combination with 
Colombo’s relatively high level of competency, made capacity less of an influential issue 




Dependency & Unilateral Action  
Sri Lankan Free Riders? 
 
As indicated in model 1 in Table 22 (row 1), India’s ability to unilaterally 
implement a demand requested of Sri Lanka is insignificant, and slightly correlated with 
non-compliance. This finding differs from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, where 
Moscow’s ability to unilaterally take over tasks was correlated with a higher likelihood of 
Afghan compliance with that task. However, as discussed in the U.S.S.R.-Afghanistan 
Chapter, this may be a byproduct of the Soviet philosophy of intervention in Afghanistan, 
where after a few months Russians had largely taken over Afghan government functions. 
This is a different model than one in which the foreign state works with the dependent 
state in an alliance.  In the U.S.S.R.-Afghan experience, tasks Russians could undertake 
without the participation of their Afghan allies were either 1) complied with by the 
Afghans under the supervision of their Soviet advisors, or 2) complied with by the 
Afghans because resistance would fail to change the outcome, and resistance could carry 
a high price, as the KGB did not take kindly to dissent.  
This linear relationship between compliance and unilateral ability did not exist in 
the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq or Afghanistan, or the Indian offensive in Sri Lanka. In 
these conflicts unilateral ability impacts compliance in varying ways, as certain 
conditions create incentives for compliance, while others seem to motivate non-
compliance. For instance, the July 1987 demand that Sri Lankan ports “not to be 
available for military use by any country against India,”543 is an example of a demand 
Colombo complied with that India, with its regional dominance, sizable navy, military 
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superiority and record of using force to protect its interests in Sri Lanka, had the physical 
ability to implement unilaterally if it so wished. The Indian Navy could block foreign 
vessels, or even go so far as unilaterally taking over Sri Lankan ports. Colombo was well 
aware of these capabilities, and in part complied with the Indian demand in order to 
avoid confrontation.  
However, there are other cases where India had unilateral enforcement 
capability, such as the demand that Colombo act as an intermediary sending Indian 
funds to the LTTE in order to motivate LTTE cooperation, where Colombo did not 
comply despite Indian capabilities to act without Sri Lankan assistance.544 Similar 
variation exists where New Delhi did not have unilateral ability to enforce the request. 
Sri Lanka agreed to cancel existing contracts with multinational companies in order to 
contract a British-built WWII oil storage facility known as the Trincomalee Oil Tank 
Farm only to Indian firms.545 India felt threatened by the multinational agreements due 
to U.S. corporate involvement.546 In this case, although it could potentially use force to 
take over the Oil Tank Farm, as a non-signatory to the existing agreements, it could not 
cancel the companies’ legal rights to existing contracts, which was the substance of the 
initial demand. India had to convince Colombo to cancel these agreements and sign new 
contacts with Indian companies, which Colombo did in 1987. On the other hand the Sri 
Lankan government disregarded other demands the Indians were powerless to change 
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on their own, such as its demand that bilateral talks between Colombo and the LTTE 
stop.547   
The data indicates a similar varying phenomenon in the U.S. war in Vietnam. In 
that war, as in Sri Lanka it turns out unilateral ability interacts with interest, which 
indirectly impacts compliance. The statistical model in Table 22 illustrates the 
interaction effect within the context of other data from the war, while Table 24 (below) 
isolates the effect. It indicates that if India could act unilaterally and Sri Lankan and 
Indian interests converged, Colombo was more likely not to comply due to incentives to 
free-ride. If India could act unilaterally and allied interests diverge, there was a higher 
probability of compliance as Colombo was more willing to agree in order to protect its 
interests since the action may be implemented without them anyway. The reverse is true 
if unilateral action is not possible.  If independent action is not possible and interests 
converge there is a higher likelihood of compliance, as Sri Lanka will undertake the 
action for the sake of its own interests. If alliance interests diverge and India cannot 
implement the reform without Sri Lankan assistance, we should expect to see higher 
rates of non-compliance as there is no interest motivating compliance and likely no 
consequences for non-compliance.  
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Table 23. Predicted Relationship Between Unilateral Capability and Interests 
Impacting Compliance Probability 
 
 Unilateral Action Possible for Foreign Power 
 
















   
   
   
   


















Table 24. Ordered Probit – Sri Lanka’s Compliance with Indian Demands, 1986-1990 
Interaction Effect With Indian Unilateral Capabilities and Sri Lankan Interest 
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548 As discussed in previous chapters, the variable allied interest convergence/divergence is produced by 
combining two interest variables, “Private Benefit for Domestic Regime,” and “Threat to Private Benefits for 
Domestic Regime.”  The variable was created in order to have a robust measure of Sri Lanka’s interests based 
on costs and benefits, instead of substituting one (costs or benefits) for interest while excluding the other. 
Since the foreign power (India) is making the request, we can assume they are interested in the request. 
Therefore interest convergence/divergence between allied is based on the interests of the domestic regime 
(Sri Lanka). Interest is determined by taking into account costs (Estimated by the variable, Threat to Private 
Benefits for Domestic Regime) and benefits (Estimated by the variable Private Benefits for Domestic 
Regime) for the domestic regime. These are coded as dummy variables and measured by using documentary 
evidence. For more on coding see Methodology Chapter. For more on interest variables see the section on 
interest as an independent variable. Regardless of approximation for interest, the interaction effect between 
unilateral capacity and interest outlined in the above graph remains statistically significant with compliance 
when the same regression is run substituting Benefit for Domestic Regime. Ordered Probit, Capacity -
0.690* (0.351), Unilateral Potential 1.174** (0.449), Domestic Regime Private Benefit 1.657** (0.371), 
Interaction between Unilateral Ability and Domestic Regime Benefit -1.656** (0.571). The 
Convergence/Divergence variable was produced in order to account for costs as well as benefits in the 





Costs, Benefits and Colombo’s Rate of Compliance 
 
This chapter has addressed the impact on compliance of capacity, the wartime 
counterinsurgency environment, increases in enemy threats, and Indian unilateral 
ability to implement reforms without Colombo. This section accounts complements these 
findings by accounting for interests, an important variable impacting compliance.  
Subject Areas  
Six category types were created to classify requests by general subject in order to 
observe if trends in compliance correlated with different types of issues.  
1. Development—Projects or activities intended to support economic growth and 
provide social services. Including provision of services for refugees and youth 
programs. 4/79, 5% of Indian requests.  
2. Economic Reform—Actions intended to change economic policies. Including the 
establishment of a financial council. 1/79, 1.3% of Indian requests.  
3. Political Reform—Actions intended to change government policies and 
institutions. Including electoral, law enforcement, governance and amnesty 
protocols. 45/79, 57% of Indian requests. 
4. Political-Military Counterinsurgency Strategy—Effort intended to implement 
counterinsurgency strategy. Including COIN projects, announcements 
recognizing Tamil grievances and pacification activities. Note, there may be 
certain overlaps with political reform. 10/79, 12.7% of Indian requests. 
5. Military Reform—Actions intended to change military policies and institutions. 
Including organizing paramilitary groups and dissolving military institutions. 
5/105, 6.3% of Indian requests. 
6. Military Strategy—Actions intended to guide military forces in the execution of 
the war effort. Including withholding force and the position of Sri Lankan forces. 
















Military Strategy and Military Reform.! ! Interestingly the above results are 
notably different than what was observed in several other conflicts, in particular the U.S. 
intervention in Vietnam. In that conflict, Saigon exhibited the highest rates of 
compliance with requests regarding military strategy and military reform. However, as 
illustrated above, in Sri Lanka these issue types had the lowest rates of compliance. 
There were five requests made regarding military reform, including, making the armed 
forces of Sri Lanka reflect ethnic make up of Sri Lankan society (instead of dominated by 
the Sinhalese), transferring paramilitary forces into regular security forces, inducting the 
Citizen Volunteer Force (CVF) into the reserve and regular police force, increasing arms 
available to the CVF and implementing policies that increase the strength of the CVF. 
Colombo did none of these things. The Sri Lankan government was distrustful of Indian 
advice regarding military organization. India had spent years undermining Sri Lankan 
efforts to suppress the Tamil insurgency through military means. Therefore its advice on 
how to organize and staff Sri Lankan security forces was not heeded. !
Requests pertaining to military strategy had similar results. In Vietnam it was the 
number one issue most complied with. The South Vietnamese were less likely to see such 
requests as threats to their regime as military actions targeted the enemy and usually did 
not require internal reform. However, this was different in Sri Lanka due to the historical 
Indian alliance with the Tamil insurgency. Colombo was much more inclined to see 
requests regarding military strategy as potential threats to Sri Lanka’s security. Even 
though such requests targeted the Tamil threat instead of the Sri Lankan regime, 
Colombo was wary these requests would set back, instead of serving their struggle 
against the LTTE. Requests included reforms such as vacating and relocating the Sri 




north, ordering the CVF to take action to evict the LTTE and to withdraw paramilitaries 
and “homeguard” troops.    
Political Reform and Counterinsurgency Projects.! ! As was the case in other 
conflicts investigated in this study, the vast majority of Indian requests related to 
political reforms New Delhi sought from Colombo. These included issues such as 
amending the 1956 Official Languages Act to make Tamil An official language, increasing 
provincial autonomy, make law enforcement protocol in the northeast the same as in the 
rest of Sri Lanka, passing legislation allowing displaced Tamil citizens a postal ballot, 
recognizing Tamil political parties and postponing election nomination deadlines. For 
20/45 (44%) there was full compliance and 11/45 (24%) partial compliance, which 
meant for 31/45 (69%) of these requests there was notable effort on behalf of Colombo to 
comply. This rate of compliance made requests for political reform a better predictor of 
compliance when compared to other issue types. (See Table 22, Row 7.) !
Other issue subject headings such as military reform, military strategy, 
counterinsurgency strategy and development were all associated with non-compliance 
when compared to requests pertaining to political reform (see Table 22, Rows 7-10). This 
high rate of compliance was partially caused by Colombo’s willingness to cede certain 
political concessions to the Indians in order to get New Delhi’s cooperation on solving 
the Tamil issue, since India had previously been working against Sri Lankan interests. 
This is in addition to India’s successful attempts to coerce Colombo into compromising 
with the LTTE. The September 1987 demand that Colombo agree to LTTE 
recommendations regarding the composition of the Interim Administrative Council, a 




East Province, is one example.549 The Sri Lankan government agreed to the LTTE 
suggestions regarding the Council.550 However the Council did not have any significant 
impact and Colombo became increasingly hesitant to provide such concessions, as it 
seemed “every concession led to more demands by the LTTE.”551 
Requests made under Indian counterinsurgency strategies such as Colombo 
acting as an intermediary sending Indian funds to the LTTE, announcing openings for 
Tamils in government and refraining from blaming the IPKF for postponing election 
nominations, were all coded as requests related to counterinsurgency strategy. Although 
several such requests can also pertain to political or military reforms, this sub-grouping 
is intended to capture requests specifically relating to a counterinsurgency protocol in 
order to track compliance trends within and across counterinsurgency strategies. 
Ultimately there was a mixed reaction to these requests in Sri Lanka, as Colombo 
complied with COIN-related demands less frequently than with other political reforms, 
but more frequently than with requests for military action.  
Development and Economic Reform.! !Lastly, as previously discussed, compared 
to other conflicts including the U.S. intervention in Vietnam and the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, there were very few Indian requests for economic and development-related 
requests. The majority of such requests related to instructions on handling Tamil 
refugees. This lack of Indian interest in such topics may be at least partially attributable 
to the high capacity of the Sri Lankan state when compared to other domestic partner 
regimes. India perhaps did not feel it needed to pressure Colombo to implement 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
549 Letter of the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo to the Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene 
Conveying the Agreement Arrived at with the LTTE on the Interim Administrative Council in the Northern 
and Eastern Province,” Colombo, September 28, 1987, India Sri Lanka: Relations and Sri Lanka’s Ethnic 
Conflict Documents – 1947-2000, Ed. Avtar Singh Bhasin (Indian Research Press, 2001), Volume VI, 
Document 739, 2083. 
550 India. Parliament. Lok Sabha, Lok Sabha Debates (Lok Sabha Secretariat., 1987), 457. 




economic reforms or development projects, because there were somewhat 
comprehensive policies already in place. Additionally, and likely even more critical in 
explaining to the lack of such requests, is that fact that New Delhi was not as invested as 
other intervening states in the long term development of the Sri Lankan government and 
therefore did not have similar plans regarding financial and developmental 
restructuring.  The few requests that were made had a mixed record of compliance, and 
ultimately were correlated with higher levels of non-compliance when compared with 
requests for political reform. !
These findings are helpful for understanding general trends in compliance among 
various issues, in particular when contrasted against the findings in other conflicts. 
However, as has been the case in other conflicts analyzed in this study the correlation 
between issue type and compliance are not as significant or reliable as other variables 
included in the study (see Table 22). There are several reasons why this is the case. 
Firstly, there are too few cases of certain types of requests, causing disproportionate 
distribution between issue areas being analyzed. As previously mentioned, in Sri Lanka 
there were very few cases of request regarding economic reform (1/79), development 
(4/79), or military reform (5/79), making compliance findings among these categories 
less reliable in comparison with other issues such as political reform, (45/79).  
Due to the inequity in distribution the statistical models in Table 22 primarily 
rely on comparing requests relating to political reform against the other kinds of issue 
categories combined. From this analysis it is possible to conclude that in the Indian 
intervention in Sri Lanka there is a higher likelihood of that requests for political reform 
be complied with when compared with requests asking for other reforms. This is in part 




concessions to Sri Lanka’s Tamils, especially earlier in the conflict before the Tamil 
insurgency turned against Indian soldiers, making it evident to Colombo that New Delhi 
could not sufficiently coerce the LTTE. 10/13 (77%) of demands related to political 
reform requested in 1987 were complied with (either partially or completely). In 1988 
20/27 (74%), and in 1989 1/3 (33%) Indian requests for political reform were complied 
with. By the end of the intervention Sri Lanka was not nearly as willing to make 
concessions.  
Costs, Benefits, and Compliance 
As was the case in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan (U.S.) the potential for short-
term benefits for Colombo was one of the highest predictors of compliance.552 If the goal 
of the demand could potentially be made to serve the interests of the regime or head 
policymakers in Colombo, it had a much higher likelihood of being adopted than if it 
couldn’t immediately help the regime.  
One example of a request from New Delhi that held the potential to benefit the 
regime in Colombo was the 1988 request that President Jayewardene issue directives to 
the Sri Lankan Election Commissioner “to set in motion preparations for elections to 
Provincial Councils, polling booths, list of officers, etc...”553 India pushed the President to 
include various election directives but also left several aspects of election protocol up to 
Colombo. This openness in the request provided an opportunity for Jayewardene to 
make choices that would serve his short-term interests, including decisions regarding the 
election that could appease various domestic interests or consolidate his authority. It was 
coded as providing an opportunity for Colombo’s short-term interests. Perhaps 
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unsurprisingly it was complied with. In September 1988 the President issued specific 
orders to the Election Commissioner for mid-November elections.554  
 In addition to benefits, requests can also pose potential threats or impose 
potential costs on the domestic regime. Statistical analysis on Sri Lankan compliance 
(See Table 22) reveals potential threats are associated with non-compliance. Similar to 
the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the correlation between threats and non-compliance is fairly 
strong in the Sri Lankan war when compared to other wars.555 There are several likely 
reasons why this is the case. In Vietnam, for example the strong American commitment 
to Saigon may have made South Vietnamese leaders more willing to implement policies 
that were potentially threatening to their regime, believing Washington wouldn’t leave 
Saigon vulnerable to the enemy or to domestic political opposition. The opposite may be 
true in Sri Lanka. Colombo was acutely aware of India’s tentative loyalties to their cause, 
and therefore may have been less willing to implement reforms that posed potential risks 
than allies with more durable foreign support.  
One example of a potentially threatening Indian request was the August 1988 
demand that the Sri Lankan government inform New Delhi about the outcome of 
discussions with various Tamil groups regarding elections.556 By this time Colombo had 
largely lost faith that New Delhi could deliver the Tamil insurgents. January 1989 
brought the election of President Premadasa, who was regularly engaging in bilateral 
negotiations with Tamil groups, including the LTTE, purposefully excluding New Delhi 
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and with the expressed intent of working with the Tamils to expel the IPKF.557 Needless 
to say the Sri Lankans did not comply.  
It may be interesting to note that costs and benefits are not mutually exclusive. 
Requests can fail to pose either potential costs or potential benefits, can primarily be 
either potentially costly or useful, or can pose both costs and benefits. For example, 
consider the January 1988 request that President Jayewardene ensure that prominent 
Tamil leaders participate in elections, provided they recognize the unity of Sri Lanka.558 
This request posed both potential costs and benefits to Colombo. It could bring 
meaningful compromise with Tamil leaders, prestige to the president, reduce hostilities, 
and gain Tamil recognition for the territorial integrity of a united Sri Lanka. However, 
allowing Tamil leaders to participate in elections would also undermine Sinhalese 
control over government institutions, inviting protest from domestic elements such as 
the JVP, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front), a separatist leftist 
Sinhalese insurgent group that was seeking harder lines be taken against the Tamil 
groups and Indian troops in Sri Lanka. This would make the president vulnerable to 
political and physical attack. President Jayewardene ultimately made efforts to 
encourage Tamil leaders to participate in elections, however many Tamil officials were 
being intimidated or assassinated by the LTTE, and Colombo found itself helpless in 
stopping their campaign.  
Conditions of War and Internal Politics 
 Domestic political obstacles, such as parliament blocking the implementation 
of a demand from New Delhi, were captured by a control variable, “Conditions of War or 
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Internal Politics Impacting Compliance Environment.” This variable monitored times 
when the compliance environment was impacted by complications from the war itself, 
the internal political dynamics of the domestic regime or the internal political dynamics 
of the foreign intervening state. Each of these three potential influences was tracked 
separately to allow for independent analysis. However, because they describe somewhat 
similar circumstances, namely issues of the war and domestic politics influenced 
compliance, they were combined in the statistical models shown in Table 22 (bottom 
row). However, independently discussing each of these variables is worthwhile in order 
to show how they differ as well as illustrating the potential complexity of complying with 
a given demand. The context under which compliance decisions are made is dynamic, at 
times influenced by the actions of the enemy, competing political actors or internal 
disagreement within domestic or foreign political institutions. The decision whether or 
not to comply with an ally’s demand can be a complicated process involving multiple 
actors.  
Indian Institutions and Sri Lankan Domestic Politics Impacting Compliance  
 No war fighting force exists without internal bureaucratic tensions and 
interagency rivalries. Chester Cooper’s 1972 Institute for Defense Analysis pacification 
summary report observed, “the American effort to advise and support the Vietnamese in 
their pacification program was significantly blunted by institutional rivalries and 
frictions among MACV, CIA, AID, and the embassy itself… there was little attempt to 
establish effective overall control, or even coordination, of the various far-flung 
American programs.”559 Similarly India’s force in Sri Lanka suffered internal divisions.  
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 Indian intelligence services (RAW), the organization that led the effort to train 
Tamil militants prior to 1987, continued to work covertly to negotiate with LTTE 
leadership throughout 1987-1990. But Indian military leaders tasked with suppressing 
the LTTE were cut out of the loop. According to journalist Rohan Gunaratna the tension 
between Indian political, military and intelligence services created several serious 
problems for the Indian effort. For example, in March 1988, IPKF forces ambushed and 
killed two LTTE leaders who were in active negotiations with authorities from RAW, and 
were even reportedly carrying correspondence between LTTE founder and leader 
Velupillai Prabhakaran and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. When they were killed, “the 
IPKF was not aware of the RAW plan – even if they knew, it would not mattered as they 
had no mutual respect for each other”560 Indian High Commissioner J. N. Dixit who 
worked closely with representatives from Colombo was also largely excluded from 
ongoing RAW-LTTE negotiations, despite being the senior-most political officer in the 
Indian effort. 561 In other words Indians were know to occasionally work at cross-
purposes, which undoubtedly influenced relations with Colombo.   
 Although important to the internal problems to the dynamics of Indian forces, 
bureaucratic issues within Indian agencies were not frequently cited as impacting Sri 
Lankan compliance with Indian demands. They influenced only 4/79 or 5% of requests. 
However despite its rarity, there were occasions, such as the Indian demand that Sri 
Lanka maintain law through the Civil Volunteer Force (CVF),562 where internal 
institutions of the Indian intervention impacted compliance outcome. In this demand, 
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New Delhi asked Sri Lanka to bolster the CVF, only to have Indian intelligence (RAW) 
take over training and arming, ultimately using the CVF as an instrument to implement 
Indian interests in Sri Lanka.563 Colombo initially attempted to follow through with 
support for the CVF, but when its ranks swelled with over 30,000 Indian-recruited and 
armed Tamil youths, Colombo was unable to control the organization, let alone use it as 
an instrument to maintain law and order.564  
Although more frequently cited as an issue, (9/79, 11% of requests), domestic 
political issues internal to Sri Lanka were also not statistically significant in determining 
whether or not leadership in Colombo implemented a given demand. Nevertheless such 
complications were known to occasionally impact compliance outcomes. This was the 
case with the 1988 demand that Colombo prevent individuals settled in northeast Sri 
Lanka after 1983 from voting in the 1988 election.565 New Delhi feared “if such persons 
are allowed to vote in the Provincial Council elections, Tamil opinion across the Board 
will say that Sinhala colonialization has been legitimized.”566 In other words if post-1983 
registrants were allowed to vote, Tamils that had fled their homes would be excluded, 
while Sinhalese that had subsequently claimed those areas would have political voice. 
There was notable Sinhalese pressure not to give in to this demand, as not only would it 
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work against Sinhalese representation, but would also exclude individuals who had 
turned 18 since 1983, and therefore violated longstanding electoral laws.567 Colombo did 
not comply.  
War Impacting the Compliance Environment 
 Because the Sri Lankan government was making decisions regarding 
compliance within the context of a violent insurgency, it is important to monitor how 
developments in the war affected compliance with Indian demands. In order to specify 
the potential impact of this wartime environment, a general variable on the impact of 
complications from the war was created, “War Impacting Compliance Environment.” 
This variable captures aspects of the wartime setting, including for example, violence, 
combat operations, refugee influxes, and overtures or offenses by the enemy. One or 
more of these factors was cited as an issue affecting compliance in 34/79 (43%) of 
demands.  
 Consider for instance the Indian demand that Colombo “make special efforts to 
rehabilitate militant youths.”568 This seemingly simple request was complicated by the 
fact that security concerns were consuming an exorbitant amount of Sri Lanka’s 
resources. Sri Lanka is a small state with big security problems. Colombo’s deficits 
averaged 12.4% of GDP from 1985-1989, and defense spending escalated from 1.1% of 
GDP in 1982 to 4.8% in 1988, despite India taking over responsibility for disarming the 
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LTTE from 1987-1990.569 Such expenses left little room for rehabilitation programs such 
as those requested by New Delhi regarding militant youths and the diversion of funds to 
the military was part of the reason Colombo did not comply.   
Furthermore in the Indian intervention, increased military pressure by the LTTE 
led to a decrease in the rate of compliance with Indian demands. For example in 1987 the 
Indians requested Colombo 1) withdraw its paramilitary personnel from the North and 
East and, 2) transfer paramilitaries into regular military services and disband its 
“homeguard” forces.570  The “homeguards” typically consisted of groups of locals 
ostensibly organized to protect Muslims and Sinhalese civilians in Tamil areas and 
border villages.571 In keeping with the agreements made in the July 1987 Indo-Sri 
Lankan Accord, Colombo began to disband these groups, but this “was suspended when 
Muslims and Sinhalese were attacked and retention of homeguards became essential to 
protect them.”572 Colombo furthermore did not comply with New Delhi’s requests that 
they dissolve the paramilitaries, in large part because increased violence from the war 
made it politically and in some cases, even physically untenable to do so.  
The point that an increase in enemy action inspired Colombo to refuse Indian 
demands is interesting when contrasted to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam, which caused 
the opposite reaction. In Vietnam Tet inspired an increase in the rate of compliance with 
foreign allied demands. There are several reasons why enemy violence in these two cases 
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had opposite effect on rates of compliance with allied demands. In Sri Lanka the Tamils 
threatened the cohesion of Sri Lanka as it fought for independence for Tamil areas, but 
the insurgency did not threaten the existence of the state itself. The NLF and North 
Vietnamese in Vietnam on the other hand were vying for state control in Saigon. The 
type of threat posed by the increased enemy activity was also substantially different. In 
Sri Lanka there was somewhat gradual increase in LTTE activity, while the military 
action of the Tet offensive created an unprecedented political shock in Vietnam.  
 Furthermore differences between India and the U.S. in their respective 
commitments in Sri Lanka and Vietnam may have contributed to variation in the 
influence of enemy action on rates of compliance. A domestic regime under threat coping 
with a less committed ally may experience the fear of abandonment, which would draw it 
towards immediate solutions that momentarily best protect its security interests. This 
makes the regime less willing to provide concessions or comply with allied demands, as it 
is unsure of the payoffs for those actions.  Colombo, having witnessed Indian agencies 
undermine their interests for years, did not have faith requests coming from New Delhi 
would serve Sri Lanka’s interests. And LTTE offensives discredited Indian claims that it 
could disarm the LTTE if Colombo gave enough political concessions. The Sri Lankan 
government became less willing to provide concessions to Indian interests as Tamil 
violence expanded, because the Indian strategy was clearly not working. However in 
Vietnam because of the high level of American commitment, Saigon may have been more 
willing to go with U.S. demands, as Washington had always stood against the communist 
North.  
 Lastly there are differences in the types of requests being compared between 




increased pressure from the LTTE were frequently requests such as reducing military 
pressure against the enemy and providing increased roles to the IPKF. In Vietnam the 
types of requests increasingly complied with after the Tet military offense were requests 
for increased South Vietnamese militarization and Vietnamese government expansion. 
Although more cases need to be examined, this may indicate that in addition to other 
dynamics taking place following an enemy offensive impacting compliance, there may be 
a tendency of domestic regimes to increase their military involvement, regardless of the 
demands of their foreign allies.  
Conclusion 
New Delhi had both overlapping and distinct interests with both sides of the 
conflict in Sri Lanka. India used commonalities to get concessions from insurgents and 
counterinsurgents alike, but was unsuccessful getting either to fully promote the Indian 
vision for Sri Lanka. India’s position on devolution, the transfer of power from the 
centralized state apparatus in Colombo to localized government institutions in Tamil 
areas is an example of one issue that ultimately alienated both Tamil and Sinhalese and 
made India’s attempts to force compromise fall short of meaningful conciliation. After 
pushing Colombo to transfer power to more local levels, in 1988 New Delhi asked 
President Jayewardene to ensure “that Pradeshiya Sabhas [Village Councils] and 
District Councils do not dilute role of Provincial Council and Provincial Government.”573 
But this request for middle-range concentration of Tamil areas failed to satisfy the 
Tamils, who sought greater localized control, and it failed to please Sri Lankan 
government officials, who sought as much centralized power as possible. The focus on 
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the provincial level was largely based on India’s own governance models.  This solution 
effectively took power from Colombo without significantly strengthening the Tamils and 
it left both sides unsatisfied.  
Furthermore, despite India’s seemingly strong coercive tools in its dealings with 
both Colombo and the LTTE, Colombo’s rate of compliance with Indian demands 
remains consistent with other conflicts (62%), and the LTTE were also somewhat 
effective at avoiding Indian petitions. New Delhi was best able to coerce Colombo when it 
could credibly negotiate with the insurgents.  This is particularly evident in India’s initial 
demands that Colombo provide the Tamils with certain rights such as recognition of the 
Tamil language and acknowledging the North and East areas as traditional Tamil 
homelands. Meaningful dialogue with the enemy was similarly useful for the U.S. at the 
end of the U.S. war in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger coerced South Vietnamese President 
Thieu to agree to uncomfortable aspects of the Paris Peace Accords because Kissinger 
was in direct contact with Hanoi and could potentially cut Saigon out of negotiations 
completely.  This is similar to what the Indians were able to threaten in 1987 before the 
LTTE made it clear they were not interested in cooperating with the Indian Peacekeeping 
Force.  
In summary four categories of variables (listed below) were tested to offer insight 
into Sri Lanka’s compliance with Indian demands:  
1. Capacity—The inability of the Sri Lankan government to implement certain 
requests made by India is unsurprisingly correlated with non-compliance, 
however in part due to its infrequency (capacity was cited as an issue in less than 




determining compliance outcome. Other factors, such as those listed below were 
more influential in determining Colombo’s response to New Delhi’s demands.  
2. Interest—Colombo was more inclined to comply with requests that could 
potentially provide short-term benefits and less likely to comply with requests 
that posed potential short-term threats. This finding held despite India’s history 
supporting the insurgents, a precedent which allowed New Delhi to issue credible 
threats against its Sri Lankan government allies. The issuing of such threats did 
not change Sri Lanka’s inclination to comply when it was in its interests, and to 
dismiss demands that posed potential threats. In fact, India’s history supporting 
Tamil separatists may have strengthened such inclinations as New Delhi’s 
relatively low commitment made Colombo more likely to protect its interests, 
even at the cost of the collective alliance.  
3. Dependency—As in other conflicts such as Vietnam, Afghanistan (U.S.) and Iraq, 
there was an interaction effect between India’s ability to independently undertake 
the request and the interests of New Delhi and Colombo. If India could undertake 
the activity unilaterally and interests between allies converged, there were higher 
levels of non-compliance due to incentives to free ride. If interests diverged and 
India could act unilaterally, New Delhi was able to coerce Sri Lanka into 
complying by threatening to act independently and excluding Colombo from 
benefits. More details are provided in the section on dependency and unilateral 
ability.  
4. Wartime Environment—The consequences of operating in a warzone made it 
more difficult for Colombo to comply with requests. Furthermore, an increase in 
military activity by the LTTE lowered levels of Sri Lankan compliance with Indian 




interests and more likely to look inwards to the Sri Lankan military to deal with 




Chapter 9:  
CONCLUSION 
This study was motivated by two questions: What affects how much influence an 
ally has over its counterinsurgency partner? And what effects do inter-alliance dynamics 
have on who wins and who loses counterinsurgency wars with foreign military 
interventions? After analyzing nine wars574 and 460 policy demands made from an 
intervening force on its ally, I offer several findings.   
First, shared interests do not necessarily produce cooperation between allies. 
Mutual interests are vitally important in motivating cooperative behavior, but as shown 
in this study, interests and dependency interact to produce incentives for compliance or 
defiance of allied requests. Second, once a military is committed in a counterinsurgency 
intervention, there are relatively few opportunities for the intervening force to coerce its 
ally. As described in previous chapters, an intervening force possesses coercive leverage 
only under specific conditions, namely that allies disagree over the issues addressed in 
the request, and that the intervening force can implement the request independently 
should the domestic ally fail to participate. If allies agree on a request that can be 
implemented independently by the foreign force, the domestic regime is more likely to 
fail to comply, opting instead to free-ride off the efforts of its partner.575  
Counterinsurgency interventions are difficult foreign policy problems. The 
findings from this project and the diplomatic history of these wars should temper 
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expectations about what can be coerced from an ally in a counterinsurgency. The data 
suggests there are limited opportunities for policymakers to coerce allies and no 
intervening military has yet been able to achieve over 68% full or partial allied 
compliance with their requests.  
Nevertheless, despite opportunities for a foreign force to coerce a 
counterinsurgency ally being surprisingly difficult to pin down, these moments can be 
noteworthy. The United States was able to coerce its Vietnamese allies into making 
painful concessions to the North Vietnamese during the Paris peace talks.576 The U.S. 
was able to pressure its allies due to the fact that American forces were withdrawing 
(therefore lessening the U.S. commitment to Saigon) while also having the ability to sign 
a peace agreement with communist forces with or without South Vietnam.  
 Similar conditions for coercion were evident in other counterinsurgency wars as 
well. Consider, for example, the experience of Mozambique fighting the RENAMO 
insurgents with the help of Zimbabwe. Although there is little documentation regarding 
the nature of the alliance between Mozambique and Zimbabwe during their 
counterinsurgency alliance, it is clear Zimbabwe successfully applied pressure to 
Mozambique to negotiate with RENAMO to come to settlement after 1990. According to 
one historian, the domestic “opposition to Robert Mugabe was beginning to use the issue 
of military involvement in Mozambique to castigate the Prime Minister.”577 Mugabe 
pressured Mozambique to negotiate in order to end the insurgency.578 By October 1992, 
the war was over by reconciliation, with RENAMO accepted as a mainstream political 
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Aside from specific circumstances of lowered commitment to allies withdrawing 
from the intervention and the ability to exclude the ally should they fail to cooperate, the 
study suggests the best way for an intervening force to coerce an ally is not to be more 
aggressive, but to either alter its dependency on the ally to implement reform (which can 
be difficult depending on the nature of the alliance and the request in question) or to 
restructure incentives to create short-term benefits for the domestic ally. In Iraq, for 
example, the U.S. unwittingly promoted anti-corruption reform by promoting free press 
initiatives. Despite Iraq being consistently ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in 
the world, Washington’s request that Baghdad comply with financial disclosure 
requirements for public officials was largely fulfilled by 2009, due in part to media 
attention.580 Iraqi officials were motivated to comply with the transparency initiative in 
order to foster politically useful reputations for being tough on corruption.581 Without 
the personal political benefit to politicians created by media attention, it is doubtful the 
U.S. could have done much to convince Baghdad to comply. 
Regarding the influence of counterinsurgency alliance dynamics on war outcome, 
two things are clear from this study: 1) The character of the in-country 
counterinsurgency ally, the character of the intervening ally, and the existence of a large-
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scale foreign intervention can all potentially influence war outcome; 2) However, based 
on the findings of this study, the ability of the foreign intervening force to coerce its allies 
to comply with demands and hostility between allies has little influence on winning or 
losing the war. The next section will explore the claims in greater detail.  
 First, it is evident that the in-country counterinsurgency ally is vitally important 
in winning or losing counterinsurgency conflicts. Reflecting on the U.S. war in Vietnam, 
retired intelligence analyst Chester Cooper wrote that despite losing 58,000 Americans 
to the cause, American analysts “have had to return again and again to the hard fact that 
it was basically our ally’s war.” 582  U.S. involvement in Saigon’s bureaucracy only served 
to undermine strategic goals of independent Vietnamese capabilities. Yet, despite this 
straightforward observation, subsequent U.S. counterinsurgency analyses on Iraq and 
Afghanistan have reportedly continued to overemphasize U.S. efforts while overlooking 
the role of the domestic ally in determining war outcome.583  
The existence of a foreign intervention is itself also significant influencing war 
outcome, but it is not a straightforward issue. Only the grimmest of security situations 
attract large-scale foreign interventions, a selection bias that stacks the odds against 
success in this universe of cases. In basic terms, a foreign force contemplating military 
intervention on behalf of a counterinsurgency ally is faced with several options vis-à-vis 
political involvement with its ally.  Each approach has unique costs and benefits. 
Policymakers can opt out of intervening, they can provide political advisors, or they can 
attempt to dominate the political decision-making processes of the allied state. This 
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study analyzed the later two forms of intervention. These include conflicts such as the 
U.S. war in Vietnam and the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, where the intervening 
state strongly advised an allied counterinsurgency regime but did not govern the state 
itself. These wars were contrasted with more aggressive political interventions such as 
the approach taken by the Soviets in Afghanistan and, to a certain extent, the Vietnamese 
in Cambodia and the Egyptians in Yemen, which controlled certain decision-making 
institutions within the allied state.  This study provided some evidence regarding the 
trade–offs involved in these different interventionist approaches.  
Opting not to intervene takes away opportunities for a foreign force to implement 
policies unilaterally, forfeiting immediate efforts to contain an insurgency. It also denies 
opportunities to convince allies to implement policies that might otherwise go unfulfilled 
without an in-country foreign military presence. However, a failure to intervene can also 
strengthen an ally’s bargaining position. A non-interventionist foreign commitment to an 
ally can enable the foreign force to make credible threats to the ally because the foreign 
force has not yet intertwined its security interests with the success of that ally. This lower 
commitment can provide leverage in negotiations with allies, as well as deny the 
domestic ally the ability to free-ride off the efforts of intervening forces.  
A foreign state opting to intervene militarily in a counterinsurgency conflict has 
several options regarding the nature of its involvement with the allied government. With 
the exception of the U.S. in Iraq under the Coalition Provisional Authority, democracies 
such as the U.S. and India tend to take strong advisory positions with domestic allies, but 
stop short of directly taking over the domestic decision-making institutions of their 




institutions can willfully contradict foreign forces. However this dynamic can also foster 
domestic political independence, an important factor facilitating foreign withdrawal.  
Because this study relies on released primary source documents which are more 
readily available from democratic regimes such as the U.S. and India (and former Soviet 
files, released in a moment of post-Soviet Russian openness), less data is available about 
inter-alliance dynamics in interventions that directly control domestic 
counterinsurgency allies, an approach adopted more frequently by authoritarian states. 
This more aggressive approach to allies can undermine self-sufficiency in domestic allied 
institutions, but it solidifies the counterinsurgency unit. Although there were several 
other important dynamics influencing war outcome, it is interesting to note that the 
Vietnamese were successful using this strategy in their ten-year intervention in 
Cambodia (December 1978-September 1989) to overthrow the Pol Pot regime, while the 
Soviets in Afghanistan and the Egyptians in Yemen from 1962-1967 had less success with 
similar methods.  
The counterinsurgency wars examined in this study provide examples of how 
alliance dynamics can affect war outcome, including, for example, the impact of the 
negotiation process between allies over counterinsurgency policies on performance, the 
affect of limited government capacity on policy, and the level of domination of the 
foreign ally over the domestic regime influencing alliance relations and performance. But 
like many critical political factors in counterinsurgency wars, the pathways between 
these important alliance-related variables and their influence on winning or losing the 
war are multifactorial and complex. While the study was able to systematically test 
specific claims about the likelihood of compliance with specific allied requests based on 




independently implement the policy should its ally fail to participate, the project was not 
provided the opportunity to systematically test propositions regarding alliance dynamics 
and war outcomes. Nevertheless, the data gathered on compliance provides insights into 
the layered relationship between counterinsurgency alliances and war outcomes.  
Consider for example, counterinsurgency interventions undertaken by cash-
strapped states such as Cuba in Angola, contrasted against superpower interventions 
such as the U.S. in Afghanistan. Evidence from the study indicates that developing states 
may have different development expectations for domestic allies when contrasted with 
resource-rich intervening forces.584 Lower development expectations can influence the 
types of demands made by intervening forces, the reforms implemented by the domestic 
regime and ultimately the counterinsurgency strategy adopted to fight the war. Similarly, 
domestic allies have different aid expectations for interventions undertaken by less 
wealthy states. These alliance dynamics can also influence war outcome. Consider, for 
example, how managing popular expectations for development in Iraq and Afghanistan 
has been difficult for Washington.585 Many Afghans and Iraqis expected the American 
intervention to result in a rapid rise of living standards in Iraq and Afghanistan. When 
these expectations were not met, there was dissatisfaction with the U.S. In Mozambique, 
on the other hand, there is no evidence that Zimbabwean troops intervening to help 
Mozambique combat the insurgency were ever expected to undertake any development 
actions. Just by being wealthy, the U.S. inadvertently created high expectations for 
reform and an inter-alliance dynamic with potential strategic consequences.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
584 Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale, 
Reprint (Routledge, 2012), 159. 
585 Michelle Parker, Programming Development Funds to Support a Counterinsurgency. Nangarhar, 
Afghanistan 2006, September 2008; Tom A. Peter, “Afghanistan War: Gap Grows Between US Efforts, 






Furthermore, basic characteristics of the intervening state can influence the 
character of the enemy insurgency and influence war outcome. A superpower 
intervening in a conflict may unintentionally provide huge fundraising opportunities for 
an insurgency, as enemy states take advantage of the opportunity to use an insurgency as 
a proxy through which they can challenge the superpower. This boost in support for the 
insurgency may not be as notable in interventions undertaken by smaller states. This was 
evident in the amount of aid provided by Washington to the mujahedeen fighting the 
Soviets in Afghanistan contrasted to Washington’s more-limited assistance to UNITA 
forces battling Cubans in Angola. As illustrated across the study, complex subtleties 
related to counterinsurgency alliances and the states forming those partnerships can 
easily develop into dynamics that affect war outcome.  
Yet, despite the in-country regime and the nature of the counterinsurgency 
intervention being vital factors among many influencing who wins and who loses these 
conflicts, the findings from this study suggest that the ability of the intervening force to 
promote its agenda and coerce its ally may ultimately have little bearing on war outcome. 
The consistency of rates of compliance across different wars (with different outcomes) 
implies that compliance with allied requests might not indicate much about 
counterinsurgency success. This is striking because it debunks the assumption 
underpinning all counterinsurgency advisory missions, which hold that complying with 
the agenda of intervening forces should lead to a greater likelihood of success. However, 
the assumption that following the instructions of the foreign ally will increase the 
likelihood of victory was not supported by the findings in this study.  
The proposed idea that successful coercion of counterinsurgency allies may not 




counterinsurgencies. First, it undermines the notion that the intervening force has 
consistently sound strategic policies. The prevalent assumption is if the ally (such as the 
Karzai regime in Afghanistan) follows the prescriptions of its foreign allies (the United 
States), there is an increased chance of winning the war. However, in a 
counterinsurgency context, the political effects of military and political policies can be 
difficult to estimate ahead of time. Policies often have unintended consequences that can 
harm the war effort. This may be especially true with programs designed by foreign 
forces that may not appreciate the political nuances of a particular area.  
Consider, for example, the U.S. request that Afghans conduct year-round poppy 
elimination campaigns.@CA Kabul did not fulfill the request, and non-compliance may 
have actually helped the American counterinsurgency effort. As the governor of 
Badakhshan discovered, destroying poppy crops as sprouts gave local farmers time to 
replant different crops, while destroying poppy crops late in the season put farmers at 
financial risk. Eliminating the crop only once a year in the spring caused a significant 
drop in poppy cultivation (75%), yet enabled the governor of Badakhshan to maintain 
public support. When asked about his successful policies he commented, “The reason I’m 
successful is because I’ve gained people’s trust… It certainly isn’t because of an effective 
police force or the central government’s efforts.”@CB Local knowledge can be a critical 
asset when the targets are the political loyalties, or “hearts and minds,” of the local 
population. Domestic actors were sometimes able to take more nuanced positions and 
tailor foreign-designed policies to evolving local situations. This study showed that the 
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failure of in-country regimes to fully comply with foreign demands did not always create 
a strategic disadvantage for the counterinsurgency campaign.  
This is not to argue that allied defiance typically helped the war effort. The study 
uncovered numerous occasions of disastrously corrupt domestic political actors whose 
habits produced strategic liabilities for the counterinsurgency campaign. Non-
compliance with foreign demands more often than not was an indication of free-riding or 
incompetence on behalf of the domestic ally, both generally harmful to the war effort.  
But nevertheless defiance itself should not be taken as a sign of strategic loss or 
impending counterinsurgency failure. In fact, as illustrated by the Indian experience in 
Sri Lanka, defiance can be a sign of strength in the domestic ally, which is likely helpful 
to achieving counterinsurgency goals. The Sri Lankans defied several Indian demands 
not out of weakness, free-riding, or incompetence, but because Colombo sought 
independent control over the counterinsurgency campaign apart from Indian designs. It 
took Colombo twenty years after Indian withdrawal, but eventually it won its 
counterinsurgency war.  
These observations suggest that hostility within counterinsurgency alliances may 
not be a negative indication about the likelihood of counterinsurgency success, and 
furthermore, that animosity between allies may not negatively influence the outcome of 
counterinsurgency wars. Inter-alliance tension, which is frequently taken as a sign of 
dysfunction and sub-optimal performance, may in fact be correlated with success. 
Because so little work has been done examining this class of alliances, intervening forces 
largely assume that smooth, cooperative relationships between allies are an indication of 
achievement. This may not be the case. The “ideal” relationship in a counterinsurgency 




defend its interests and move toward independent operations, sometimes defying the 
demands of its allies. An acrimonious counterinsurgency alliance may benefit the larger 
political processes fostering allied independence and foreign military withdrawal.  
This study on compliance with allied demands in counterinsurgency wars has 
created several new avenues for research in the fields of alliance politics and power 
analysis. At its heart, this study is a systematic analysis of power. Where does influence 
come from in counterinsurgency alliances? Why do intervening forces have such 
difficulty motivating compliance from seemingly dependent domestic allies? Debunking 
the persistent convention of conceptualizing power as a trait of wealthy states, the study 
shows how a preponderance of resources has shockingly little bearing on coercing allies 
in the counterinsurgency context. Following the advice of David Baldwin, the study 
analyzes power by defining particular actors in particular situations in order to conceive 
of power as causation (a change in behavior), not as a given characteristic of resource-
rich actors.@CC It is evident that in counterinsurgency alliances where there has been a 
sizable military commitment, intervening forces should not confuse a preponderance of 
resources for a preponderance of influence in inter-alliance negotiations. As illustrated 
throughout the project, there are more complex political variables creating and limiting 
influence in these alliances. From these lessons in the future I hope to provide better 
insights into how to conceptualize power and coercion in foreign policy.   
Additionally, moving forward with related research, I intend to examine allied 
commitment as a variable in counterinsurgency alliances, specifically examining the 
period of military withdrawal in order to analyze how a decrease in foreign allied 
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commitment may influence the behavior of domestic actors. This was touched upon in 
this study, but merits an independent examination. Additionally, I intend to take the 
theories proposed in this study and test them in other wartime environments to identify 
what may or may not be unique about counterinsurgency alliances. Furthermore, I 
would like to examine coercion and compliance in alliances formed between insurgents 
and foreign allies, contrasting those findings with the outcomes uncovered in this study 
on counterinsurgencies. Interestingly, there would be overlap between case studies 
examined, including, for example, India’s one-time support of the Tamil insurgents, 
Syria’s policies arming factions of the PLO, and the U.S. funding the mujahedeen against 
the Soviets in Afghanistan. Leverage in alliances with insurgents may or may not differ 
from alliances with counterinsurgents. It would be interesting to examine if states have 
different opportunities to coerce insurgent allies as opposed to counterinsurgent 
partners or if political actors behave in similar ways regardless of which side of the 
conflict they are associated with. At least in the case of counterinsurgency alliances, as 
examined by this study, there are surprisingly limited opportunities for foreign forces to 
coerce domestic allies. To the dismay of future intervening forces, this is a systematic 







Appendix A:  
METHODOLOGY—EXAMPLES  
Step-By-Step Example of the Methods - U.S. War in Vietnam 
A detailed example from data collected may be helpful in illustrating the methods 
processes utilized in the study. Below is an example from the U.S. war in Vietnam. The 
Vietnam chapter systematically uses primary source documents from the U.S. war to 
construct a unique compliance database tracking 1) demands made by the U.S. on the 
Government of Vietnam in Saigon (GVN), 2) the outcome of these requests and 3) 
structural issues and characteristics of demands that may impact compliance outcomes. 
Tracking these elements provides a better understanding of their potential importance 
and impact on coercion, compliance and inter-alliance bargaining dynamics.  
Step 1 - Analyze Statements from the Foreign Executive Outlining Its Policy 
Goals for the Domestic Regime (Policy Documents) 
The U.S. was involved in Vietnam from 1954-1975. But the American 
commitment to a non-communist South Vietnam went through varying stages, a 
phenomenon that led some to refer to the cold war U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia as 
“The Vietnam Wars.”589  Nevertheless the war most Americans know as “Vietnam,” 
lasted from 1965 to 1973. In this study we begin collecting data in January 1964, a year 
before the first sizable introduction of U.S. troops. There are several methodological 
reasons for choosing to start the analysis in 1964. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was 
passed in August 1964 signaling the start of the escalation that led to 184,300 U.S. troops 
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being deployed in 1965, a force which suffered 1,369 combat deaths that year alone.590 
Starting the analysis a year ahead of substantial troop arrivals helps ensure thorough 
analysis that captures as much data as possible, including interactions that prepare for 
the 1965 offensive, without including demands made before the U.S. was fully committed 
to Vietnam, a form of intervention outside the scope of this study. Ultimately, beginning 
a year ahead of the troops helps gather a more complete picture of U.S.-GVN relations 
and inter-alliance bargaining space.591 
The first step in analysis entails identifying specific demands from the U.S. to the 
GVN required relying on the 12 volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) on Vietnam 1964-1973. FRUS is produced by the U.S. Department of State Office 
of the Historian, and contains “declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies. 
Foreign Relations volumes contain documents from Presidential libraries, Departments 
of State and Defense, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, Agency for 
International Development, and other foreign affairs agencies as well as the private 
papers of individuals involved in formulating U.S. foreign policy. In general, the editors 
choose documentation that illuminates policy formulation and major aspects and 
repercussions of its execution.”592 Each volume contains the text of several hundred of 
the most important declassified policy documents for a given time period in order to 
provide a definitive documentary resource on an important history event for scholars 
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and government officials to use for reference. FRUS is considered one of the foremost 
resources for U.S. national security policy materials. 
Due to the size and importance of the war in Vietnam, there are 12 volumes of 
materials on the issue, organized chronologically, collectively containing roughly 11,000 
pages of material. These volumes are all available online (see 
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments) and keyword searches are available by 
volume. Using a combination of the bound volumes published by the U.S. Government 
Printing Office, online copies of these volumes as well as copies of original documents 
when material was only referenced (but not reproduced) by the FRUS collection, it was 
possible to identify 105 unique demands from the U.S. to the Government of South 
Vietnam (GVN) over the course of the war. For example, one set of requests from the 




593 Original located at Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–1 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Also 
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!  408. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State  
Saigon, November 9, 1964—7 p.m. 
CINCPAC for POLAD. This is a U.S. Mission cable. Ref. A–337, October 30, 1964. It is apparent that 
the next few months will be critical to the success of the new government and to our efforts to bring 
about some degree of stabilization in the internal political situation of SVN. The members of this 
government are generally inexperienced in public life and have never worked together as a team. It is 
the consensus of the Mission Council that under favorable circumstances it will require three to four 
months to get this government to function with any degree of effectiveness. By that time an assembly 
may have been formed and unless its performance has been acceptable in SVN eyes the government will 
face the hazard of removal. 
To avoid waste of effort in uncoordinated activity, it is essential for the government to establish a series 
of short-term objectives which are reasonably attainable and which, if attained, will provide a point of 
departure from which we can later undertake more ambitious projects, military and civilian, inside and 
outside SVN. Such subsequent projects would include combined and increased military political-
economic pressure on DRV, intensification of the in-country anti-VC effort, expansion of force goals 
for military and police forces, and the initiation of medium-term economic, social and psychological 
programs. 
For planning purposes, we are taking February 1, 1965 as the target date for the short-term objectives 
(Annex 1). However, we are in doubt as to the feasibility of even approaching these objectives without 
finding some means in the immediate future for sustaining morale and encouraging a despondent 
country grown tired of the strains of the counterinsurgency struggle. We have only one reasonably 
certain way to provide this stimulant—by military actions (we are thinking primarily of air strikes) 
against the DRV which will do damage to the sources of VC strength along the infiltration routes and to 
a limited degree in NVN itself. For maximum morale effect, the existence and results of these actions 
need to be known, at least in part, in SVN. Furthermore, some U.S. participation is required to impart 
sense of U.S. willingness in future to share in necessary action to stop DRV support and direction of 
VC. (This also important as corresponding signal to Hanoi.) It is a delicate matter, however, to execute 
such operations because of the danger of premature escalation at a time when the new government is 
inadequate to provide leadership to the country and to use its resources to contain the probable VC-DRV 
reaction which might result from any significant air campaign against DRV. 
Our partial solution to this dilemma is to introduce into the short term military program an expansion of 
34–A operations to include limited air strikes against North, an intensification of the actions against 
infiltration targets in the Laotian corridor, and reprisal strikes for major VC depredations as required. 
There are presently only 10 qualified VNAF pilots available for such covert air strikes so that their 
scope would necessarily be limited. Our thought is that the Laotian Air Force should continue to play 
the leading part in air attacks in the corridor but we would get agreement for increased U.S. participation 
from Souvanna in order to indicate the U.S. commitment needed to encourage the GVN, as well as 
perhaps the RLG. (Some thoughts on this were contained in Embtel 1415 3 3. Document 406. reporting 





































































This document was added in plain text to the FRUS collections in order to facilitate 
searching. However for the sake of validity and source accuracy it is important to note 
that each document was added verbatim from the original document. Here is a copy of 








An issue that came up during this stage was a lack of specificity of some of the 
requests from U.S. officials to the GVN. This phenomenon was not unique to Vietnam, 
and is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 on methodology. Several “demands” are 
not requests for the adoption of specific policies so much as they are general goals 
including stability, prosperity, or security. These aspirations are too general to effectively 
monitor in terms of compliance or coercion. Therefore goals such as the following were 
not included in the study: “(a)… reinforce and accelerate the progress already made; 
(b)… markedly improve the interdiction of infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and 
supplies; (c)… upgrade, accelerate, and coordinate the pacification program in the 
countryside; and (d)… maintain political and economic stability and support the 
development of the constitutional process.”594 
Accelerating progress, improving interdiction, upgrading pacification, and 
developing constitutional processes sounds impressive, but they are ends, the results of 
reform, not means to reform. Only requests that specifically outlined policies for the 
GVN to adopt in order to achieve goals such as the ones above were included in the 
database, including demands such as adopt “Project Take-Off,” a specific pacification 
strategy that later became the “Phoenix” program, which was designed to upgrade 
pacification, and form an advisory council to draft a new constitution in 1966, intended 









Step 2 - Determine the Compliance Outcome of the Given Demand, and the 
Relevant Conditions for the Demand 
Once specific demands from the U.S. to Saigon have been identified it is possible 
to trace what happens to each of those demands. This requires carefully monitoring 
compliance as well as the critical factors that seem to influence compliance. This 
database tracked the outcome of compliance by searching though the following sources:  
1. Foreign Relations of the United States (for follow up documents discussing what 
happened to requests made by the U.S. to the GVN) 
 
2. The four volumes of the Pentagon Papers 
 
3. Digital National Security Archive (DNSA)  
 
4. Declassified Document Reference System (DDRS)  
 
5. Online U.S government document repositories including usaid.gov and dtic.mil 
 
6. Secondary sources, including historical accounts of the U.S. war in Vietnam and 
articles on the U.S.-GVN alliance.  
 
Most of the time, evidence was found in primary source documents. For example, one of 
the requests given in the document reproduced above, “Initiate a program for the 
improvement of the port of Saigon and the Saizon River channel”595 is discussed in the 
document below, a memo from December 1966, declassified by the Lyndon Johnson 
Presidential Library in 1994 and available online via the Declassified Documents 
Reference System (DDRS).  
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This information is then coded and collected in a database, following the rules outlined 




Appendix B:  
CHART COMPARING TYPES OF DEMANDS MADE BY FOREIGN ALLIES 
ACROSS COUNTERINSURGENCY WARS 
 
Category of 








U.S. in Vietnam: Form elected village executive councils 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Institute local government 
India in Sri Lanka: Increase provincial autonomy (devolution) 
U.S. in Iraq: Pass provincial powers legislation 




U.S. in Vietnam: Offer Amnesty/Reconciliation 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Offer Political Settlement 
India in Sri Lanka: Amnesty to militants who surrender arms 
                                      Detainees to be released if all groups enter negotiations 
U.S. in Iraq: Amnesty and National Reconciliation Plan and Legislation  
U.S. in Afghanistan: Jirgas on Peace and Integration Policy 
 
Include Opposition in 
Government 
U.S. in Vietnam: Appoint opposition leaders to new Government 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Negotiate with tribal and religious leaders to       
                                             “attract” them to “the side of the party” 
India in Sri Lanka: Announce openings for Tamils in Government 
                                   Prominent Tamil Leaders to participate in elections 
U.S. in Iraq: Cease sectarian  appointments 
                       Urge prominent Sunnis to engage in the draft constitution 
U.S. in Afghanistan: Retain Internationals from UNAMA and ISAF on the  




U.S. in Vietnam: Advisory Council to Draft Constitution 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Enact a Constitution 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: Forming Constitutional Review Committee (CRC)  




U.S. in Vietnam: Route funds directly to province, make Province  
                               Chief the key figure in pacification efforts 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Institute local government 
India in Sri Lanka: Increase provincial autonomy (devolution) 
U.S. in Iraq: Pass provincial powers legislation 
U.S. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands – already highly decentralized]  
 
Limit Clientelism 
U.S. in Vietnam: Promotion Based on Merit and ARVN Efficiency  
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Stop Purging the Military 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: Cease sectarian appointments  
                       Cease politically motivated prosecutions 
U.S. in Afghanistan: Merit-based Appointments of Key Ministers  
 
 
Direct Talks with 
Enemies 
U.S. in Vietnam: Offer to Talk to the NLF 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Bilateral Talks with Pakistan and Iran  




U.S. in Iraq: Increased negotiated cease-fires 
U.S. in Afghanistan: [No demands on similar issues in database, but it has 





U.S. in Vietnam: Land Reform 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Land Reform 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: Agricultural reform / increased privatization 




U.S. in Vietnam: Increase funds for youth programs 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Organize youth programs – especially for students 
India in Sri Lanka: Rehabilitate Militant Youths 
U.S. in Iraq: Fund militia reintegration programs 
                         young militia members to receive training 





U.S. in Vietnam: Vocational Training for Graduating Students 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands] 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: Support vocational training 
U.S. in Afghanistan: Services and Vocational Training for Former Child  





U.S. in Vietnam: Simplify Import Procedures 
                                  Require Advanced Deposit by Importers 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Economic Expansion – Domestic & Foreign Trade 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: Expanding microfinance and SME lending 
                        Limit private sector subsidies  
U.S. in Afghanistan: Transit Trade with Pakistan 
                                      Conclude APTTA Agreement 




U.S. in Vietnam: Limit spending to prevent inflation 
                                   Increase certain taxes 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands] 
India in Sri Lanka: Establish Finance Commission 
U.S. in Iraq: State banking reform program  
                         Increase certain taxes 
U.S. in Afghanistan: Registration and Oversight for Hawalas  
                                      Anti-Money Laundering Law  
 
Focus on Rural 
Populations 
U.S. in Vietnam: Expand Rural Electrification 
                                  Credit to Farmers 
                                  Distribute New Seed Varieties 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Organize Poverty Committees – Win Over Peasants 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Afghanistan: Contribute to Electricity Development Projects 
 
Religious Leaders 
U.S. in Vietnam: Revitalize Inter-Religious Council 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: Fractionalize Mullahs  - Divide Religious Leaders 
India in Sri Lanka: [No similar demands] 
U.S. in Iraq: Protections for minority political and religious parties 
U.S. in Afghanistan: Engage Religious Figures in Public Messaging 










U.S. in Vietnam: South Vietnam Take First Strikes Against North Vietnam 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands] 
India in Sri Lanka: Sri Lankan Forces to Stay Confined to Barracks 
                                   Out of Conflict in NE Region  
U.S. in Iraq: Increase Iraqi Security Forces Operating Independently 






U.S. in Vietnam: [No similar demands] 
U.S.S.R. in Afghanistan: [No similar demands] 
India in Sri Lanka: Civilian Volunteer Force (CVF) to be inducted into the  
                                   Reserve and Regular Police Forces 
U.S. in Iraq: Support Concerned Local Citizens (CLC), incorporating a  
                         percentage into ISF 
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